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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
As a local filmmaker I was compelled to film during the 34-day war waged by the 
Israeli government on Lebanon in July 2006. My questioning of the function of my 
images amidst the proliferating international and local live media images of that war 
led me to pursue an interdisciplinary research. This thesis project, presented partly as 
an installation and partly as a theoretical text, is the result of my research.  
 
My thesis argument and original contribution to knowledge is that ‘co-liveness’ has 
become inherent in the act of watching live war since the first televised live broadcast 
of war (The First Gulf War, 1991). I have defined co-liveness as the local citizens’ 
experience of war as an embodied reality and as a mediatised event turning them 
simultaneously into potential targets and media spectators.  
 
My colleagues’ non-recognition of ‘co-liveness’ in my edited sequences leads me to 
question how the factual/fictional construct of what counts as an image of war is 
recognised revealing the ‘technostrategic discourse’ (Cohn, 1987) as a recognisable 
language/view from a gun/air raid perspective. 
 
Michel Foucault’s “return to the origin” (1977) inspires the analysis of the framing of 
first Gulf War (1991) and its critique as ‘infotainment’ and ‘spectacle’, as discursive 
practices where foundational omissions are inscribed in a critique that perceives all 
spectators to be distant to war’s materiality. A diffractive reading enables me to 
propose an imaginary co-live perspective on the margins of the text. 
 
The accompanying installation “Fragments” is conceived through the combined 
influences of ‘Détournement’ (Debord, 1958), the ‘Parergon’ (Derrida, 1979) and 
‘Articulation’ (Haraway, 1992) where every visitor’s trajectory maps a personal 
interaction with the elements on display. Co-presence lends a renewed reading to 
what it means to ‘watch war’ when visitors share their impressions in a final 
discussion. 
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PREFACE 
 
The topic of war preoccupied me for a long time before I engaged in this research, 
having punctuated a large part of my childhood and adolescence, later becoming the 
main theme of my fiction films. It was as a civilian whose immediate family members 
did not partake in the fighting that I experienced the intermittent wars constituting 
what came to be known as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), and it was as a 
civilian and filmmaker that I experienced the July 2006 Lebanon war, filming without 
any intention to turn my images into a research by practice. I am stressing the civilian 
aspect of my experience because of its pertinence to my own camera placement, and 
therefore to the perspective of the images that I filmed at the time, and to my 
subsequent mode of address in my thesis. My access to the visibility of the 2006 war 
came from inside the house where I stayed with my grandmother and from public 
spaces that were (supposedly) not being targeted. The Israeli army’s air raids drafted 
differential zones of security within the country separating those who were going to 
be spared and those who would be targeted, while keeping everybody under the threat 
of potential accidents. Although my grandmother’s house was not in a regularly 
targeted area, the frequent air raids that were labelled either as ‘accidental’ or ‘tactical’ 
meant that all residents were potential targets. 
 
When the Israeli government waged war on Lebanon in July 2006, I had been filming 
intermittently in Beirut since 2001 around my preoccupation with a feeling of a 
pending war. I continued filming, but now it was the July 2006 war’s course in my 
(and my family’s) daily life that took over. “There are situations,” writes Slavoj Zizek 
on the topic of violence, “when the only truly practical thing to do is to resist the 
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temptation to engage immediately and to ‘wait and see’ by means of a patient, critical 
analysis.”1 I waited for three more years following the end of the July 2006 war 
before engaging with the footage I had filmed. However these years of waiting came 
from a sense of disappointment and were not the result of calculated patience. Before 
my introduction I would like to elaborate the reasons why I have pursued a research 
by practice instead of the post-production path that I would have normally followed 
and to contextualize the choices behind my writing style as a guideline for the reader.  
 
1. A re-generative practice  
 
Unedited mini-DV tapes gathered in a drawer in my Beirut flat between 2001 and the 
early summer months of 2006. Containing recordings of intermittent filming, they 
seemed like an endless project in the making. I lived in the United States most of 
these years and filmed every time I went back to Beirut to visit my family. Distance 
from the routine of life in Beirut exacerbated my impression that the city was prey to 
a continued and continuous pending threat making citizens (myself included) live in a 
constant state of ‘waiting for the next war’. I then thought that filming Beirut (its 
streets, some moments with my family, road trips with friends, etc.) where my 
memories of the civil war persisted would make me understand the quotidian that 
produced this tension. However, what my footage mostly revealed is the manner in 
which the city reflects the conflicted local and regional perspectives leading to the 
sensation of perpetually ‘waiting for the next war’. Anthropologist Sami Hermez’s 
doctoral thesis entitled ‘In the Meanwhile: Living everyday in anticipation of violence 
                                                
1 Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London: Profile Books, 2008), 6. 
 11 
in Lebanon’ (2011),2 spells out the very nature of the sensation I was seeking to 
capture on film. Hermez sees anticipation of war as part of the mundane suggesting 
that “it is a practice that moves elusively in duration and is not confined to a specific 
moment in time.”3 As a way of living, of speaking, of being, the anticipation of 
violence for Hermez constantly makes “the past fold into the present.”4 In my 
countless conversations with Hermez, I understood the complexity of the anticipation 
of war as a structure that is inscribed in the routine of daily life, in the regional 
political climate, and in the intricacies of language with its enmeshment in individual 
memories of the Lebanese Civil War. It was in the early summer months of 2006 that 
I returned to settle in Beirut. For all the filming around the anticipation of war, the 
onset of the July 2006 war as a daily reality was shocking. I borrowed a friend’s video 
camera during the 34-day siege fuelled by disbelief at the sudden extensive use of 
violence and by a compulsiveness to document its traces in my immediate 
surroundings. For myself, and for many people that I filmed and interviewed during 
that war, an overall sensation of being at an impasse and expecting no political 
solutions was a feeling that was often verbalized and fuelled by the Israeli 
government’s actual and psychological warfare (through leaflets, drones, random 
phone calls offering rewards in exchange of information). Additionally, the 24-hour 
media visibility of the resulting deaths of civilians and the destruction of Lebanon’s 
infrastructure continuously asserted the technological superiority of Israeli military 
equipment.  
                                                
2 Sami Hermez, “Living everyday in anticipation of violence in Lebanon” (PhD diss., Princeton 
University, 2011). 
3 Sami Hermez, “The war is going to ignite: On the anticipation of violence in Lebanon” Political and 
Legal Anthropology Review (2012):328, accessed May 11th, 2013: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1555-2934.2012.01206.x/abstract 
4 Hermez, “The war is going to ignite,” 341 
 12 
 
“How can the world just watch and do nothing?” was a persistent question repeatedly  
asked by interviewees on camera. I realize now that what this question raises is the 
degree of responsibility one human being has towards another, and brings to the 
forefront an important consideration as to the relationship between the visible as 
knowable in the media (the world watches, therefore the world knows), and the 
awaited action that could produce the change that would stop the course of war. As 
John Ellis writes: “Events on the screen make a mute appeal: ‘You cannot say you did 
not know’,” adding that this produces: “an aching sense that something must be 
done.”5 The sensation that something must be done acknowledges that the quest for 
peace during war resides in others, ‘others’ being citizens of the countries that are not 
under attack. The people who ask this question ponder whether the so-called world is 
incapacitated or does not care. Yet the complaint about the silence of those who watch 
and cannot act or re-act masks the fact that we too watch, we in that case being the 
citizens living war just as we had watched on TV other wars in other cities. There are 
clearly degrees of incapacitation operating in different countries, and if watching 
means knowing then it is a form of knowing that does not enable immediate change. 
The immediacy required in war is suppressed by the military technology which 
functions at a speed far superior to the time it takes decisions makers to reflect on the 
next step that could halt violence. That question opens up another, namely that of 
filming war (or what to film of war), since watching comes as a result of someone 
having filmed which, in the case of media institutions, is (and has been since 1991) 
live. Watching live war can result in fear, anxieties, muteness, activism, indifference 
etc., and is not quantifiable since it varies from one individual to another and may 
                                                
5 John Ellis, Seeing Things: Television in Age of Uncertainty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 11. 
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well be cumulative. In my case it was detrimental to my ability to bring my film 
project into completion. 
 
The end of the July 2006 war left me with a sense of utter disappointment. People 
died, families were displaced, and bridges and buildings had fallen and as the daily 
reconstruction started fast, my own video images became dated and they reasserted 
our incapacity (mine, others’, and the world’s) to stop the course of war while 
watching it on TV, living it on a daily basis, and filming its traces. My footage 
reminded me how quickly adaptation to war’s course and to its end takes place and 
how the persistence of life’s quotidian motions helps one to incorporate and negotiate 
daily notions of danger and impending violence. This was an adaptation to a forced 
fate however, and not to a choice of life and self-realization, for who would choose 
war as a means of growth? Life and death here belonged to the whims of politicians 
and soldiers taking orders and my own images only asserted that my everyday life in 
Beirut (consisting of pre-war, war, and post-war in repeating cycles) deepened my 
alienation between life’s course (with its hopes, loves, dreams and yearnings) and its 
resulting images (waiting for war, living war, adapting to war). My images revealed 
to me how random this war was in its beginning and ending and yet how impactful on 
my everyday life for years to come, as this research attests. 
 
I’d like to borrow feminist theorist Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘regeneration’ from 
her philosophical reflections on science and technology to reflect on why my own 
images (videos as well as photographs) may have become non-regenerative in the 
immediate wake of the end of the 2006 war. “For salamanders” Haraway writes, 
“regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure 
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and restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd 
topographical productions at the site of former injury,” adding that “we have all been 
injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth.”6 Using the hybridity 
between humans and machines visible in cyborg imagery, Haraway calls for 
abandoning myths of (re)birth and the categories that separate the technological from 
the natural, in order to find ways in which the bodily and the technological can be 
explored as complementary. War creates multiple sites of injury where the 
technological and the bodily always clash (through the destruction of places and of 
bodies) and/or combine (through the reconstruction of places and of bodies). A 
process of regeneration necessarily starts just as war ends, as the rubble is cleaned, the 
dead are counted and mourned, and the realization of what happened slowly settles in 
requiring adaptation to a changed life. It is precisely in the interconnectedness 
between the latest military technology of war and the helplessness of bodies that my 
confusion grew. Drones, for instance, that I learned to hear and detect, (and was told 
not to film because my camera would appear to be a weapon to its operator) were 
technological vision-weapons and they placed (us) local citizens under constant 
surveillance and the threat of an impending strike. The soldiers who operated these 
remote-vision killer machines were akin to invisible cyborgs capable of striking 
anyone they wanted from a distance, and through the recorded vision of a camera lens. 
The video camera in my hands was also akin to additional mechanical eyes and 
revealed, parallel to my own vision, my quotidian life through its recorded image. 
Mine were embodied and private records whereas the camera on the drone took aerial 
images of me as a potential target. Both cameras turned a life-course into recordable 
and visible bits of information to be used for very different purposes, one enabling the 
                                                
6 Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto For Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s”, in The Haraway Reader (New York: Routledge, 2004), 38 
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killing of a life in its course, the other attempting to preserve the personal memory of 
the traces of war in daily life. Additionally, the internalized and imagined 
visualizations of how Beirut appears through the drones and bomber planes’ sighting 
devices (available on the internet) competed with local media’s live camera angles 
revealing the resulting destruction. In the midst of so many competing angles of 
recorded sights, a forced and an imposed fusion between the technological and the 
embodied experience of war was taking place with a violence that I had not felt prior 
to that war. It is what I have proposed naming ‘co-liveness’ in my thesis, that is, for a 
local citizen the hybrid space between the living body’s experience of war (with 
smells, sights, and presence on the ground), and its live mediatisation. My growing 
scepticism towards the production and dissemination of images as part of the natural 
and expected flow of evidence of war, and my incapacity to process the significance 
of so much imagery while experiencing war as a material reality, led me to pursue 
research as a regenerative practice. 
 
In order for the technological and the bodily to merge, or for regeneration, as 
Haraway calls it, to take place when the technological (as drones, as air raids, and as 
live TV images of death through air raids) had been antagonistic, a practice that 
questioned and reflected upon what it means to record sight in contemporary wars 
became necessary. My research is a modest step in that direction. When everyone 
possesses and uses cameras (from armies, media institutions, fighters, to civilians 
with phones) and when there is no lack of space to post the results (TV, the internet, 
portable phones) it is important to situate whose sight is being recorded (a soldiers’, a 
citizen’s, an institution’s), to determine its angle (space, the air, the ground, an office 
far away, the house) and to understand how it gets translated in order to create 
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meaning. Does the recording of sight sustain war, does it suppress others, does it 
teach one how to resist, does it seek a common ground, does it demonize, etc.? 
 
The performativity of war was and continues to be a topic of inquiry for various 
Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese filmmakers and artists some of whose works 
question in content and in form the production (and suppression) of the meaning and 
memory(ies) of war7. By way of example, Ghassan Salhab’s feature film Beyrouth 
Fantôme (1998) poetically addresses the fictionalization of war by weaving a thread 
between fiction and non-fiction. Interspersed within the film’s narration, the films’ 
protagonists (who presumably grew up in Lebanon during the years of the civil war) 
look into the camera lens and relay the ongoing anxieties that the years of the 
Lebanese civil war left them with. Thus the non-fictional traces of a real war that 
turned into a memory merge into the fictional war of the film revealing their 
inextricability and the ungraspable, yet persistent marks of violence in the performers’ 
psyches. Actor, writer, director, musician and artist Rabih Mroué’s lecture-
performances, installations and videos equally explore the material traces left by the 
Lebanese civil war unsettling the fixity of meanings in the act of interpreting images. 
In Make me stop smoking (2006) for instance, Mroué displays a personal archive of 
videos, photographs and images that he had been collecting for many years and uses 
them to reconstruct and narrate to his public what may or may not have taken place 
revealing how, for every individual memory, fabrications, truth, and fiction 
continuously merge to produce meaning. Mroué plays himself and other personas in 
                                                
7 To name a few artists who have been exploring the traces and narratives of the Lebanese civil war 
since the late nineties: Lamia Joreige, Rabih Mroué, Lina Saneh, Akram Zaatari, Joanna Hadgithomas, 
Khalil Joreige, Walid Sadek, Tony Chakar, Walid Raad amongst others whose individual works often 
probe the fluid borders between film, performance, video art, architecture, and archives. 
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his performances disrupting the notion of separateness between self and others, while 
juggling with the figure of the witness/actor in war. Similarly, filmmaker, artist, and 
photographer Akram Zaatari’s films and installations question the fluid line that runs 
between rumours, silences, and official histories of war. His installation entitled 
“Letter to a Refusing Pilot” (2013) for instance is evocative of a side-shadowing8 
poetic proposition where the horror of what ‘might have been’ is subtly intertwined 
with the melancholy of ‘what has been’. Zaatari’s installation is based on a rumour he 
heard during the 1980’s about the refusal of an Israeli pilot to follow his superior’s 
orders to target a school in his hometown in Sidon and who released his bombs into 
the sea instead. Zaatari later realized that what he thought was an urban legend was 
the real story of an Israeli pilot who spoke publicly about his refusal after ten years of 
silence. Weaving an ominous music track into video images of the quotidian daily life 
of the pupils attending the school, Zaatari evokes the threat of the potential bombs 
that never materialized. In his installation, the fragility of life (where schoolchildren 
nature, ants, and the breeze that makes the paper rockets in the hands of schoolboys 
fly, and his memories all interconnect) seems to be always in danger of extinction. It 
is one soldier’s decision to disobey that maintains the pulsating rhythms of a life of 
incalculable possibilities in Zaatari’s installation. 
 
The installation format was not one that I had explored in depth prior to this research. 
But the freedom of looking at images as traces rather than as carriers of fixed stories 
led me to a deeper understanding of the complex interrelatedness between war and its 
representations. In my installation entitled “Fragments”, submitted alongside this text 
                                                
8 In his book Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History (1994) Michael André Bernstein 
proposes to fight against foregone conclusions and claims that embracing the technique of side-
shadowing (or what could have happened) allows for the untold possibilities to be taken into 
consideration, thus opening up the richness and mystery of the continued interpretation of life 
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and elaborated upon throughout this thesis, the combinations of texts, photographs, 
video sequences, computer images, and my co-presence with visitors revealed how 
different interactions with the materiality of war (from a distance, from proximity, as 
a fiction, as news, as a grandparent’s story) produce and alter the reception of the 
meaning of the images. Just as my practice became more relational, its regenerative 
potential was revealed to me and my research tools (video editing, writing, and setting 
up the installation space on three different occasions) turned into the constitutive 
means of a project that is (continuously) in a state of ‘becoming’ and that can only be 
complemented through my interactions with others. For that reason, my thesis 
structure details my research journey through my exchanges with colleagues, and 
reveals how these exchanges branched to lead me to explore existing scholarship on 
the representation of war. 
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2. On the linguistic and the visual 
 
The “linguistic” and the “visual” can't be neatly distinguished 
because their relation is not one of binary opposition, negation, 
logical antinomy, or even dialectic in the usual sense. Word 
and image are more like ships passing in the night, two storm-
tossed barks on the sea of the unconscious signaling to each 
other.9 
 
             W.J.T Mitchell 
 
I propose that the reader approach this thesis as a practice in words and in images 
rather than as a research divided into separate categories of theory and practice. My 
research is anchored in practice and where practice initially referred to my 
filmmaking practice that I questioned during war, it later came to designate the 
processes of editing my footage, writing my thesis, sharing and co-learning. The tools 
I used to engage with my research are verbal and visual and they combine and clash 
to reveal the limits inherent in the verbal and visual representations of war. These 
tools led to a map of the spatial and temporal interactions with my colleagues 
allowing my research to take shape. In London, new angles on war and its 
representation were revealed to me that I had not previously reflected upon. 
Becoming a subject of study, ‘air raids’ transformed from being loud terrifying 
sounds into two words written on a historical timeline whose development for 
military science could be traced in books and whose impact could be analysed in war 
images. My experiences too had turned into digital images that I carried around and 
excavated for meanings. Although distance from ‘war’ as a daily anticipation allowed 
                                                
9Andrew McNamara, “Words and Pictures in the Age of the Image: An Interview with W.J.T. 
Mitchell”,Eyeline, 30 (1996): 16-21, accessed November 10, 2012: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/4620/ 
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me to engage in quiet reflection I understood that reading and writing about ‘war’ in 
general might constitute the trap of ‘objectivity’ that would lead me away from the 
materiality of war. The July 2006 war had produced a sense of urgency that I did not 
wish to put aside as irrelevant. The search for the interconnectedness between 
language and weapons (or where to position my new self as opposed to my old self in 
a practice that reflects on war) led me to a seminal text by the feminist scholar Carol 
Cohn, entitled “Sex and Death in the World of Rational Defense Intellectuals” (1987). 
Cohn writes that by learning the language of nuclear strategists (which she refers to as 
‘Technostrategic’) she almost lost her own (which she refers to as ‘English’): 
“Speaking the expert language not only offers distance, a feeling of control, and an 
alternative focus for one’s energies, it also offers escape. Escape from thinking 
oneself as a victim of nuclear war.”10 Cohn discusses this as a linguistic position 
giving power to the speaker in relation to the subject and eliminating some of the 
notions that she wanted to address, such as ‘peace’ and ‘human suffering’. Cohn’s 
text confirmed my hesitancy to fully embrace a new language by affirming that for a 
victim of war language is embodied, subjective and thus never distanced from the 
feelings of pain and mourning. I understood I would have to withstand the same 
challenge with critical analysis for it provided me with a linguistic stance that 
distanced me from my own emotions. The sense of loss and of mourning had 
propelled my choice to pursue a research. Negating my emotions was not my aim, but 
learning how to incorporate them in my critical reflection was. My thesis thus 
expresses both my lived experience of war and my distance from it through a constant 
back and forth changing of linguistic and visual registers that are nonetheless 
                                                
10 Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, 12, no.4 (Summer, 1987): 706, accessed May 15, 2013: 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3174209?uid= 3738432&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102491046607 
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subjective. Using the analogy of a camera, critical reflection and self-reflexivity 
represent the different lenses that I use, while I remain the person operating the 
camera from a subjective and situated position. Feminist epistemology posits situated 
knowledge as the embodied way of knowing life first through its direct experience 
and through its effects on the body. Yet situated knowledge, for Haraway, neither 
denotes authenticity nor absolves one from responsibility, but only asserts the 
partiality of experience and serves to abolish the illusion that one angle denotes 
objectivity. The situatedness of my body and therefore my knowledge as a civilian 
who has lived and feared the violence of war is the position from which I wrote and is 
by no means privileged, superior, nor is it inferior, to other positions, but it is one that 
I have inhabited and aimed to understand more deeply in my pursuit of research in 
London. Presented with a different font (e.g., Baskerville in pages 27, 28, 29, 30), the 
self-reflexive parts of this thesis are meant to question how mundane dealings with 
war produce bodily knowledge (Fear, for instance, is the embodied knowledge of 
danger). They may alter a reader’s reception of the information shared, may lessen or 
sharpen its authoritativeness, may question it, etc., but invariably are meant to 
question what knowledge of war is, from where and from whom does is it generate 
and in which form/at (namely form and format) is it considered viable. In this sense, 
the text remains open to interaction and exchange reflecting the fragmented 
structuring principle of my accompanying installation where, as noted, visitors could 
walk and experience different views of war (personal, military, media).  In both the 
text and the installation, I aspire to implement filmmaker and theorist Trinh T. Min-
Ha’s recommendation, in her essay about representation, otherness, and authority: “It 
is crucial to bring about ways of looking and of reflecting that make it impossible to 
engage on a subject (the content, the cause) without engaging at the same time the 
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question of how (by what means) it is materialized and how meaning is inter-
produced in the process.”11 It is my hope that Minh-ha’s question of how it has 
materialized is continuously revealed in this thesis through the fragmentation of the 
text to draw from the installation and vice versa.  
 
 
3. The articulation of co-liveness through reflection and diffraction 
 
Self-reflexivity and critical analysis have enabled the articulation (rather than the 
representation) of co-liveness as my main thesis argument. Co-liveness is a space that 
exists at the intersection between the experiential embodiment and materiality of war 
as it happens (and is therefore a present-tense), and its simultaneous mediatisation. By 
the time I wrote about it, co-liveness had turned into the lived memory of the 
embodiment of war and into the recorded signal of its mediatisation (in my own 
footage). A filmed image of co-liveness turns its experiential and embodied side into 
an image of civilians watching war on television erasing the material reality of war 
and removing the capacity for action or the imposed inaction inherent within that 
space.  Donna Haraway uses the term articulation in lieu of representation to reveal 
the ‘artifactualism’12 of nature (or how we perceive/construct nature, as she says 
through fiction and fact) writing: “To articulate is to signify. It is to put things 
together, scary things, risky things, contingent things.”13 Articulation has allowed me 
                                                
11 Trinh T. Minh-ha, “World as a Foreign Land,” in When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, 
Gender, and Cultural Politics (New York/London: Routledge, 1991), 198. 
12 The French philosopher Jacques Derrida elaborates on the artifactuality of Televised liveness, where 
factuality is made into an artifice, as elaborated further in the body of the thesis. Artifactualism in 
Haraway’s writing points to the non-divisiveness of the categories of nature/culture and fact/fiction. 
13 Donna Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others,” in 
The Haraway Reader (New York: Routledge, 2004), 106. 
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to look for new ways to express co-liveness instead of attempting to represent it 
within a filmed image. For Haraway articulation does not rely on reflection (or that 
which creates a duplicate image) but operates through diffraction (akin to a ray of 
light that spreads to reveal interference patterns): “an articulated world has an 
undecidable number of modes and sites where connections can be made.”14 By way of 
example it is precisely through the articulation of the multiplicity of my colleagues’ 
reactions to my own footage that I was able to perceive how my images diffracted 
into different readings. Co-liveness was only visible to colleagues who had recently 
experienced war as civilians but appeared like images of watching war without any 
perceivable physical danger inherent to that space to others who had only known war 
through images. In taking into account this difference in perception, and in noting this 
as a diffraction path, my research branched in order to find the parameters that make a 
war image recognizable.  
 
Although Haraway considers reflection to be merely transposing a mirror image of 
the same and therefore merely reflecting the same pattern or problematic into a new 
space, I view the process of reflection as inherent to vision, and to the camera’s 
functioning, and therefore an essential component to my research aims. Reflection (as 
self-reflexivity), diffraction (as a registering of interference patterns), and critical 
analysis are complementary methods of inquiry for me. In short, it is through effects 
of reflection and diffraction that this thesis took shape, and itself can be seen as an 
artifactual articulation of questions, emotions, and reflections about the representation 
of war that my research journey in London has enabled. 
 
                                                
14 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters” 
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4. The chapters 
 
It is important to note that my thesis project neither proposes a new theory of liveness 
nor suggests a model for the representation of live war, and despite the fact that it is 
guided by feminist epistemology and situated knowledge it does not engage with the 
analysis of gender and war, itself a complex topic worthy of a separate study. I have 
approached my thesis project as a practicing filmmaker and my aim is to observe how 
proximity and distance to the materiality of war impacts the reception of its 
mediatisation and to suggest additional angles for rethinking the complexity of the 
role of image making during war.  
 
The chapters of my thesis reconstruct my research journey beginning in Chapter 1 
with recollections of the July 2006 war (Harb Tammuz) when competing versions of 
live war were at once useful to map areas of safety, and paralyzing by the sheer 
quantity of violent information. My argument in this chapter is that live war has rarely 
been observed from the place of reception of air raids. Elaborating on my research 
aims my research question is proposed as finding methods that would allow me to 
reveal the interconnectedness between the experience of war and its mediatisation 
(co-liveness), to counter the view of war as a spectacle, and to explore the inherent 
ambiguities in any attempt at representing war. 
 
The process of watching and editing sequences from the footage I filmed during the 
2006 July war is explored in Chapter 2. I question what makes a war image 
recognizable when two edited sequences showing my grandmother watching live war 
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on local television are perceived by my colleagues as ‘not looking like war’. My 
argument in this chapter is that my colleague’s non-perception of co-liveness is 
inseparable from what happens in the hors-champs (out-of-frame) of the material TV 
set itself. While war continues through the night and after the TV has been turned off 
for some viewers, (Lebanese viewers in this case), others, living at a distance from 
war, fail to perceive the co-existence of the materiality of war and its live 
mediatisation. Noting that my colleagues’ perceptions are diffractions of their 
experiences of war, I decide to maintain co-presence as a constitutive learning 
element in my research project. Guy Debord’s ‘Détournement’ (1958), Jacques 
Derrida’s ‘Parergon’ (1979) and Donna Haraway’s ‘Articulation’ (1992), are explored 
as having influenced the building blocks of “Fragments”. In the fragmented and 
exploratory space, cohesion is maintained through co-presence where I gather with 
attendees at the end of their visit to exchange their immediate opinions and views.  
 
Chapter 3 explores what counts as an image of war through a short historical account. 
My argument in this chapter is that what Carol Cohn has called ‘the technostrategic 
discourse’ (1987) used by nuclear strategists, has been transposed into the visual 
framing of live war. Combining strategy and technology, it is the language/angle used 
by nuclear strategists to discuss war from a disembodied and aerial view. My 
argument in this chapter is that transhistoricity (looking at war as having a continuous 
narrative) and technotsrategy combined are what make a live war image recognizable 
rather than the view of war from the quotidian space of a local home where war is 
being waged.  
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In chapter 4, Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and look for foundational 
omissions leads me to analyse the first Gulf War on CNN (1990-1991) and the 
critiques of live war (war as a spectacle, as infotainment, as virtuality) as part of the 
discursive practices of live war. My argument in this chapter is that co-liveness 
remains a blind spot for critics of the first Gulf War CNN broadcast such as Paul 
Virilio, and Jean Baudrillard who do not theorize the local conception of war as an 
embodied danger that is mediatised at the same time. Inserting performative/ 
diffractive readings of fictional propositions that respond to the critique’s omissions I 
evoke co-liveness on the margins of the text itself.   
 
And finally, my conclusion reiterates the trajectory that my research took to take 
shape in the form of a text and an installation.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction: I am free 
 
 
 
 Someone’s body is sitting in a 
small plane. That body will 
never be mine, it is not mine. 
It’s a man’s body. He is smiling 
to the photographer, in black 
and white. The body is 
comfortable, seated in a plane 
flying over a city. This body 
can, with a move of the hand 
press a button to release a 
bomb and his eyes, still smiling, 
may never know the true 
impact of one hand move on 
other bodies. Newsreels 
watched for this research have 
often doubled me, whether in 
Hiroshima, Vietnam, Baghdad 
and Gaza turning me into the 
viewer of the aggression and 
the receiver of the bomb at 
once. I saw this scene in the 
countless photographs, and 
newsreels I watched for this 
research. I saw how the view 
from the plane makes it look 
like a mere piece of empty land 
on fire. Distance in the 
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photograph equates with the 
absence of other human bodies. 
Now I see why they insist, ‘they’ 
being the military spokesmen, 
that their wars are clean. For 
this soldier, it is clean. Between 
him and his target there are 
spaces and more spaces while 
his tiny space remains 
unaffected by his own actions 
 
 
   It is a duel between a finger 
and many invisible bodies. 
Blood is absent here and only 
dust rises to cover the view. If 
he could see it (the blood that 
is) he would not recognize it as 
human anyway. Everything on 
his screen is black, white or 
green. It is the colour of the 
blood of aliens in Hollywood 
science-fiction movies. If he 
could see it, blood that is, 
would he stop, turn around, 
doubt, and maybe like that 
pilot I heard about fly back to 
his home and refuse to obey 
orders? 
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        The year: 2006.  
A war was waged by 
technologically equipped 
democratic bodies, or were 
they democratically equipped 
technological bodies?  
I walked a street, my feet 
were on the ground but the 
soldier’s feet watching me 
remained invisible to me. 
Where were they?  I would’ve 
liked to throw a stone straight 
into the camera lens of the 
it/he/she/there (what I 
learned to call a drone) as it 
followed me in a small Beirut 
street. A flying object, a 
buzzing sound controlled by a 
he or a she, sitting there in 
another country. It terrorized 
me with a camera and 
enslaved me to a possible 
death. But I was free to run 
away. And I was free to be 
followed, tracked, and 
surveilled. “You are free to be 
arrested, imprisoned and even 
hanged,” 15  the Turkish poet 
Nâzım Hikmet wrote.  
                                                
15 Nâzım Hikmet Ran, “A Sad State of Freedom,” The Art of Marxism Poetry, accessed April 19, 2013, 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/art/literature/nazim/sadstate.html 
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Fig.1 
 
 
 
 Fig.2 
 
 
I was free to hear my city bombed by the latest technologies and I was even free to 
watch it on my television and to film it as I did, in between breakfasts, lunches, and 
dinners, and then to research it as I was compelled to do, and to write about it as I 
have done and continue to do. But, as the poet said: “this kind of freedom is a sad 
affair under the stars.”16 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Hikmet Ran, “A Sad State of Freedom”. 
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1.1 A newsreel from the eighties and a shipment of bombs in 2006 
 
Watching newsreel footage of Beirut being bombed relentlessly by the Israeli army 
during the 1980s, filmed in a panoramic angle with the camera placed right by the 
tank firing rockets startled me. Is this how Beirut was being bombed when I was 
growing up there? Although more than a decade had passed since the end of the 
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), these images left me with an irreconcilable 
sensation of an offence perpetrated twice. The first offence was the actual Israeli 
bombings of Beirut the scope of which I could not grasp at that age, as must have 
been the case for several Beirutis of my generation who were born in a city already at 
war. That offence was revived in the mediated environment of the Israeli soldier in a 
frame that sustained my gaze right on the Israeli tank and on a faceless soldier buried 
in the invisibility of his function and the commonality of his military role. With every 
new firing round of rockets I shuddered far more in front of the images than I did as a 
child residing in the city, or so it seemed to me as I tried to reconstruct my memory. 
These images made me aware of a new angle of vision, one that had never been my 
own. This was a military angle, a soldier’s viewpoint from his tank. The angle was 
static for the tank was placed far enough to know what it was targeting and the 
camera operator neither searched for the aim nor tried to predict where the explosion 
would occur. His video camera appeared to be a mere extension of the soldier’s 
weapon. My memory of my lived experience and that military camera angle had 
never stood face to face before. Watching these images was akin to being visually 
exposed to a foreign language, a language that displayed the source of the missing 
half of my predominantly aural memory of the Israeli bombing. No visual record of 
the mental space of my experience of war was recorded or recordable. It had moved 
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into a hazy space where reality and dreams mix to form a subjective and forever 
shifting mental image. The video images relocated me and made me part of the 
Israeli soldiers’ environment as they claimed precedence. I stood with the soldiers 
who were manning their tanks and I could even look behind them and around them as 
the cameraman’s lens moved about, whereas in my memory I remained with family 
members and neighbours in a dimly lit room, or was it a garage filled with strangers, 
or maybe even a staircase listening for the sound of metal ripping through stones? 
This military video managed to confuse my memory as well as my sense of 
responsibility, as I was able to detect in a couple of recurrent dreams. In those dreams 
I would see myself walking alongside Israeli soldiers as they prepared to launch 
missiles into Lebanon. Unable to communicate with the soldiers despite my presence 
amongst them, I wished to alter the course of their attacks but was incapacitated. I 
was invisible to them, and akin to a ghost who could only watch but not act. Inside 
the dream state, the thin material separation that was provided by the TV screen 
vanished to leave me standing right inside a video image’s unfolding of events whose 
outcome was not negotiable. When the image started with the launching of a rocket, 
the next one would be its landing.  
 
Although these presumed bombs did not actually kill me, for I sat watching the 
video, the framing managed to turn me into a ghost to my own lived experience, 
albeit symbolically. The frame asserted the absence, invisibility and unimportance of 
the local citizens being bombed and the interiority of the city’s houses was erased 
while the re-ordering of its external architecture was made visible through the 
massive destruction. There seemed to be no inside to this frame in which Beirut was 
turned into a mere cityscape or what could have been a pre-fabricated Hollywood set. 
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Additionally, the images claimed that this was an important day in the telling of the 
history of my city, demonstrating that my human capacity at recollection would 
never equal the video camera’s immortalizing of military operations in images. What 
was I doing on that particular day? Where was I sitting? I had no idea. As the images 
progressed, a reporter translated them to his (intended) audience. Standing by the 
tank, he stated that these bombs, though destructive, were only targeting the 
terrorists, implying that the complex notion of what defines and who categorizes 
terrorists was now programmable into weapons, and immediately detectable and 
destroyable by bombs. These images communicated in audio-visuals a military 
perspective inscribing the politically say-able within the see-able as image. In this 
instance the epistemology of war became invariably linked with the trajectory of the 
functionality of weapons and of the mediatized visibility of the weapons’ impact on 
cities. My direct experience that was neither indexed, nor documented, and that could 
only be accessed through a hazy process of recollection was momentarily muted by 
these images. But had I filmed my own hiding and waiting during the 1980s would 
that have changed the course of the bombing? Not really. These bombs did victimize 
and kill in action and in reality at the time, but the trace left by their representation 
can no longer kill anyone.  
 
The very production of these images in their choice of framing and distribution as 
images of war betrays the processes by which the practice of watching war from a 
military perspective is normalized. In defence of such a military war report it could 
be claimed that it is natural for soldiers in the army to kill and that these images only 
document this killing. “What is ideological” writes Trinh T. Minh-ha, “is often 
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confused with what is natural or biological, as is often implied in women’s context.”17 
In the context of men who become soldiers, killing is naturalized through the 
ideology of the ‘right to wage war’. Thus the ‘right to kill in war’ can only be 
exercised through the ideology of war whereas the removal of that context turns 
killing into a crime. Who gives that right, and who removes it? The ideology of the 
right to kill (and who gave these Israeli soldiers this right) is what the archival 
newsreel video images masked. The visibility of the military angle separates the act 
of war (and bombing) from its inception as a political perspective. The physical 
distance from the resulting impact on the bodies residing inside the city leaves an 
invisible-out-of-frame which is inhabited (so does the reporter assert) by bad people 
and therefore, killable people. In these images it is the techno-scientific progress of 
smart bombs (that can target Arab terrorists) that thus upstages the subjectivity of all 
the people in the filmed frame (and outside of it) grouping them into one reading. 
Thus the Israeli soldier, the reporter, as well as the targeted individuals are 
victimizers and victims, heroes and/or villains (depending on which side deciphers 
the frame), leaving no place for what is in-between and what lies outside of the 
perimeters of the visibility of war as an orchestrated, framed spectacle of punishment, 
explosions and fires. 
 
Unlike the delayed exposure time between my lived experience of the 1982 Israeli 
bombing of Beirut and my viewing of the newsreel of that bombing more than a 
decade later, it was common during the 2006 July War to simultaneously hear the 
Israeli air raids, see their live mediated transmission on various local and international 
channels, and receive additional information from the web. It became impossible to 
                                                
17  Trinh T. Minh-ha, “Questions of Images and Politics,” in When the Moon Waxes Red: 
Representation, Gender, and Cultural Politics (New York/London: Routledge, 1991), 149. 
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separate the immediate visibility of war’s targets (future and present) from the local 
civilians’ TV sets. One particular live war report on CNN struck me at the time as it 
revealed how watching live war maintained the sensation of the anticipation of 
violence during war (Hermez, 2011) through the airing of military information as 
‘objective’ news. 
 
The war started on the 12th of July 2006 with the Israeli military bombing of Lebanon 
and the enforcement of an air and naval blockade for a period of thirty-four days. A 
week into the war, I was at my grandmother’s house watching a CNN live report 
where the news anchor announced that a shipment of the latest smart bombs was soon 
to be flown from Washington via the UK to Israel to be used in the Lebanon war. I 
was angered at being exposed to this information while the city was being bombed. It 
is not that I preferred to be misinformed but this type of information asserted my 
position as a passive, incapacitated audience member watching my own city’s 
predetermined future. I understood that there was nothing I could do to stop or change 
that decision and my being informed of it through the media turned it at once into 
knowledge of a political decision as well as a position of power with the prediction of 
real (and violent) effects due to take place in the near future. Not only was the 
bombing to continue is what the live report implied, but audiences were informed of 
the means of its continuation in the name of objective news reporting.  
 
Educating viewers on the destructive and highly efficient capacities of the bombs in 
question, the CNN anchor was heedless of the open circulation of news and the 
geographic position of the viewers watching this report seemed irrelevant. This type 
of information did not alter the life of an American citizen living in New York City 
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for instance (unless they were related to someone in Lebanon, in which case it still 
asserted a general public impotence in the face of the decision to wage war), rather it 
reinforced the power dynamics between the United States and its allies versus 
Hezbollah, who were presented as a potential worldwide threat. Not only did the live 
report boast of the technological inequalities between the Israeli army and Hezbollah 
but it also foreshadowed the failure of political endeavours to stop the bombing. It 
projected scenes of destruction for days to come and announced the type of ‘recently 
invented’ bombs that would lead to the death of some Lebanese citizens in the near 
future. The thought that some of the citizens who died as a result of these bombs 
weeks later may have watched that live report on television, begs for a moment of 
reflection on the multiple effects (psychological as well as real) of such information. 
The anticipation of the arrival of the latest weapons is at once imposed and 
normalized through the news (for who can stop it once it’s been declared on TV?) and 
their usage on the local population is a non-negotiable (future) outcome. The satellite 
technology that serves to relay live news is revealed as a potential (visual) apparatus 
of punishment, which propels the creation of a time of anticipation of the visible 
effects of these smart bombs on other cities and other citizens (or of live war). For 
Michel Foucault, as cited by Hall, an apparatus of punishment is “inscribed in a play 
of power, and always linked to co-ordinates of knowledge.”18 As one of the local 
civilians who watched this live report I now had information which submitted me to 
the power of ‘smart bombs’, and was made just as invisible as in the 1980s newsreel 
report I’d mentioned earlier. This time however, it happened before the act of 
bombing had taken effect. In this instance, war and its proceedings were announced to 
local and non-local citizens as though they were a lethal injection and an inescapable 
                                                
18 Stuart Hall, “Foucault: Power, Knowledge, and Discourse” in Discourse Theory and Practice, A 
Reader, ed. Margaret Wetherell et al. (London: Sage, 2001), 75. 
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fate delivered as an objective news item before it turns into a future reality for some, 
and images of that reality for others. The normalization of the news items happened 
through placing the utmost importance on the type of arms deals that take place 
during war (and this is what my grandmother first commented upon a week later 
when we heard them). The media in this instance serves war’s aim acting as the 
institutionalized means to produce a discourse of power/knowledge and leading to the 
anticipation of war as a future (and anticipated) spectacle of punishment.  
 
Michel Foucault elaborated on the role of institutions (hospitals, prisons, universities) 
in enforcing power through a process of segregation and separation that produces 
discourses around madness, crime, etc. Taking the live war report of the shipment of 
smart bombs as an example, it segregates populations in a manner that is similar to 
that effected by a prison or a hospital. The live information addresses (while 
separating) those living outside of the borders of Lebanon from those living inside 
and presents them with a way of understanding and finding meaning in (or a discourse 
of) the July 2006 war on Lebanon. Foucault’s definition of discourse, as cited by Hall 
is relevant: “By discourse Foucault meant a group of statements which provide a 
language for talking about a way of representing the knowledge about a particular 
topic at a particular historical moment.”19 A military transaction between Israel and 
the United States, presented as ‘live news’ thus turns into the ‘future’ pre-ordained 
reality of a city’s destruction and as information (or knowledge) about the means. 
Although anyone who owns a TV set at home can presumably watch live war, the 
term watching unifies the how, what, who and when, whereas it is precisely in the 
detail that this watching can potentially turn into an extension of the act of waging 
                                                
19 Stuart Hall, “The Work of Representation” in Representation: Cultural Representations and 
Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Sage, 1997), 72. 
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war. The same live report (be it the one detailing the shipment of weapons, or the one 
revealing to my grandmother and I what the air raids we heard were targeting a week 
later) would have been received with a different necessity for engagement and action 
in another city (which is not to suggest that all Lebanese citizens reacted or felt 
similarly). 
 
A week into the airing of that report, air raids woke me up in the early hours of dawn 
and I headed to the living room where I found that my grandmother was also awake. 
She asked me if the new shipment of bombs that they mentioned in the news had 
arrived from Washington: “these air raids” she said “have a different sound from the 
ones used last week. I think they’re the new ones. Don’t you think so?” We turned the 
TV set on and watched the live news that relayed images of the targeted areas. My 
grandmother and I were, at that point, potential targets of unmediated war (as heard in 
the sounds and as seen in the smoke in the night sky) and media spectators of live war 
showing the city on fire. The disparity is substantial between a citizen watching the 
spectacular effects of the bombing on his or her TV set in London and pondering the 
intensity of the destruction, and a citizen living in Beirut watching the same live 
report revealing what is happening a few blocks away. Proximity creates a subjective 
position which necessitates decision making in reaction to every given live war report, 
whereas being geographically distant turns the same live news into information that 
may produce indifference or at most a sense of shock at the horrors of contemporary 
wars.  This is what I later came to call co-liveness which I filmed and experienced as 
part of the quotidian of war. Watching live war and being potential targets of that 
same mediatized war had merged into one space. Live war in this instance was not 
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relayed only through one local or international channel. Instead it meant being able to 
navigate between various stations, and various versions of live war. 
 
1.2 Live War during the July 2006 War on Lebanon (Harb Tammuz) 
 
The mere switch of a channel on the various local and regional satellite channels 
(such as Al Manar, Future TV, and Al Jazeera) as well as on international satellite 
channels (such as CNN and BBC), all accessible to Lebanese residents, showed a 
different live framing of the same war. This difference revealed the manner in which 
power relations manifest themselves in (and as) live images of war.  Power according 
to Foucault is “neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and 
existing only in action,”20 and here the exercise of power is observed as the combined 
effects of the act of war as well as relaying that act live. The complexity of live war as 
a media construct lies in its claim to a ‘liveness’ that continuously shifts allegiances 
and therefore angles (depending on who it is framed for and who frames it). By way 
of example of how live transmissions are imbricated in power struggles, Israeli 
General Dan Halutz declared on local Israeli television on July 12th: “we will turn 
Lebanon’s clock back 20 years.” 21  Two days later, Hezbollah’s leader (Hasan 
Nasrallah) in an apparent answer to that statement stated in a live address that ‘we’ 
(implying Lebanese citizens) are no longer helpless the way we used to be in the late 
seventies and early eighties adding that this time we will retaliate and not suffer alone 
the Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Nasrallah finished his speech addressing local 
viewers telling them to watch the live destruction of an Israeli warship: “Now, in the 
                                                
20 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon (London/New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 89. 
21Elise Labott, “Israel authorizes ‘severe’ response to abductions” CNN.com, July 12, 2006, accessed 
June 19, 2013, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070305101409/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast
/index.html 
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sea and in front of Beirut, the Israeli military warship that has been targeting and 
bombing our infrastructures, people’s houses, and civilians, watch it burn and 
drown.”22 A few minutes later, the live transmission showed one of the Israeli military 
warships on fire. Celebratory fireworks were heard in the city in the midst of 
additional Israeli aerial bombings that were also relayed live. In this instance, war’s 
live image and the real time of war became mixed up turning me into a TV audience 
to a war where the framed reality appeared to have surpassed fiction. I remained glued 
me to the TV set awaiting the next ‘live’ update as to what was happening a few 
blocks away. 
 
Noam Chomsky rightly discredits the reasons given for the 2006 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon: “The standard Western version is that the invasion was justified by 
legitimate outrage over the capture of two Israeli soldiers at the border. The posture is 
cynical fraud.”23 If accepted as legitimate, however, the justification denotes the 
acquiescence to an alarming disproportion in the value of human life across borders 
and nationalities. The capture of two Israeli soldiers was accordingly punishable by 
the destruction of a country’s infrastructure, leading to the deaths of 1200 Lebanese 
citizens and the displacement of a million others. How was targeting the bridges that 
linked the Lebanese cities going to bring back the two soldiers, and what did the 
airport runways that were bombed or the blowing up of power plants leading to a 
massive oil spill in the sea have to do with it? The Israeli military seemed 
unconcerned that the indiscriminate bombing could lead to the death of the soldiers 
who were held captive in Lebanon. With the ‘War on Terror’ having been declared in 
                                                
22  “Nasrallah: bombing the Israeli warship, July war 14-07-2006”, accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRVvPEEAmck 
23 Noam Chomsky, “On the US-Israeli Invasion of Lebanon,” in Al-Adab (August 19, 2006), accessed 
May 10, 2012, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20060819.htm 
 41 
2001 as an on-going conflict by George W. Bush (following the New York City 9/11 
attacks which he labelled as an ‘act of war’) the July 2006 Lebanon war fell under the 
American discourse of fighting terror. The Israeli politicians employed the same 
rhetoric by labelling the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers as an act of war 
(artificially) linking the twin tower attacks (2001) the Afghanistan War (2001), the 
Iraq War (2003) with the Lebanon July war (2006) as part of the global war on terror. 
However, the July 2006 war seemed to be largely a display of the Israeli 
government’s ‘right to punish’ which, according to Foucault, as displayed in public 
executions is part of the sovereign’s right to wage war on enemies where the aim is to 
portray to all eyes “the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the 
law, and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength.”24 Hence for having 
failed to foil the kidnapping of two of their soldiers and refusing to negotiate a 
prisoner swap with Hezbollah, the Israeli army showcased their power to kill publicly 
and disproportionately.  
 
The spectacle of war as punishment was implemented at once by the use of the latest 
Israeli and American military technologies that surpassed any weapons held by the 
Hezbollah fighters and by the airing of war on regional and international satellite TV. 
On the regional channels, the details were graphic and the corpses of the victims 
being snatched from under the rubble were daily images underlining the fact that air 
raids were indeed targeting civilian populations. Censorship regulations limited the 
international satellite channels to wide-angle frames of aerial bombings, omitting 
scenes of carnage and confirming the Israeli government’s insistence that civilians 
were not being targeted. The back and forth image and counter-image, and their truth 
                                                
24 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin Books, 1975), 48. 
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versus our truth that both regional and international live transmissions aired all 
contributed to framing the images of war as a spectacle of destruction and punishment, 
deepening the impact of the launch of war as the continued ‘right to punish’. 
 
Relaying the live images of war seemed to have become a new way of censoring 
one’s right to an unmediated reality. In The War of Dreams (1999) the anthropologist 
Marc Augé claims there is a general and invisible war being waged on people’s 
dreams adding that: “confrontations of the imaginary have accompanied the clash of 
nations, conquests, and colonisations.” 25  Seeing a growing threat posed to the 
imagination by the fictionalization of world events in the media, he writes: “We all 
have the feeling we are being colonized but we don’t exactly know who by.”26 Indeed 
the relentless relaying of the July 2006 war through competing angles broadcasting 
death, destruction, and explosions created the incessant necessity to replenish oneself 
with images, if only to map areas of safety. Simultaneously this need to know through 
images created the sensation that a double war was being waged on the country: one 
of the senses and another mediatised one impacting on, populating, and imprisoning 
the imaginary. The imaginary, as the malleable and private universe which opens up 
many possibilities of evasion, was blocked as its projections were inhabited by a 24/7 
structure that pre-scripted what was happening and what will happen. Real-time (as 
the subjective, individual perception of the real which is inherently a plurality of 
experiences) was warped into live time as though the only access to survival would be 
to watch the live war news where politicians exchanged their daily promises and 
threats. The interruptions of sleep by air raids disallowed dreams from fulfilling their 
nightly potential of escape into an elsewhere, while beeping messages from friends 
                                                
25 Marc Augé, The War of Dreams: Exercises in Ethno-fiction (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 5. 
26 Augé, War of Dreams. 
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with additional instant news accentuated the links between information, connectivity 
and the brutality of the bombings. 
 
What I am questioning here is not the importance of gaining access to information 
during war, but the obsession with live news that colonize the present moment. 
“Instead of colonizing by force territories exterior to one's own, we are now 
colonizing and being colonized through monitors and passwords within our own 
territories,” writes Minh-ha in relation to the competing imageries on cyberspace, 
where the colonization of the mind occurs through imagery both produced and 
received incessantly through a state of connectedness. Minh-ha differentiates the uses 
of technology when in the hands of artists and philosophers who aim “to give form, 
trans-form, and de-form” as opposed to its use for consumerist purposes and as a 
technique to maintain power effects.27 While the technology of the weapons inflicted 
psychological and material defeats, the preponderance of images of large-scale 
destruction and death mirrored their power effects and pointed to the failure of the 
international justice system to change the course of war. The incessant consumption 
of images of war became a habit, while the dated belief that images could and would 
change the course of war slowly gave way to the disappointing realization that images 
merely mirrored and accentuated the existing hierarchies of power.  
 
The instrumentalisation of memories and of the imaginary are explored by the 
filmmaker Chris Marker in his philosophical science-fiction film La Jetée (1962). In 
the film’s plot, following the large-scale destruction left by a Third World War, 
                                                
27 Trinh, T. Minh-ha, and Marina Gržinić. Inappropriate/d artificiality (2005), accessed, May 5, 2013: 
http://trinhminh-ha.squarespace.com/inappropriated-articificiality/ 
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humanity is saved from total annihilation by the protagonist’s ability to focus on a 
visual memory from the past that allows him to connect with a war-less world. The 
protagonist is capable of finding new forms of life through his mental search for the 
face of a woman he is unable to forget. His survival consists of his ability to escape 
the present time and to draft new universes connecting him with a future that 
possesses the required energy to save the present from total annihilation. Being able 
to (mentally) leave the present is in Marker’s film what saves humanity from total 
destruction, even if it doesn’t end up sparing the main protagonist who is ultimately 
killed by the scientists. Marker’s exploration of war through the inseparability 
between ‘visualizing’ and ‘being’ reveals that the capacity to evade the grim present 
of war is activated through one’s imagination. 
 
During the July 2006 war, the live frame of war claimed to be the only valid present 
that required me to sit, watch and hide, to be scared, to look for targets, to seize the 
joy of the occasional cease-fire, and to be bound to one spot like a prisoner waiting 
for a cease-fire to be able to go for her walk in the garden. Wasn’t my continuous 
watching of live war and filming that watching a form of acquiescence to my 
incapacity to do anything else? Was I waiting to see how things would turn out in the 
live feed or in reality as they mixed and depending on which came to me first? 
Waiting for the live update had turned into an unending infectious activity. However, 
the ‘imprisonment and colonization of the imaginary’ (to use Augé’s terminology) 
lost its hypnotic effect when I left the TV/computer screen. There were other realities 
on the streets of Beirut, outside of the relentless live war frame. Organizations as well 
as activists volunteered their efforts to host displaced families and children in public 
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parks and in schools.28 My daily trips to Sanayeh garden accentuated how live war on 
competing TV channels was rarely about life, singular, and embodied and more about 
targeted areas and death tolls. I evaded the live news of war as much as I could and 
filmed that which continued to exist outside of the mediatisation of war, namely the 
quotidian of survival.  
 
The end of the July 2006 war left me with an irreconcilable disappointment. Walking 
amidst the rubbles of the city my nostrils filled with the smells of decayed bodies 
stuck under piles of five or six storey-buildings that had collapsed under the impact of 
bombs. I couldn’t stop taking photographs from sheer shock at the immensity of the 
resulting destruction. Weren’t my photographs also part of the imposed spectacle of 
destruction and war?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 In the Sanayeh garden for instance, my point of contact was with Wissam Abousleiman, the general 
coordinator from the Heiket Il Ighathe El Madaniyye a local initiative of civilian volunteers. As part of 
the citizen initiative, they gathered donations to temporarily relocate the hundreds of refugees who had 
fled from areas with the heaviest destruction tolls. 
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1.3 Elsewhere29 
 
 
  
Fig.3 
                                 Visitor: May I have a copy of this photograph? 30 
 
 
                                                
29 In her essay entitled “The Promise of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d others” 
(1992), Haraway writes about Elsewhere as the SF (which stands for the Science-Fictional and the 
Speculative-Factual) where new stories and spaces emerge by avoiding to replicate the existing 
narratives and finding new unexplored combinations. In this case, the Elsewhere is un-reachable, these 
images being repetitions of the redundant narrative of the city of Beirut as the site of destruction. 
 
30 The under-titles are an example of Diffraction, revealing some visitors’ reactions to them. Placed 
inside a large textbook in the desk area of “fragments”. I took these photographs during the 34-day 
2006 July War on Lebanon, and a few days following the cease-fire. 
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Fig.4 
 
 
Visitor 1: I didn’t know how to read this photograph.  
Does he wear a mask because of pollution? 
  
Visitor 2: He doesn’t seem to care that he is surrounded  
by all this death, reading his newspaper calmly. 
  
 
 
Fig.5 
 
Visitor: How fantastic! 
I mean, in a strange way of course. 
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(Fig. 6) 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 7) 
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Fig. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
Stuck. It was akin to claustrophobia on a city level. A surge of joy filled my body at the 
sound of the first airplane crossing into the Beirut city sky following the reopening of 
the airport. I had not noticed the absence of the sound of planes during the siege. 
That sound’s return marked a return to normalcy and the existence of the possibility 
to connect with an elsewhere. I can neither reproduce that sound in words, nor 
reproduce that feeling in pictures, but it may be that the eradication of the elsewhere 
is one of the tactical aims of war. An airplane is after all a seeing /flying device that 
allows one to view other cities from atop, to stop being the target down below and 
land within a few hours into a place where a siege of this kind is inconceivable, unless 
it’s on TV, in a film, in the news, in history books, archival pictures, a grandparent’s 
reminiscences, or someone’s elsewhere. 
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1.4 Co-liveness, research aims, and research question 
 
As noted in the preface, my pursuit of research was fuelled by questions raised by 
having experienced, filmed, and watched war during the July 2006 war on Lebanon. 
Donna Haraway’s use of articulation to observe how the myths of creation (the 
accounts of the Garden of Eden, Modernism, etc.) restrict the prevalent scientific 
discourses on nature allowing scientists to speak in the name of nature informed my 
method. “Articulation is not a simple matter,” Haraway writes adding that: “language 
is the effect of articulation, and so are bodies.”31 It is important to be articulate in the 
face of war. In its most literal meaning articulation as talking, or explaining, is 
precisely what war incapacitates. What to articulate and who can articulate during war 
is a question with an infinite number of answers. When a politician with the power to 
wage war is articulate (through politics, which is based on communication, and 
exchange), it is to incapacitate the other side’s articulations and to supress any form of 
response. My own realization that the dailies I filmed prior to and during war were 
non-regenerative was a form of inarticulateness in the face of war. For a filmmaker 
articulation, at its purest form, is the joining of one image next to another, and another, 
in order to communicate an emotion through the passage of time on a screen.  
 
Where to articulate (in language) means to be able to speak clearly, in anatomy refers 
the combination of joints that help a body to move. Articulation, with both meanings 
combined, allows for new bodies of knowledge to get formed, new ways of seeing to 
be perceived, and new ways of speaking to be heard. Articulation is therefore an 
important component of regeneration. I have used articulation in my thesis both as a 
                                                
31 Haraway, “The Promises of Monsters”,105 
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form to link the visual and the linguistic in my text (such as the personal reflections 
throughout the thesis) and to create disjointed enclosures within one large space in my 
accompanying installation entitled “fragments” where visitors created their own 
articulations (elaborated in chapter 2). I approached my research as a filmmaker for 
whom the interrelatedness between war and the media had become incommunicable, 
and filmmaking remained my primary research tool. The post-production process of 
viewing and re-viewing footage, selecting, editing, and screening drafted the roadmap 
of my research. 
 
Although my thesis unlike Haraway’s body of work does not analyse scientific 
discourses and their impact on the prevalent discourse on nature, science is not remote 
from war. Haraway sees the science question as relevant to the military where 
“struggles over what will count as rational accounts of the world are struggles over 
how to see.”32 Live war is always a media channel’s decision on how to see life 
(whose life), and on how to see death (whose death) and is inflected through the 
framing of war (which in others words is where to see from) as well as the language 
used to describe what counts as an account of war, and who matters in these accounts. 
The ‘rational’ account of the July 2006 war that was provided by the Israeli 
government borrowed the ‘war on terror’ discourse, as noted previously, borrowing 
the ‘you are with us or against us’ rhetoric. The Israeli propaganda war leaflets 
(referred to by the Israeli army as psychological operations or leaflet missions33) 
dropped all over Lebanon not only revealed their desired reading of the July war, but 
asserted their aerial military control of the whole country. The flyers proposed that 
                                                
32 Donna Haraway, “Situated knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14.3 (1988): 587, accessed May 5, 2012, 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3178066?uid=3737968&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102572811371. 
 
33 Psychological Operations during the Israel-Lebanon War 2006, by SGM Herbert A. Friedman 
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Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah will lead Lebanon to its demise and that he should 
be stopped at all costs.34 Drawing Nasrallah as a cartoonish character or as a double-
headed snake betrayed a patronizing conception of residents as childlike and simple-
minded. Some flyers provided numbers to call should people wish to collaborate with 
the Israeli government, using terms such as ‘terror’ and ‘terrorists’ to delineate a (a 
universal) conception of right from wrong. The philosopher Achille Mbembe suggests 
that it is the duality of “reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that has determined 
late modern criticism’s ideas of what is considered political, but that other more 
tactile categories such as life and death should be observed in order to determine the 
place that politics gives to life and death.”35 Observing the tactile categories of life 
and death that dominated the July 2006 war, the resulting civilian deaths reveal that 
the Israeli government’s re-interpretation of the war on terror motto was ‘either you 
are with us, or you die’. Although this rhetoric unified many residents who 
temporarily put aside their politics and tried to help the displaced residents, sectarian 
divisions also occupied a place in the reading of the July 2006 war. Whom do I 
support? Am I Moslem or Christian, Maronite, Sunni, or Shia and furthermore am I 
with the Sunnis or with the Shias etc.? These questions, which I was sometimes asked 
in the Sanayeh garden and later in London, revealed the lack of choices in rehashed 
territorial and political crises. The sought for answers betray the expectation of a 
stereotype that would neatly arrange the unstable notion of belonging (and/or not 
belonging) to a citizenship, a community, and to a country into a clearly delineated 
narrative. Being all of the above while simultaneously being none of the above 
                                                
34 This has, since 2006 become a common accusation aimed at Hezbollah due to the subsequent 
alliances that Hasan Nasrallah made with the Syrian government in response to the 2011 uprising.  This 
thesis will not delve into these changes but will remain rooted in the July 2006 Lebanon war. 
 
35 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics”, in Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on Biopolitics and the 
Defense of Society, eds. Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (New York:Palgrave Macmillan 2008), 
154. 
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appears inconceivable or fictional under the alphabet that categorises people into one 
thing or the other.  
 
“The myth of sectarianism,” says Ussama Makdisi “and the myth of perpetual co-
existence, cannot explain the contradictions of real history, or why religious diversity 
becomes a problem at some point in time.”36 If these myths are necessary tools for 
war waging, for mobilizing troops and mercenaries, and for metanarratives, they fail 
to capture the exceptions that make up the quotidian of daily life in a country where 
various nationalities as well as religions have intersected and continue to intersect. 
Managing to find ways to cross back and forth in the divided Lebanon of the seventies 
and eighties was quotidian to some families including my own and this has 
contributed to my perception of Lebanon’s divisions as porous and continuously 
shifting whereas the fear of being targeted by an invisible sniper, or a sudden car 
bomb explosion remained the same on all sides. I am neither dismissing the 
seriousness of the reality of the sectarian violence that took place during the civil war 
years nor am I claiming that a peaceful co-existence is what defines Lebanon, but 
attesting to the volatile nature of sectarian and political divisions that sometimes erupt 
and at others remain dormant.  
 
The interconnectedness between the Israeli army’s drone activities and air raids 
during the 2006 July war and what was relayed live by local and international media 
turned most residents into target/witnesses, as noted earlier. Whether they were 
Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Kurdish, Iraqi, Armenian, Christian, Moslem, Druze or 
a mixture thereof, they all appeared to drone operators as silhouettes, walking, 
                                                
36 Ussama Makdisi Lecture at Rice Univrsity “Sectarianism in the middle East: A Brief History of a 
Modern Problem,” accessed June 6, 2014: http://vimeo.com/91244381 
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running, driving etc. on a street down below, and silhouettes cannot debate their 
political subjectivity. Whilst sectarian debates could in the long-term turn into a tool 
for analytical questionings of the socio-economic and international political alliances 
that foster divisiveness and violence in the country and region, an aerial military 
supremacy transforms all citizens alike into targets who cannot look into the eyes of 
those who are aiming at them, but who can only perceive the results (on live TV and 
on the web) of such a military aggression and perception. My thesis will thus remain 
rooted in questions of the representation of war and its materiality.  
 
In her elaboration of epistemologies of situated knowledges, Haraway argues for “the 
view from a body, always a complex, conditioning, structuring, and structured body, 
versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity. Only the God trick is 
forbidden.”37 Situated knowledge is neither innocent nor devoid of complications 
because every single body is made up of existing emotional, social, and intellectual 
structures that condition knowledge and therefore limit the manner in which 
knowledge gets mediated through it. Situated knowledge is a reminder of the 
partiality of knowledge, of vision, and of location and is therefore a modest and 
vulnerable place that calls for connectedness with other partialities as the basis for 
knowledge formation. All views come from bodies and what Haraway contests as the 
‘god trick’ are claims to possess a higher truth, and to have access to an objective all 
perceiving, unifying vision that comes from nowhere. This vision disallows 
communication with others, since it is secure in an all-seeing aerial place. My use of 
situated knowledge as a framework in this thesis centres my research always leading 
me back to my own experience, and reminding me of its limitations, while equally 
                                                
37 Haraway, “Situated Knowledges”, 589. 
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making me question whose situated knowledge I am reading, facing, and conversing 
with inside the research.  
 
“We are all chimeras,” writes Haraway, “theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine 
and organism. In short, we are cyborgs.”38 If all humans are cyborgs, living through 
and with technology, it is the body/machine combinations pertinent to contemporary 
war that I would like to observe closely in this thesis from a citizen’s situated position. 
A cyborg is “a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as 
a creature of fiction,” writes Haraway, adding that “social reality is lived social 
relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction.” 39 
Nowhere is it more evident that the machine/organism combination is a struggle of 
continuously shifting fictions than during war. Two examples of the 
machine/organism combinations are: Live war on Television and on computers / 
civilians at home watching, drones in the air /civilians on the streets. There are more 
combinations of machine/organism fusions that show how struggles for survival 
during war are struggles over how to translate information in order to survive and to 
ensure the safety of loved ones.40 Live war reveals how the machine/organism fusion 
between the military and communication technologies is always controlled by the 
military although it seems as though a civilian living in the city under attack is ‘free’ 
to know what’s happening. What use is it if a citizen is free to know how, or with 
                                                
38 Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs”, 8. 
39Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s,” The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory, ed. Steven Seidman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 83. 
40 By way of example, the Iraqi blogger Raed Jarrar who posted occasionally in Salam Pax’s blog 
“Where is Raed” during the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, wrote, on the 24th of December, 2003: 
“The breaking news at Al-Jazeera TV said American fighters were bombing AdDora where one of my 
uncles lives. My father decided to call them and see what happened, but they were sleeping! My cousin 
said: ‘they are using cluster bombs, and we can hear the sound of a 57 (an Iraqi anti-craft gun) shooting 
back, but everyone here is sleeping’ LOL. What?? Where did the 57 come back from!” 
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which latest weapons (that their own governments will never match) s/he may get 
killed?  
 
In the case of drone attacks, the satellite technology provides an unlimited flow of 
information to citizens while also enabling the drone operators to scan the area from 
above, and to pick areas to bomb. A drone is an example where the cyborg soldier sits 
in an office in a distant city without risking any physical injury himself/herself and 
can take a life based on a camera view from above, capacitated through satellite 
vision. Although the communication technologies place all citizens on an equal 
footing, since most people are connected via satellite technologies to the imaged 
production of war, the military technologies function within a hierarchical structure 
that dictates that one portion of the viewers will also be the targets. When seen from 
the perspective of a civilian residing inside the city and subjected to bombing, the 
access to technology during war signifies an unlimited access to the communication 
technologies consisting of the simultaneous production of war visuals aired during or 
after raids have been released, and to the impossibility of safety in the face of 
advanced military technology.  
 
How does this configuration of technological in/equalities get articulated in the 
current debates surrounding live war? Although the advent of live war during the first 
Gulf War (1991) has produced critical reflections on the war as a ‘spectacle’, the war 
as ‘infotainment’, and the ‘post-modern war’,41 it has rarely been observed from the 
place of reception of actual air raids. The argument in my thesis is that the 
                                                
41 See e.g. Postmodern war: The new politics of conflict (1997) by Chris Hables Gray, Media spectacle 
(2003) by Douglas Kellner, and "Infotainment and 24/7 News” by Daya Kishah Thussu from War and 
the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7 (2003). 
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configuration of in/equalities between military and communication technologies 
produces different readings across a spectrum of war as a spectacle, war as distant 
suffering, war as infotainment, but that war as a co-live space, is left largely 
unexplored. The lived experience that determines the co-live space varies with every 
individual, and is not recordable, definable, or categorizable. The cyborg is a suitable 
analogy to explore co-liveness as a fluid, embodied, and ungraspable space. Using 
Haraway’s definition of the cyborg, co-liveness can be explained in her exact terms: 
“It is between fiction and lived experience…It is a struggle over life and death, where 
the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion.”42  
Fiction, science, and social reality interrelate in co-liveness where war, as an 
embodied struggle between life and death, involves a continuous deciphering of the 
optical illusions of the live mediatisation of air raids, as well as their proximity to the 
senses. In this case, a local citizen has to continuously determine where the border 
between the live image, and the lived experience exists, and how that border can 
reveal survival methods. The live images of war may well be fictional constructions 
made to fool the enemy, or to encourage the allies, and are akin to optical illusions, in 
as much as war itself functions and propels itself through such illusions. What senses 
are to be trusted when immediate vision is put at the service of a mediatised view? 
The cyborg for Haraway is also a reminder of the necessity to drop the illusion that 
categories are immoveable. The category of power, and powerlessness that can be 
reversed, the category of allies and enemies that is always rearranged, the category of 
us and them that is a mirror illusion are all at play in a moment of co-liveness when a 
civilian has to decide what to do next. Co-liveness submits a body to the power 
effects yielded by a system operating through aerial control capacitating both 
                                                
42 Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs”, 83. 
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information and bombing, and engages a civilian with one concern: how to survive 
the war. My aim is to articulate co-liveness through the practice of editing my footage, 
and writing my thesis and to delineate a situated conception of distances when 
reflecting on live war. My research question is: 
 
How can I turn audio-visual subjective/real-time images recorded during war from a  
civilian perspective into a practice that 1) questions the interconnectedness between 
live time and real time in contemporary war; 2) counters the mediatized live view of 
war as a spectacle of destruction and; 3) questions– in form and in content – the limits 
inherent in representing war?   
 
I do not imply in my question that real-time exists as an absolute. Although I am 
opposing it to live-war it is no less a site of representation and therefore just as 
ambivalent in its relationship to the ungraspable, non-representable real. ‘Real-time’ 
and ‘live-time’ are only opposed in my research question in the sense that the real-
time footage captured in my camera consists of moments (such as conversations with 
my grandmother, or my grandmother and her neighbour watching live war) that are 
not newsworthy. Although these images served to decentre the framing of live war 
temporarily, revealing a frame within a frame, another citizen’s perspective would 
have produced completely different footage. The ambivalence of the ‘represented’ 
and its relationship to the ‘experienced’ is a structural question in my relationship to 
my dailies and to my practice. This ambivalence, inherent to any image, reminds me 
of Nicholas Mirzoeff’s call to the right to look.43 Mirzoeff writes that the right to look 
is “the right to the real contained within a subjectivity that has an autonomy to arrange 
                                                
43 Nicholas Mirzoeff, “The Right to Look,” Critical Inquiry, 37, no. 3 (Spring 2011), 473, accessed 
December 5, 2012, http://nicholasmirzoeff.com/RTL/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/RTL-from-CI.pdf. 
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the relationships between the sayable and the visible.”44 In my application and use of 
Mirzoeff’s right to look in my thesis, I question the manifested authority inside any 
image framed as a war image for it is an imposed frame/framework regulated by an 
authority that determines what/how I should and/or should not see. Moreover, the 
right to look equally revealed to me the partiality of my own images. “The right to 
look” writes Mirzoeff “is not about merely seeing. It begins at a personal level with 
the look into someone else's eyes to express friendship, solidarity, or love. That look 
must be mutual, each inventing the other, or it fails. As such, it is unrepresentable. 
The right to look claims autonomy, not individualism or voyeurism, but the claim to a 
political subjectivity and collectivity.”45 I perceive the autonomy of the right to look, 
as reclaimed by Mirzoeff, not only in relation to the limits of representation, but also 
as a reminder that it is an inherent right to one’s political subjectivity. It is a right that 
is constantly challenged, repositioned, and erased through the imposition of social 
orders that are forcefully implemented through war. One is able to look prior to 
representing, and that look exists before the image, and this simple observation is 
eluded in the race to appropriate ‘real time’ within images. To look into the eyes of 
another is to continuously re-create one another beyond the imposed frameworks of 
representation, and beyond voyeurism as Mirzoeff notes. To look into someone’s eyes 
in a city at war is a shared questioning as to the fragility of life, and a realization of its 
evanescence, and beauty, and maybe of the possibility of that being the last look. It is 
therefore an existential look that is unrepresentable. How can that right to share with 
another, to look, and to reinvent together, be respected and transferred from Lebanon 
to London through my practice?  
 
                                                
44 Mirzoeff, “The Right to Look”, 473. 
45 Mirzoeff, “The Right to Look”, 1. 
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1.5 Real time and Live time  
 
A contextualization of my use of the terms real time and live time follows. The use of 
‘subjective/real time’ in my research question points to my own practice of filming 
during the July war (that led to the footage and the photographs I took prior to, 
during, and at the end of the 2006 July war on Lebanon and that became the basis of 
my London research). As for live-war, the term designates the media practice of 
transmitting war as live news to relay information (that I watched on CNN, Al 
Jazeera, Al-Manar, etc.). The interconnectedness between live time and real time 
points to what I have called a co-live space where access to multiple views of live war 
is possible while hearing the unmediated bombing inside the city. Liveness is used to 
map and to translate (through the political agenda of the channel in question) the 
audible sounds of air raids into practical bits of information to decide whether to 
escape or not. Is it CNN? Then the angle would differ from Al-Manar (Hezbollah’s 
channel), etc. This personal screening of the information on the TV screen through the 
channel’s bias is not unfamiliar to Arab audiences. In his description of the growth of 
the pan-Arab satellite channels since 1990, Marwan Kraidy writes: “The channel 
surfing Arab viewer sees the same military action described as a ‘terrorist attack’, a 
‘suicide bombing’, a ‘resistance operation’, or a ‘martyrdom operation’.”46 Many of 
these TV stations, being privately owned institutions, reflect their owners’ political 
affiliations, fragmenting the same news of an explosion through different political 
lenses. What matters in the case of an explosion (for a citizen residing in the city) is 
whether it took place in an area nearby (can I leave the house? Will there be a second 
explosion?), whether friends and family have been affected (Who needs my help 
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where?), and if there are any signs that this will be on-going (checking the different 
channels precisely because of their different political affiliations for clues, etc.).  
 
The multiplicity of live views of the same reality reflects the complexity of the 
artifactuality of televised liveness. For the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, 
artifactuality refers to the performative nature of news where actuality [les actualités] 
is produced by media institutions who continuously mediatise an event (by recording 
it, editing it, and broadcast it) while it is taking place.47 Ute Bern writes: “The terms 
‘performativity’ and ‘performance’ derive from the verb ‘to perform.’ They denote 
the capacity to execute an action, to carry something out actually and thoroughly, as 
well as to do according to prescribed ritual.”48 The performativity of the actuality of 
an explosion (to use Kraidy’s example) allows for the live staging of the political 
agenda of the channel and its diffusion through the live images of the killing of people 
How to frame the images, from which angle to film, what not to film, what the voice 
over says, and how the reporter narrates it, etc., are technical specificities that 
combine to reveal the media institution’s political perception of that act. The 
mediation of the operating body behind the camera is always political. Yet, when I, as 
a citizen, know that every live angle shows me the same news differently, I have to 
search for the essence of what the event means to me, to make sense of it, and decide 
on my next action. This means that when I am in connection to pending news, I am 
always in a state of alertness and can never settle into the information as though it 
were transparent and devoid of mediation. However, the fact that each channel frames 
                                                
47 Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001, ed, trans, and with an 
introduction by Elizabeth G. Rottenberg (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 86. 
48 Ute Berns, “The Living Handbook of Narratology”, Interdisciplinary Center for Narratology (ICN), 
University of Hamburg, (2013) accessed May 5, 2013, http://www.lhn.uni-
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the same event differently does not imply that no one died in the explosion, nor that 
the explosion did not happen, as Derrida cautions: “The necessary deconstruction of 
all artifactuality must not serve as an alibi. It must not exaggerate the simulation and 
thereby neutralize all threats in what might be called the delusion of delusion, the 
denial of the event: “Everything, one might then say, even violence, suffering, war, 
and death-everything is constructed and fictionalized, constituted by and for the 
media, nothing ever happens, there are only simulations and delusions.”49 Although 
artifactuality is inherent to media’s staging of actuality and is important to deconstruct, 
such a deconstruction should not be used as an alibi to disbelieve everything. That 
would lead, according to Derrida, to a form of nihilism where death, violence, and 
pain would be seen as constructed and therefore irrelevant. Deconstructing 
artifactuality for Derrida should serve to search for truth and strive for justice and 
equality.50 There are various constructions and competing notions of truths during war, 
yet the only truth that matters for a person who lives close to where the act of violence 
has been perpetrated, is the one that reveals how to ensure survival. The more distant 
the viewer is to the act of the violence, the more the deconstruction of artifactuality 
could turn into a philosophical exercise. 
 
Artifactuality was inherent to the live coverage of war in Lebanon in July 2006 where, 
as noted, each channel proposed a variation of the same news. However the 
information revealing the destruction of the city and the death of civilians placed 
performativity on a second level of importance. Did it matter how the live news was 
framing the fact that the city was being subjected to air raids? Not immediately. It was 
clear that the Israeli army was bombing the city. What mattered urgently, and in the 
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face of impending danger, was to ensure one’s safety. The artifactuality of liveness in 
this case only reflected the conflicted local and international political agendas through 
competing angles, but the real in the event always took over. “However artificial and 
manipulative it may be,” Derrida writes, “we cannot help but hope that artifactuality 
will bend itself or lend itself to the coming of what comes, to the event it bears along 
and towards which it is borne [se porte]. And to which it will bear witness, whether it 
wants to or not.”51 In other words, the staging of the actuality through liveness 
remains the artifactuality of what is taking place (a reality with all its elusiveness as 
seen through the construct of liveness, of lenses, of the audiences every channel 
addresses, etc.). Derrida hopes that the artifactual would always bend to bear witness 
to the event since it is born of it, and from it. When what is at stake is one’s safety, 
artifactuality bends to the immediacy of the proximity of the event which in the case 
of co-liveness may be visible/audible and mediated at once. The necessity to 
deconstruct artifactuality is precisely in order to avoid complacency and remain alert 
as to how live war gets incorporated in the quotidian of one’s life during war. 
 
“It is immediacy, clearly, which is at stake, as far as ‘fully' live television is 
concerned,” 52  writes Stephanie Marriott. She illustrates her statement with the 
September 11 World Trade Center attacks that one can watch as they happened, with 
the recording having maintained the instantaneity of the moment of liveness of the 
attack, while the immediacy of the event can no longer be accessed.53 Distinguishing 
between the immediacy and the instantaneity of liveness, Marriott questions the thesis 
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53 Marriott, Live Television, 50. 
 64 
that television is ontologically live. 54  Since the instantaneity of electronic 
communication is preserved, as Marriott claims, the event will always be perceived as 
live despite the fact that it is not immediate, arguing against the view of television as 
ontologically live. Taking Marriott’s example, what mattered most to the people 
residing in New York at the time, was to ensure safety by walking to safer areas, 
trying to understand what to do next, etc.55 The construct of liveness at that moment 
varied between instantaneous and immediate, with replays of the first crash and 
immediate transmission of the second, but the people’s experiences were very 
different depending on how distant or close they were to the Twin Towers. For New 
York City residents, co-liveness took over for a day and media channels kept 
broadcasting the tragedy in a loop, while no one knew what would happen next. I 
would like to consider a more fluid reading of instantaneity versus immediacy 
through the specificity of the location, the distance to and from the attack, as well as 
the lack of information as to what was happening. Karen Barad’s notion of onto-
epistemologies, as the study of practices of knowing in being56 is helpful in observing 
how the distinction that Marriott makes between immediacy and instantaneity gets 
blurred in a city at war, where violence is perpetrated for months. 
 
Knowing and being are fluid and connected during co-liveness, diffracting into 
information by way of live war and through the embodiment of the materiality of war 
just as media channels compete to guess and to broadcast what is happening. 
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Instantaneity and immediacy get mixed up in replays of the last few days’ events, and 
they serve to reorient (or disorient) a citizen residing in a city being bombed, which 
goes on for days on end (and which unlike 9/11 is made of continuous impacts). 
Although war is continuously supplemented with live views from multiple sources, 
most citizens continuously mediate this mediatisation. Taking the example of the 
newscast I wrote about in my introduction, where a CNN reporter explained how 
missiles were being sent from the US to Lebanon, the instantaneity of the live report 
in the US (constructed with images of missiles, and a reporter explaining their future 
uses) became the source of a pending immediacy in Lebanon. For a week in between, 
irrelevant of whether the images on TV had been live, they predicted the future 
changed reality of the Lebanese residents. When viewed from the US this report may 
have been either instantaneous or immediate, but never became the source of a lived 
experience for people residing outside of Lebanon. Distance changes the very 
perception of immediacy and instantaneity depending on the situatedness of the 
viewers. I wish to probe this further borrowing Haraway notion of response-ability, in 
its combined meaning of responsibility as well the ability to respond. Since I reside in 
Beirut, I cannot but feel responsible for a live report detailing bomb shipments since it 
is telling me my city will be bombed shortly.  I am responsible for the preservation of 
my life and for the lives of my friends and family, and the live news is a threat to my 
very existence. What are the responses that are incapacitated, or capacitated by this 
live report that implicates my future very actively? While giving me knowledge that is 
in a most obvious manner linked to power effects, it is putting me in a position of 
alertness which makes me anticipate the act of war, as well as its ‘immediate’ 
accompanying live report. The question of distance, or in this case proximity, changes 
the reception of the live report. I will venture to say that such a knowledge provides 
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response-abilities to escape, change areas, hide, etc., but never to halt the promised 
violence it delivers as live news, as though it were a set football match in the future. 
But I refuse to compare tragedies with soccer games, and/or to adopt the often used 
term spectacle to describe live war, because if liveness as a format delivers the war 
news in a similar fashion to spectacular sports news, that does not mean that sports 
and war have conflated. One is a game, and the other a political decision, and liveness 
as a construct does not change the tragic reality of one content or the entertaining 
value of the other. Reflecting on liveness in war versus liveness in entertainment 
should be clearly separated, because the actual and the virtual distances that are 
continuously eluded and enacted alter the relationship of the local viewer to television 
and to liveness in specific.  
 
Citing and debating Heath and Skirow’s proposition that “liveness – transmission 
‘live’, as it ‘happens’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘en direct’ might be regarded as part of the 
essential structure of television”, Marriott writes: “Only an argument from immediacy, 
then, will permit us to offer an account of the essential liveness of television. This 
account would appear, at first glance to be difficult to sustain given that the majority 
of the encounters with the world which are afforded to me by television are not 
immediate.”57 The distinction between the content that liveness delivers may be the 
key question in this case. The encounters that Mariott has with a variety of shows are 
not applicable to all countries. If the content I, as a viewer am watching happens to be 
news of war in a co-live space, I am still afforded different types of live programming. 
I may choose to watch a soccer game instead of war because I am tired of the news, 
but the moment I hear an air raid’s impact in a neighbouring street, I will switch the 
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TV to the live news channel to see what is happening. In that case, the essence of 
television news is indeed its liveness, and how it relates to my future safety. 
Presuming Mariott’s interaction with television’s liveness may not have occurred 
through sustained wars where TV liveness has been made essential within a quotidian 
space, her argument is experientially sound. But that has not been my own experience 
with liveness (specifically live war). Am I then arguing that the ontology of television 
is liveness? No I am not, but I am arguing for a situated discussion on liveness that 
neither considers the location of the spectator as irrelevant to the viewing process 
itself, nor conflates the materiality (and singularity) of the event being represented 
through the construct of TV liveness. The equalization of war, famine, floods and 
football through the same live lens leads to their depoliticization and exploration as 
images devoid of material manifestations.  
  
When failing to consider the ways in which live war (not liveness in general, but live 
+ war as a filter of violence through liveness) alters one’s ability to respond, the body 
of the viewer experiencing war is removed from the picture, rendering her/him 
irrelevant in the midst of arguments that favour TV signals and their ontology. By 
maintaining that one has the choice to turn the TV off all the time, and becoming 
present to one’s presence, the debate changes. If that presence is similar to what is on 
live TV, such as war, TV becomes helpful in mapping war’s material effects in the 
city. My aim is not to engage with debates about the ontology of TV liveness, nor to 
propose co-liveness as a category, because that would remove the materiality of war 
from the debate and blur the singularity of each experience. By exploring, (in this 
thesis and in the accompanying installation) the onto-epistemological diffractions 
(through language and through images) that different distances from live war and war 
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(as a lived violence) produce, my aim is to understand how the ‘being’ and the 
‘presence’ of some citizens count as places from which debates about live war emerge, 
while the ‘non-being’ and ‘absence’ of other viewers changes how live war is 
theorized.  
 
I began to explore the question between the live versus the real in war by watching 
my own dailies and attempting to edit a couple of short sequences to share with 
colleagues. 
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Chapter 2. This does not look like war 
 
 
 
 
“We know that under the revealed image there is 
another one which is more faithful to reality, and 
under this one there is yet another, and again 
another under this last one, down to the true 
image of that absolute, mysterious reality that 
nobody will ever see. Or perhaps, not until the 
decomposition of every image, of every reality.” 
 
                                                                                 Michelangelo Antonioni 
                                                                                 The Architecture of Vision (1996) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 
                  
                            Visitor: The painting behind the TV is captivating. 
                             Did you deliberately frame it like that? 
 
 
 
 
When I started editing my footage, the interconnectedness between live time and real 
time appeared to me in London as a third image. The subjective real that had framed a 
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live TV image, was itself now framed by a new subjective embodied reality. It 
appeared on a cold winter afternoon in London, on a timeline in an editing program, 
and inside a library. The traces of the real had already vanished to leave me with 
digital images of a frame within a frame. I did not even remember the July 2006 war 
through my dailies. They were taken in a rush and they settled in my mind as a 
memory only a couple of years later when I had already travelled to start my research. 
These digital traces were fluid and filled with potential meanings that the process of 
re-watching and re-editing revealed. They evoked a universe that was partly familiar, 
pixelated, and electronic. Some images that were filmed at night for instance revealed 
the impossibility of the technology in my hands to copy my sense of hearing as I tried 
to record the nightly distant air raids. I knew I could add these sounds in my edits (I 
tested some sound effects of explosions, from the Second World War), and enhance 
them in order for the image to fit the reality that I remembered. But would that have 
meant that I was re-constructing reality? “Reality runs away,” writes filmmaker and 
theorist Trinh T.Minh-ha “reality denies reality. Filmmaking is after all a question of 
framing reality in its course. However it can also be the very place where the 
referential function of the film image/sound is not simply negated but reflected on its 
own operative principles and questioned in its authoritative identification with the 
phenomenal world.”58 Minh-ha’s reflection is a reminder that image/sounds when 
viewed in their own terms, as mediations of a subjective perception of the real 
through a recording apparatus, rather than as identical references to life as one 
perceives it, can lead to a deeper questioning as to their accuracy and inaccuracy in 
providing a record of a lived moment. Repeatable, rewind-able, and moveable at will 
on a timeline that can be accessed, created, and changed, digital images reveal how 
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memory too is continuously reformulated, tested, questioned, and opposed through 
their shuffling. To recompose these images outside of a structure that favoured a daily 
chronology of the July 2006 war events, and to accept the inaccuracies resulting from 
the mediation of the camera as a recording device, were the first steps I took in 
approaching my footage. Abandoning the attempt to fix meaning in my sequences, to 
present a ‘larger picture’, to contextualize, or to historicize the July war to an invisible 
audience by organizing dailies on a chronological timeline of events etc., I 
recomposed my sequences without the constraining imposition to tell ‘the real story’. 
My sequences started to appear more truthful to my eyes in their evocation of a place, 
(in this case my grandmother’s house), rather than an event. 
 
Following the screening of two of my sequences to my colleagues, a discussion 
followed. “This does not look like war,” I was told. The images in the first sequence 
were of a sunny morning in July when my grandmother was preparing the day’s meal 
and talking about the anxiety that the ongoing war made her feel. She asked me to 
stop filming her because she felt her heart was weak. The second sequence showed 
images of my grandmother and her neighbour watching news of the July war on 
television, while chatting. Assembled from footage that was filmed during the 34-day 
July 2006 war on Lebanon, both sequences were representations of Beirut at war, seen 
from inside my family’s house. Filmed from a perspective that revealed the quotidian 
life of my grandmother, whose flat is a forty-minute car ride from the neighbourhoods 
that were being targeted by air raids, both sequences stood outside of the recognized 
view of war. As images, they lacked the familiar pointers that would determine their 
recognition as ‘war images’. My colleagues’ remark was not meant as a critique but 
as a confirmation of the novelty of this angle to their eyes. Seeing images of war from 
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a local house where citizens were also watching war on a local TV channel pointed to 
a mediation of war that they were not accustomed to seeing.  
 
I was reminded of a similar response (dating from a couple of years prior to my 
research) when an elderly Italian anarchist in Cagliari (Italy) exclaimed at the sight of 
my portrait photographs: “Where is the blood? Where is the rage I saw on the 
Internet? These cannot be displaced refugees! Are you purposefully hiding the 
atrocities? This is outrageous! People in your photographs look relaxed.” He had seen 
my photographs of displaced refugees whose neighbourhoods had been targeted and 
who had moved to a public garden (Sanayeh garden) living in makeshift tents while 
waiting for the end of the war. Photographing people who refused the camera lens 
access to the privacy of pain was deemed inacceptable. I had a body of images of war 
without war. The daily images in local newspapers and on local television of women 
in tears and of bloodied men carrying dead children, made my own photographs and 
video footage appear questionable in comparison. “The media’s message may 
condemn war, violence, and bloodshed,” Trinh T. Minh-ha writes, “but its language 
operates as a form of fascination with war, and war scenes persist in dominating the 
spectacle.”59 Although the spectator in this case was infuriated by the spectacle of 
destruction and death that the July war had led to, he expected to see more of the 
same, refusing that war may have produced different images. Images had to exist as 
documentation, as proof, and as a record of the proximity of death, a proximity that 
demanded blood as proof of truthfulness and of the reality of war.  
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Was the recognition of an image as one of war only possible through its framing as a 
spectacle of death and destruction? What was the inherent conception of ‘the real in 
war’ that disallowed different configurations from recorded video images taken 
during war to appear like war? “The real world,” writes Minh-ha about the 
documentary category that is supposedly suited to capture reality, “so real that the 
Real becomes the one basic referent–pure, concrete, fixed, visible, all too visible.”60 
Since there was no visible evidence of war inside my (domestic) images, was it really 
about war? John Tagg’s The Disciplinary Frame (2009) examines how the 
documentary frame has evolved to document, record, and reveal the image as an 
evidence of value, as a record of evidence, and as a surveillance method which arrests 
and limits photographic readings. 61  “Like all realist strategies,” Tagg writes, 
“documentary seeks to construct an imaginary continuity and coherence between a 
subject of address and a signified real – a continuity and coherence in which not only 
the work of the sign but also the effects of power and a particular regimen are 
elided.”62 When images of war (‘war’ being a site where the exercise of power is most 
evident) are taken as the only existing proof of the real, they invalidate the embodied 
experience of life and become allied to it (to the materiality of experience, that is) as 
evidence. When the subject (war on Lebanon in July 2006) is confounded with the 
representation of the subject (my recorded images) both the subject as well as the 
nature of digital images are made to serve an uninterrupted reading of the subject as 
an image. But neither is war only an image, nor are my experiences images, nor was 
my recording of images meant to be representative of the complex multiplicities of 
(told and untold) stories and experiences accumulated during that war. “There is no 
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such thing as documentary-whether the term designates a category of material, a 
genre, an approach, or a set of techniques,” writes Minh-ha, “This assertion-as old and 
as fundamental as the antagonism between names and reality-needs incessantly to be 
restated despite the very visible existence of a documentary tradition.”63 Experience 
and vision precede the written and the filmed that leaves traces, (as signs), that appear 
to be more real that the real. The documentary category appropriates the real within 
an image eluding the process (cameras, recording, reordering, editing) by which the 
production of ‘the real’ is enabled, and dissimulating how it is just as much an 
alteration of the real as fiction is. The images of war as a spectacle of suffering 
manufacture expectations of what a social reality of war should look like. Here, 
recognition of a partial and mediated reality becomes dependent on its recognition 
within a dominant image. “Realism as one form of representation defined by a 
specific attitude toward reality is widely validated to perpetuate the illusion of a stable 
world,” writes Minh-ha, “(even when it depicts sickness, poverty, and war), in which 
the ‘how-to-do’s’ are confidently standardized and prescribed for different 
realities.”64  In this context to be realistic, to represent truthfully a war meant 
following the prescribed “how to do’s”: a hand-held camera, destitution, photos taken 
on the run amidst screams and cries, etc. A reality once fixed within a representation 
that becomes the referent to the topic of war in the Arab world. Iraq, Lebanon, Syria 
all become interchangeable amongst themselves as signs, and their topic as equivalent 
to famine, poverty, and violence as the tragedies of the others. This image of people’s 
distant suffering zapped interchangeably (sometimes by the very same people who are 
being portrayed) denotes stereotypical notions of the other as inexistent under any 
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other configuration but that of a subject that can portray a recurrent sameness of 
suffering within a recognizable image.  
 
Following my colleagues’ reflections, I began to question how what counts as ‘real’ 
in war is regulated through particular visual and audio-visual codes. Indeed my 
images were not meant to be images of war singular as though war were one solid 
definable entity, but the non-recognition of my images as images filmed during war 
made me question whether there is a prescribed artifactuality that regulates the 
recognisability of war in (and as) filmed images. I am using the term artifactuality 
here in allusion to both Donna Haraway and Jacques Derrida whereby it is the staging 
of actuality through the media (the performativity of actuality through the apparatus 
of teletechnology as Derrida writes) and the inextricability between the factual and 
the fictional in one’s understanding of war. When a formalized and normalized 
merging between the factual and the fictional framing of war becomes necessary for 
the recognition of the subject within an audio-visual or photographic image, such a 
recognition becomes determined by one source only. Derrida has warned against this 
type of international artifactuality: “This international artifactuality, this 
monopolization of the ‘actuality effect’, this centralizing appropriation of artifactual 
powers for ‘creating the event’, may be accompanied by advances in the domain of 
‘live’ communication, or communication so-called real time in present tense.” 65 For 
Derrida, advances in the technologies of liveness have to be accompanied by a 
rigorous reminder that the real and the live are neither pure nor stripped of 
interpretation, and although they will always be present, ways have to be found 
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against their mystification.66 Submitting the real and the present to an international 
artifactuality redefines the real as the immediate, the latest news, the present that is 
from one perspective only. This perspective is neither pure nor devoid of prior 
treatment, however, such as framing, editing, and selecting. Clearly, if there is one 
benefit to being exposed to various versions of live transmissions of war (such as on 
the world wide web where many channels may be accessed, or in Lebanon where the 
media is not centralized), it is in making citizens more aware of the continued 
construction of the subject of war through liveness. That failing, the performativity of 
an international artifactuality could turn the images and subject of war into a stable 
fiction with its chases, conflicts, and resolutions recurring as in any scripted 
Hollywood fiction. War’s recognition would then be conditioned by the repetition of 
these self-same elements. The reality of war (always fluid, changing, and embodied) 
is then eluded.  
 
An international artifactuality proposes to citizens who watch war from a distance to 
forget that war is also about life in the quotidian, so that deaths appear and disappear 
through the latest news as though they were natural disasters that cannot be stopped. 
John Ellis writes that since reality is always mediated (by understanding, by one’s 
experiences, by others etc.,) and is therefore always subjective, ‘witness’ is a more 
suitable term for a viewer who watches distant events with mixed feelings of power 
and safety: “The feeling of witness that comes with the audio-visual media is one of 
separation and powerlessness” Ellis writes, adding that “the events unfold, like it or 
not. They unfold elsewhere-especially in film-another time as well. So for the viewer, 
powerlessness and safety come hand in hand, provoking a sense of guilt or 
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disinterest.”67 Ellis’ use of the term media witness gives body to the feeling of 
helplessness when confronted with images of distant violence, but it does not take 
into consideration the nuances in the act of witnessing, nor the naturalization of the 
status of the media witness. The television witness can be seen as an extension of 
various witnessing practices where detachment and non-intervention are perceived as 
objective perspectives. The war reporter is meant to be an objective witness, just as 
the journalist, the war photographer, the TV anchor. The status of a media witness 
follows a chain of command in this case and can be linked to a professional code of 
ethics which prohibits ‘going native’ and of witnessing and relaying information, 
while remaining ‘objective’. The term ‘going native’ denotes, in journalism, lack of 
objectivity and is used when a foreign reporter writes from a local perspective. 
Initially used by European colonizers whose assimilation into indigenous cultures was 
considered a sacrilege,68 the term has since shifted allegiances (from anthropology to 
journalism), and has been demoted and criticized, while reflecting a rooted belief that 
the separation between subject and object, or observer and observed is possible.69 The 
journalist who is not a native always has the choice to go back ‘home’, but the 
journalist who is a native and who is home faces a dilemma in that proposition.70 
Similarly, the media witness who watches the world safely through a television screen 
is offered the possibility of ‘not going native’ by entering and exiting other worlds 
through the guidance of reporters, TV anchors etc., while the safety of her/his home is 
untouched. However, defining a media viewer as a witness clearly excludes a witness 
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who is also a potential target (for e.g. in co-liveness) and who feels powerless and 
unsafe as a direct result of the visibility of war in the media. That the war will happen 
whether a media witness likes it or not equally applies to the local and non-local 
viewer but when the events unfold on local television the relationship to the live 
report is one of separation, guilt, anxiety and fear, all mixed together and these 
exclude any insurance of safety.  
 
Jonathan Corpus Ong argues that although the current media witness literature71 about 
distant suffering questions the ethical implication in witnessing violence on television, 
the defining feature of witness universalizes the concept of audience as a “western-
centric and middle class conception of an audience.”72 Although Ong’s argument 
raises a valid point, even a western-centric audience is not homogeneous and it would 
be misleading to presume that all middle class audiences in the west watch distant 
suffering with a sense of safe detachment. Indeed the problem with conceptualizing 
distant suffering stands the risk of leading to the observation of the televisual event of 
suffering as devoid of the political reality that led to it, or of the complexity and 
individuality of the bodies living it. The notion that an ideal television viewer is the 
one who resides in the west, and who is detached from the realities of other cities, is, I 
would argue, one of the constructs inherent to an international artifactuality which, by 
framing the subject of distant war is also framing the supposed neutrality of its ideal 
target audience. Such a construct maintains the illusion of what Nick Couldry calls 
the myth of the mediated centre, which, by direct opposition also constructs the non-
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western viewer as an absent other who is not part of this centre even if s/he constitutes 
its topic of discussion (by comparison/otherness).  
 
For Couldry the myth of the mediated centre relies on “the belief, or assumption that 
there is a centre to the social world, and that in some sense, the media speak ‘for’ that 
centre.”73 Derrida’s definition of international artifactuality as the “centralized powers 
invested in the performativity of the real”74appears reversed but is a complementary 
notion.  For it is precisely by centralizing the mode of artifactuality that a false sense 
of centre (or the myth of the centre) is created. In that sense an international 
artifactuality both maintains the powers to manufacture the real through actuality 
while also creating the sense of a universal mythical centre, the outside of which is 
considered rogue or illegal (such as the American government considering other 
sources of actuality like Al Jazeera to be unreliable). Nick Couldry’s exploration of 
liveness as a ritual category contextualizes the naturalization of the boundaries that 
are created through liveness between real time and live time. “Rituals do not so much 
express order as naturalise it,” Couldy writes, “they formalize categories, and the 
differences or boundaries between categories, in performances that help them seem 
natural, even legitimate.”75 In order to determine which categories are formalized as 
legitimate during war, the media’s relationship with the military becomes central. In 
the case of journalists being embedded within military units (implemented during the 
2003 Iraq war), the myth of the centre gets shifted onto the military body itself that 
becomes the regulating source of categories and borders. By extension, the Iraq war 
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74 Derrida, Negotiations, 86. 
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for instance could only be visualized through the international artifactuality of a 
military angle that is presented as a natural and unmediated reality. Couldry gives the 
example of rites of passage to manhood to explain his rituals theory, where for 
instance men undergo a ritual that confirms their crossing the boundary from boyhood 
to manhood, but the whole ritual confirms the exclusion of women from that rite, and 
legitimizes the division between man and woman.76 In the case of an international 
artifactuality the ‘other’, the ‘local’ who is being invaded/liberated, is altogether 
excluded in a live address that naturalizes the rationale of invasion from a 
tactical/military perspective.  
 
How does one exit this closed formulation of an international artifactuality, and the 
relentless simplification and banalization of war as seen through the myth of the 
mediated centre? Jacques Derrida’s advice beyond this apparent inextricability 
between ‘actuality’ and its continuous mediation is to always separate ‘presence’ from 
‘actuality’. This reflection is a reminder that presence is not only always subjective, 
embodied and situated, but that it is also the lived ‘present’ time that flows in parallel 
to the timeline of media actuality. Situated, and partial, presence brings one back to 
the body experiencing the moment beyond the continuously shifting notion of 
‘actuality’ as a lens on world events. Derrida writes: “I’m trying not to forget that it is 
often untimely approaches to what is called actuality that are the most “concerned” 
with the present. In other words, to be concerned with the present, as a philosopher 
for example, may be to avoid constantly confusing the present with actuality.”77 
When the present is seen as existing by the side of actuality rather than as a result of it 
or as dependent on it, then every present can inhabit the layers of complexity that 
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exist on a timeline that is separate from actuality. What Derrida refers to as “untimely 
approaches to actuality” is an invitation to reflect on the time/space restructuring that 
actuality occupies, produces, and reproduces. 
 
What about when one has no time, such as in co-liveness where the actuality and the 
present are continuously feeding one another? Co-liveness in this instance, as 
previously noted, becomes the continuous deciphering of what matters most in the 
present moment, to the body in danger, and through the layers of the multiple 
artifactualities showing different live framings of war. A separation between the 
present, (or presence), and the war as a televised signal becomes essential, in order to 
survive and not get ensnared in the optical illusions of representation practices. Such a 
separation, in my opinion, is inherent to the space of co-liveness where the 
information relayed live is continuously decontextualized from the screen and 
recontextualized into the body of the person watching the news. It consists of the re-
mediation of the news through person-to-person phone calls in order to continuously 
map areas of safety and consider what should be done in urgency. This implies that 
despite the fact that my colleagues and I may watch the same live war report on CNN, 
it is every individual’s presence to actuality that determines the recognition (or non-
recognition) of live war and of co-liveness as ‘war’. This process occurs in the 
degrees of safety of the material space where the watching of live war takes place. 
The necessity for a complete separation between actuality and presence can be 
unsettling. Can one simply turn the TV off when one’s own city is under attack? In 
co-liveness where mediatisation and embodiment appear mutually dependent, not 
being connected to live war implies not knowing, and not knowing could lead to lack 
of safety. 
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2.1 The hors-champs of the TV as a space of diffraction 
 
The history of representation abounds with accounts that caution against the reliance 
on sight and on the frame that hosts illusory reflections. In Plato’s allegory of the cave 
for instance (even if it is an allegory on the life and learning of the philosopher), the 
world of sight is described by Socrates as a prison-den that enslaves the reasoning 
capacities of the prisoners who perceive the shadows projected on the wall in front of 
them as reality, so much so that they are unable to accept or fathom the real shapes of 
people and objects under the sun. If one of the prisoners were to leave his chains and 
go out into the sunlight, he would perceive the richness of the shapes.78 Yet, other 
accounts relate the pleasure derived from being deceived by an optical illusion, and of 
the superior skill of the one who is able to pull off such a trick. The story of a 
competition that took place in the fifth century BCE between two Greek painters, 
Zeuxis and Parrhasius, as told by the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder (23-79 AD), 
provides an illustration of this. In it, he recounts how Parrhasius painted grapes that 
looked so real, that birds perched onto the stage in order to eat them. Proud of having 
won the competition, he asked for the curtain hiding the painting to be fully opened, 
whereupon he realized that the curtain was a painting by Zeuxis.79 As a framing 
device the painted curtain camouflaged its presence by directing attention onto what it 
revealed and thus hid itself by seeming to be outside of the work itself, or an hors-
champ (out of field) when in fact it determined – and was part of – the painting. Iraqi 
cartoonist Abdul Raheem Yassir’s caricature of watching war in Iraq is a comic 
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sketch that illustrates both accounts of a citizen being so taken by the shadows of his 
TV screen and of failing to see the (deadly) tricks of such an illusion. 
 
 
     Fig.10. Abdul Raheem Yassir, cartoon. 
 
 
In this case, what is thought to be someone else’s spectacle is the staging of the real of 
the citizen’s life where the TV frame set itself is the trickster. If one were to crop the 
left part of the frame, this would be a caricature of the spectacle of war, and the 
citizen could be a resident of any country. But the left side of the frame immediately 
situates the sketch in a post-first Gulf war (1991) period when the advent of live war 
during war was introduced by CNN. Besides capturing the spectacle of watching war 
inside a city at war, Yassir also stages the spectacle of one’s own gaze by allowing 
one to see more than what the subject inside the sketch can see (namely the oncoming 
destruction of the citizen’s house). As a tragi-comic reflection on the blind spots 
inherent in the partiality of vision, on the ingrained violence of watching war and of 
watching the watching of war, the caricature articulates the normalization of co-
liveness. In the space inhabited by a citizen who is at once a media witness and a 
target, the sketch’s hors-champs of live war coincides with the living-room wall that 
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is visible to the citizen as an image, yet non-perceivable as his own wall. With his 
attention captivated by the mediatized quotidian of live war (for he is sipping tea as he 
watches), the local citizen in the sketch is prey to the spectacle of war and he misses 
the evidence of his being its very aim.  
 
As a parody of live news and of war, Yassir’s sketch questions the limits of the live 
frame, and its hors-champs. Can the separation between the present as presence and 
between actuality be accomplished here? Yes, but the viewer is so immersed in 
actuality that he forgets his ‘present’. The outside and the inside merge and the 
viewer’s vision functions within a closed system of interpretation that disallows him 
to perceive fully where the frame stops being a frame. Where the frame stops being a 
frame is difficult to pinpoint as Derrida writes in his critique of Kant's Critique of 
Judgment, in which the work (or ergon) is dissected from the frame (or parergon). 
Derrida contemplates the difficulty of extricating the intrinsic from the extrinsic in the 
frame of works of art, and he goes on to define the paregon as “a form which has 
traditionally been determined not by distinguishing itself, but by disappearing, sinking 
in, obliterating itself, dissolving just as it expends its greatest energy.”80 Accordingly, 
a frame is an absent presence that determines the subject while it appears to be 
external to it. In Yassir’s sketch the ergon and the parergon are one and the same but 
the ‘citizen’ is unable to recognize them as such.  
 
Going back to the screening of my first two sequences and pondering on my 
colleagues’ perceptions of the quotidian of war not looking like war, I considered 
their hors-champs (or out-of-frame) in relation to live war. What led to the non-
                                                
80 Jacques Derrida, and Craig Owens, "The Parergon," October 9 (1979): 26, accessed July 06, 2011, 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/778319. 
 85 
recognition of war in my footage is the context (theirs and mine), and is therefore 
inseparable from what happens once their TV set is turned off. Separating presence 
from actuality brings to light the heterogeneity of the present (as a lived experience) 
in relation to actuality, and it is only within the differences experienced in that 
separation that the space of co-liveness becomes visible. Although the term hors-
champs normally refers to the out-of-frame of the filmed frames, I propose to 
consider it, just as in Yassir’s sketch, as the out-of-frame of the material frame of the 
TV set in order to elaborate my point. The hors champs of the edited sequences that I 
screened to my colleagues triggered in me remembrances of an embodied experience 
(as presence) that accompanied live war on TV. The same held true for the Iraqi, 
Palestinian, and Lebanese visitors who attended my accompanying installation 
“fragments”. Colours, smells, sensations and the dailiness of war’s impediments such 
as electricity cuts, generator noises, being stuck at home, being anxious, being scared 
etc., accompanied the perceptions of watching live war. Whereas for most of my 
colleagues the hors-champs (of the TV set, and their presence as opposed to actuality) 
was not a quotidian of war, and when they watch live war, cook, eat, etc., just as I 
would, they later turn the TV set off, and their lives continue with other concerns that 
are not related to war as a daily struggle.  
 
Therefore war gets inscribed in one’s environment and memory in relation to the 
actual distance between the lived present and the actuality of war as liveness. What 
was not familiar in my sequences to colleagues who resided in Europe, was to watch 
war from the perspective of its citizens who were themselves watching it live on TV, 
as that defied the notion of presence as always being separate by large distances from 
actuality. For that reason, the television set inside my video frame (or the framing of 
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the frame) was perceived as a type of artifactuality (of war) framed within a larger 
unfamiliar (local war from the quotidian local angle) yet familiar context (watching 
war in a living room, on TV, with one’s family). In other words, the familiar image of 
watching television that appears to be the same, whether one resides in the United 
States, in Europe or in Lebanon, revealed itself as a far more complex space than I 
had previously considered. The familiarity of the setup (a living room, a television set, 
family members) can be cloned but is experientially linked to very distinct individual 
experiences and to social orders that allow particular modes of presence/absence in 
relation to live war. Stanley Cavell proposes that it is the “mode of absence” of the 
viewers that should be observed in every medium’s (photography, film, TV) 
generation of a “mechanical defeat of their presence to that reality.”81 Cavell notes 
that the nature of film allows the mechanical absence of an audience to a film's 
performers, who appear as mere reflection of light on light. The viewers’ presence or 
absence is towards something that has happened in the past that they absorb like a 
memory, allowing them reflection just as a novel does.82 Thus viewers are exempt 
from the ethical imperative that may occur when watching the representation of a 
tragedy, for their helplessness is ‘mechanically assured’: “The fact that I am invisible 
and inaudible to the actors, and fixed in position, no longer needs accounting for; it is 
part of a convention I have to comply with; the proceedings do not have to make good 
the fact that I do nothing in the face of tragedy, or that I laugh at the follies of 
others.”83 
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In my opinion, the mechanical absence that ensures audiences do not need to worry 
about the tragedies of others in drama and in film is replicated in the media format of 
live war. For what is presented as ‘real’ is also presented as ‘unchangeable’ (as in a 
film) and therefore suggests a forced compliance with live war where mechanical 
helplessness translates into political helplessness. The mode of absence is just as 
heterogeneous as its complementary facet which is the presence that Derrida 
recommends his readers to separate from actuality, and which consists of the life one 
returns to after the television set is turned off. A viewer watching live war from 
Europe is led to think there is nothing s/he can do to change the course of war, and 
her/his political helplessness is mechanically, or more specifically electronically 
assured, (since it is a TV signal), making live war appear like a movie. When it comes 
to co-liveness, the electronic signal is simultaneously revealing one’s proximity to the 
mediatized images, ascertaining one’s political helplessness to change the course of 
war, while the materiality of air raids are confirming the necessity for immediate 
action. In short, the military technology and the satellite technologies converge to 
confuse the understanding of presence and absence through co-liveness when the 
viewer is the target. Cavell defines live television as more like a gun-sight keeping an 
event from the world on view and thus exposing it: “In live television what is present 
to us while it is happening is not the world, but an event standing out from the world. 
Its point is not to reveal, but to cover (as with a gun), to keep something on view.” 84 
The mode of absence, as a viewer’s absence to the materiality of war while watching 
live television as a gun view, necessitates the question of whose gun view this is. 
More specifically, if live television covers a view just as a gun covers a view, then 
who is holding the gun and who is the target? Is the audience the target, or is a distant 
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‘other’ the target? In Yassir’s sketch where the view and the viewer of live war are 
both the target, the mode of absence, which ensures that the materiality of war is 
someone else’s problem on a TV screen, is a trick, and the sketched character has to 
shift his attention back to the physical space of the living-room, (or just turn and look 
around), in order to re-establish a connection with the fragility of his life and try to 
escape. 
 
For Haraway, technology is a way of life implicating social orders and practices of 
visualizations, where positioning is always necessary to ground the knowledge 
organized around the imagery of vision.85 Positioning forces one to ask: “Where are 
you when you watch what you watch?”, and it unravels the social orders implicated in 
practices that capacitate distant vision as relayed on international satellite channels,  
and/or adjacent vision as relayed on local satellite channels. Haraway proposes to 
question visualizing practices: “How I see, when I see, from where I see, why my 
seeing is capacitated, who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets 
blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? What other sensory 
powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision?”86 These questions produce different 
answers implicating memory into visualizing technologies. If I have seen, 
simultaneously, the fire caused by an air raid from my window and on live TV, the 
term ‘war’ becomes the physical embodiment of an experience that is partly 
mediatized and partly affective. Watching war is not the same for two people since 
their perceptions occur from different experiential places. The situatedness of 
knowledge and the limits of what one can know from one particular spot, implies that 
the apprehension of experiences happens through a lived memory that continues to be 
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excavated and added to as one interacts with other situated knowledges. Cavell’s 
mode of absence, and Derrida’s call to separate presence from actuality are both 
reminders that televised signals constantly warp one’s space/time relationship into 
proposed combinations of absences/presences where the individual memories of the 
conditions in which watching war is capacitated are just as pertinent in understanding 
the topic of ‘war’ as are the mediatized images of ‘war’. Everyone may feel that s/he 
knows what war is, be it as an image in a fiction film, as an experience told by a 
grandparent, or as a lived experience, and these knowledges do not annul one another. 
 
    
   Fig. 11 
 
 
An excavation of memories took place when I watched my sequences with colleagues, 
as they each tried to recall and compare how they watch war while at home. That 
made me consider co-presence as a necessary component of the development of my 
research practice. If each viewer’s experience with war (as a mediatized subject, as a 
lived experience, or as both) relocates him/her back to a material space, how, and 
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from where each one watches war on TV reveals how every “present” and its 
relationship with actuality frames the subject of war either as a distant absence, or as 
an immediate urgency. “When our cultural practices of remembering and forgetting 
are interrogated as loci where multiple power relations and power struggles converge,” 
José Medina writes in his reflections on the uses of Michel Foucault’s counter-history 
and counter-memory as epistemological sites of resistance, “the first thing to notice is 
the heterogeneity of differently situated perspectives and the multiplicity of 
trajectories that converge in the epistemic negotiations in which memories are formed, 
de-formed, maintained alive or killed.”87 For Medina, the very process of questioning 
the acts of remembering and forgetting as cultural practices reveals the inscription of 
dissimilarities and similarities in situated relationalities with institutionalized power. 
Whose material experiences and histories are eluded when live war turns the act of 
war into a history being written in a mediatized now, and whose untold situated 
perspectives are made irrelevant, or simply non-recognizable, through the conception 
of live war as always being a distant war?  
 
Every viewer is bound within particular practices of remembering/forgetting that are 
linked to power relations and to their imprints on the material space where such 
memories are/were formed. A London flat in 2006, a house in California in 2006, and 
a house in Japan 2006 do not relate in the same manner to what has been termed as 
“war” in 2006 in Lebanon. By extension, even I could not relate to the live images of 
war on Lebanon in 2006 since my lived present was always interrelated with the 
actuality of war. It is only by reflecting in hindsight that co-liveness became visible to 
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me. War and live war were maintained, drafted, memorized, quantified, and 
recognized for each one of us in different ways. Failing to see, or even to remember 
when, how, and why liveness had become so necessary to the waging of war 
necessitates counter-memories where individual genealogies of the intersection of the 
practice of liveness into the quotidian (singular and diverse) would get articulated.  
 
Thus I perceived my colleagues’ comments (or non-recognition of war in my dailies) 
as diffractions through a subjective prism of memory and experience that produced a 
singular understanding of the same images. “Diffraction does not produce ‘the same’ 
displaced, as reflection and refraction do,” Haraway writes, “diffraction is a mapping 
of interference, not of replication, reflection, or reproduction. A diffraction pattern 
does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of 
difference appear.”88 Live war, for e.g., functions through the visible mapping of the 
appearance of differences on a city-scape that is being destroyed, whereas questioning 
how the materiality of the destruction affects one’s daily life and one’s understanding 
of the representation war is a way to map where the effects of differences appear. The 
under-titles to my photographs in this thesis provide a diffractive mapping of the 
difference of reactions to similar photographs. The Black and White photograph of a 
man wearing a face mask in order to protect himself from the stench of corpses, while 
reading his newspaper for example (Fig. 4), is perceived as resulting from pollution 
by one visitor and to the display of carelessness to the death of others by another. The 
mapping the effects of the appearance of differences in recognizing (and not 
recognizing) co-liveness as war in my sequences, led me to formulate two questions: 
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1) If the images I shot during war do not look like war then what counts as an 
image of war?  
2) Is the act of watching live war linked to the assumption that distance from the 
material effects of war is inherent to watching war? 
 
These questions guided my subsequent choice of literature leading me to research 
what of war makes it recognizable (the weapons, the soldiers, the blasts, the 
civilians?) through its representation. As the live and real in war began to take on 
different meanings through my interactions with my colleagues’ co-presence became 
a guiding method for my audio-visual practice. The possibility of exchanging with 
others in a space where the diffraction of views would be capacitated meant that an 
installation space favouring co-presence was most suitable for my research. I will first 
elaborate on my installation space entitled “fragments” although this is not an 
indication of a chronological order in my research where reading, writing, editing, and 
setting up the installation took place simultaneously, and where my research questions 
were practiced both within the installation space, and within the text as practice. 
Therefore “fragments” can be read outside of the order in which I placed it.  
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2.2 There is nothing to see 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig.12 
 
                      Visitor 1: This photograph spoke to me, 
                              I don’t know why. I wanted to know more about her. 
 
 
   
                     Visitor 2: This portrait really reminds me of Sarajevo. 
         This woman could be from Bosnia.  
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  Fig.13             
  
                             
                  Visitor:  I keep wondering how a caged canary  
                            perceives air raids  
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“Why do you want to go to Sanayeh? There is nothing there to see,  
just refugees in the garden. I can take you to where people have died.” 
The taxi driver eyed my camera case in his mirror. 
“You’re a journalist?” 
I can’t remember, precisely, what I answered, but I explained what I feel, felt, at 
that moment about the media and death and life, and the images, their excess. 
"As you wish, but you know, people have to see the truth, and since you have a 
camera. It looks like a professional camera.” 
Life in war, validated only as the framed representation of its end.  
Everything else counted as nothing. 
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2.3 Fragments  
 
During my research I presented “fragments” three times, in 2010 in Philadelphia, at 
the University of Pennsylvania, and in 2012 and 2013 in London at Goldsmiths, 
University of London.  
 
 
 
Fig.14, Sabine El Chamaa, Fragments Exhibit Flyer, (2010) 
 
 
 
 
My theoretical inquiry into what counts as a war image’ (Chapter 3) introduced me to 
a massive amount of images from newsreels, historical photographs, and war archives, 
some of which I incorporated into the sequences I continued to edit from my dailies. 
In Cameras, paintings, wars remix (2013) for instance, a CNN commercial 
advertising the latest live broadcasting technology shows short interview clips with 
famous CNN war reporters who praise the ‘cutting-edge technology’, and its 
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efficiency in enabling them to broadcast live news live in war zones citing Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan as examples where this technology has been used. My insertion 
of the commercial into a sequence showing video images of my grandmother 
watching live war reveals the commodification of war for the main concern of the 
journalists is the efficiency of the technology and the speed at which it allows them to 
relay information. In its remixed position, and in the presence of my grandmother and 
her neighbour as its supposed audience members, the commercial appears irrelevant 
to the two women who are watching live war on TV. The commercial frames the 
reporters as the heroes of war, and as the holders of the stories of war, while its (the 
commercial’s) intended audience members, (in this case as fellow reporters or distant 
viewers), are those whose consumption of the spectacle of war is linked to the speed 
at which this spectacle can be documented. The method that inspired me to edit this 
remix sequence is ‘détournement’ which was the guiding conceptual and visual 
technique that led me to present my final research project as an installation project 
instead of a film, as I will elaborate further. 
 
It was during my research residency at U-Penn University in Philadelphia and my 
explorations of the predominance of the use of the term spectacle in relation to live 
war that I came to read French theorist and filmmaker Guy Debord’s The Society of 
the Spectacle, (1967). Debord was the co-founder of the Situationist International (SI), 
the group that played a key role in initiating the May 1968 revolt in France.89 Inspired 
by Marxist thought and avant-garde artistic movements like Dada and Surrealism,90 
situationists perceived the spectacle as “an affirmation of appearances and an 
                                                
89 Ken Knabb, Introduction to Guy Debord, Complete Cinematic Works: Scripts, Stills, Documents, ed. 
and trans. Ken Knabb, (Scotland: AK Press, 2003). 
90 Sadie Plant, The most radical gesture: The Situationist International In a Post-Modern Age (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 1. 
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identification of all human social life with appearances.” 91  Accordingly, the 
commodification of life and of direct experiences always takes place through a 
medium of sorts and is led by a select few leading to a society engaged with the 
contemplation of a spectacle of images. In response to the loss of connection with 
daily life, and to the loss of meaningful and creative direct experiences, the 
Situationist International (SI) aimed at creating an art that would allow for new 
situations to subvert the predominance of the spectacle.92 Détournement is one of the 
proposed artistic techniques used by the situationists as a means to subvert the 
intended meaning of films, adverts, or political speeches etc., produced for 
consumption in a society that is fascinated by the spectacle of images and that has 
consequently become impoverished in living daily life. Defined as “the reuse of pre-
existing artistic elements in a new ensemble,”93 and as “the negation of the value of 
the previous organization of expression,”94 détournement serve to dissect and dissolve 
that which creates cohesion in any given structure, (be it a poem, a film, a political 
statement, etc.), and to reorganize it within a whole new structure that eradicates the 
original work’s underlying ideology by undermining its foundation. 
 
In my questioning of the delineation of the live from the real in war, a layer of words 
had gathered upon a layer of experiences that had turned into memories. The real (the 
everyday real that keeps shifting) in that sense could only be accessed in London 
within a space that questioned the memory of war. Reflecting on my own research 
                                                
91 Guy Debord, Complete Cinematic Works: Scripts, Stills, Documents, ed., trans., Ken Knabb 
(Scotland: AK Press, 2003), 46. 
92 Debord, Complete Cinematic Works. 
93 Guy Debord and Gil Wolman, “Methods of détournement,” Situationist International Anthology. 
Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets (1989): 9, accessed: June 10, 2012, 
http://pzacad.pitzer.edu/~mma/teaching/MS80/readings/detournement.pdf. 
94 “Détournement as Negation and Prelude by SI” (1959), accessed July 5, 2012, 
http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/display/315. 
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project through détournement made me perceive writing, filming, gathering 
information, editing, and sharing with colleagues as the constituent elements of my 
research and therefore as the potential building blocks of an installation. I mapped my 
research questions into frameworks/frames to be experienced and traversed by visitors. 
Nicholas Mirzoeff’s right to look is prioritized in “fragments”. As cited previously, 
Mirzoeff sees that right as starting on a “personal level with the look into someone 
else's eyes to express friendship, solidarity, or love. That look must be mutual, each 
inventing the other, or it fails.”95 That right was recreated and maintained through co-
presence, revealing it is possible to reinvent together and collaborate in a space that is 
outside from the quotidian of war but which questions war at every step. In a research 
concerned primarily with the mediatized production of war images where the 
producers and cameramen remain invisible thus maintaining the power effect of the 
spectacle of war invisible, I problematize the authority of the 'maker of images', an 
authority maintained through the invisibility and inaccessibility of the 
author/director/artist/writer/producer. Whether or not “fragments” can be said to 
break the spectacular space of war is uncertain for it can be argued that the space 
itself is a production of a different type of spectacle. Yet it is the final dialogue and 
exchange that changes the dynamics of the space for me from spectacular to engaged 
in revealing how the personal and the political merge in each of the visitors’ 
reflections. The installation culminates in my asking the visitors to gather in a round 
chair discussion where an open conversation follows. Although “fragments” is set up 
in an installation space, it is also a situation in Debord’s sense of the term where 
visitors gather in order to play, watch, interact and finally to sit together and discuss 
how each one of us perceives the space, and ultimately how we each remember 
                                                
95 Mirzoeff, “The Right to Look,” 1. 
 100 
experiencing war. “Installations,” writes Monica McTighe “can be described as a 
form of heterotopia, a place set off from society where different times and places 
intersect via objects, materials, and images.”96 Coined by Michel Foucault in the late 
1960s the term hetero/topias (other/places) is, in reference to the term u/topias 
(non/places), a site that brings together various incongruous other sites where 
different temporalities can exist side by side. Foucault writes: “The heterotopia is 
capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several places, several sites that are 
themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theatre brings onto the rectangle of the 
stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are foreign to one another”97 
The juxtaposition of several places within the same place can be perceived as 
enabling reflection outside of the time when these places were formed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
96 Monica E. McTighe, Framed Spaces: Photography and Memory in Contemporary Installation Art. 
(Dartmouth College Press: UPNE, 2012), 18. 
97 Michel Foucault, “Of other spaces,” trans. Jay Miskowiec, Diacritics 16, No.1, (1986): 27, accessed 
Feb.10, 2012, 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/464648?uid=3737968&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102877655997 
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Fig.15 
 
 
Fig.16 
 
 
 
             Fig.17 
 
 
                                           Visitor: does it really say you can touch  
                                    and move things around? Have I read correctly?  
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I perceive “fragments” as a Site/Sight specific tactile space where co-presence is the 
means to a multiplicity of trajectories and meanings. Sites are inextricably linked to 
sights in Donna Haraway’s writings. Her proposition to always remember the 
partiality of vision and to reject the fabricated god sights that pretend to see from 
nowhere98 points to the politics inherent in visualizing practices where a location (a 
site) capacitates a located form of vision (or sight). My initial viewing experience 
with my colleagues and our diffracted readings revealed how the quotidian act of 
seeing (one’s city, one’s daily life) is not separate from the act of watching war on TV. 
“Fragments” recreates that possibility in prioritizing the visitors’ subjectivities while 
maintaining mine, leading all of us to observe the divergence of our views, and 
therefore the blind spots inherent to situated knowledge and partial vision. “The 
knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there, and 
original,” writes Haraway, “It is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, 
and therefore able to join with another, to see together, without claiming to be 
another.”99 Through the stitching of multiple partial visions, I wanted to experiment 
with the possibility of situating where (how and for whom) the real and the live as 
images of war intersect, meet, and separate. How does the creation of a genre such as 
live war (introduced during the first Gulf war in 1991 as the new way to watch war) 
militarily inscribe an image so as to crush and disempower an enemy who watches 
CNN as well, while enacting the myth of the warrior nation, manufacturing a 
consenting/dissenting spectatorship, but a spectatorship nonetheless? Live war 
universalizes the notion of a spectator/citizen for whom the actual distance to the 
geographical location of war is blurred. The interactions of visitors who grew up in 
                                                
98 Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 589. 
 
99 Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 586. 
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different cities led to a subtler vision and to the enactment of distances between 
countries, revealing the manner in which the political intersects with the quotidian. 
“Every spectator mediates a text to his or her own reality” writes Minh-Ha for whom 
the language of the spectacle is repeated every time a work denies the mediating 
subjectivity of the spectator as a reading subject and meaning maker-contributor.100 If 
the spectator forgets that s/he is part of the spectacle as a decoder it is precisely when 
s/he is unaware that her/ his televisual participation through presence, attention, vision, 
interpretation is a component for the deciphering of the meaning of a text/film. The 
functionality of a spectacle of war is enabled and enacted by the process of counting 
oneself as an outsider who watches the world of ‘others’ as it goes by on a screen.  
 
“Fragments” is a hybrid space (textual, photographic, audio-visual but mostly a space 
for exchanging views) where visitors traverse the categories/frames/frameworks that I 
questioned in my research, and interact with the material traces of the inscribed 
memories in DVDs, photographs, texts, while retracing their own through interactions 
with these elements. The space is comprised of various fragments, separated through 
transparent cloth into enclosed yet fluid “frames” or “frameworks” which denote both 
the fragmented nature of the space, and the fragmented nature of the contents within it. 
The framing devices as cloths are meant to divide and regroup the larger space 
allowing for interruptions or interactions with the materiality of the elements that are 
always in need of rearranging and reframing. DVDs that are picked, placed, and 
played by the visitors, texts, pictures, (and other elements that have propelled the 
trajectory of my research), are placed in such a manner to allow for their continuous 
displacement to enable individual and subjective experiences of the whole. The 
                                                
100 Trinh T. Minh-ha, “All-Owning Spectatorship” in When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, 
Gender, and Cultural Politics (New York/London: Routledge, 1991), 93 
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elements on display necessitate different types of interactions (categorizing, colouring, 
reading, watching, etc.) that visitors can play with in the order they wish.  
 
The installation space’s division into fluid enclosures is a reflection on framing as a 
presence/absence that limits, isolates, encloses, while it also discloses, reveals, and 
interrupts other possibilities in the larger space. Jacques Derrida questions the 
limit(lessness) between the parergon (as the frame) and the ergon (as the text, or the 
work): “What is the place of a frame. Does it have a place. Where does it begin. 
Where does it end. What is its inner limit. Outer. And the surface between the two 
limits.”101 The space enacts these questions in its (dis)organizing principle, as well as 
in the context of the critique of live war. Having multiple framing choices within the 
details of the space (such as which enclosure to pick) the visitors choose what not to 
engage with. The visitors’ awareness of installation space as a whole is never remote, 
and its materiality (the cloth separations as well as the tactile nature of their 
interactions with photographs and DVDs) is meant to continuously reveal my own 
framing as beset with a sensation of incompleteness that only their trajectories can 
complete. Moreover, the visitors’ reframing and handling of the space always brings 
them back to the presence of others, myself included, and to the artificiality of a space 
that is nonetheless taking life and meaning by everybody who is involved in it. 
Visitors can pick an isolated enclosure and choose to read all the time, or to watch 
DVDs in the solo screening enclosure, but that is a choice that is not dictated by me. 
The space questions the confines inherent in the photographic, audio-visual, and 
textual representation of war through their proximities within the larger space. A 
framing representing war from a quotidian space as revealed in my sequences can 
                                                
101 Jacques Derrida, “The Parergon,” trans. Craig Owens. October 9 (1979): 26, accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/778319?uid=3738032&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103126218253. 
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therefore be watched for a short while, and an altogether different framing of war 
from the perspective of a soldier in Iraq can then be explored through suggested 
search words on You Tube channels. When these two modes of representing war are 
watched within proximity to one another, the viewer becomes more conscious of how 
framing and filming produce war within recognizable visual codes. The proximity of 
the different modes of watching and exploring the representation of war in the space, 
questions whether it is through the abstraction of the city (Baghdad, for, e.g.) and its 
representation as a target through the military angles on live war that recognition of 
war is produced, and whether the representation of the quotidian space where people 
sleep, eat, awake, watch war, try to go out, etc. (as evoked in the footage I filmed in 
Beirut) obscures the recognition of war.  
 
“Fragments” is composed of ten enclosures/spaces: 1) A puzzle photograph(s) that 
needs rearranging and reordering; 2) A desk with texts I wrote and photographs I took 
to leaf through; 3) A shared viewing space with eight DVDs of 7-8 minute sequences 
edited from the footage I shot in Beirut; 4) A computer space with suggested search 
words on YouTube that lead to different military angles on live war; 5) Medium 
format printed portrait photographs that I took during the 2006 July war on Lebanon 
mixed with US soldiers’ night vision photographs (re)printed from You Tube war 
clips be categorized according to shape, style, or colour; 6) Two large format Black 
and White photographs that I took in Beirut during the 2006 July war to be reframed 
with small wooden frames (that always leave parts of the photographs unframed); 7) 
Copies of war leaflets that were dropped by the Israeli army onto city streets in July 
2006. The visitors are told to inquire if someone in the space speaks Arabic to provide 
a translation into English; 8) Two large format Black and White photographs that I 
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took in Beirut during the 2006 July war to color with colouring pens; 9) an isolated 
viewing space with eight DVDs of my edited sequences; 10) a computer installation 
with the soundtracks of the CNN live coverage of the First Gulf War (1991) and the 
Iraq war (2003) to be listened to on earphones while leafing through the images that 
were printed from the screen onto paper. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.18 
                         
 
                        Visitor: we were shy at first. I mean you had to ask  
                people you did not know what they would like to watch.  
                It was an awkward moment before the sequences started. 
 
 
 
 
“Fragments” is not meant to be ‘seen’, ‘traversed’, ‘explored’ in one visit (that being 
impossible given the amount of information, photographs, videos, and internet-based 
installations) rather to evoke both the question of the incessant consumption of 
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information on war during war, as well as the continued sensation of a lack of closure 
in relation to the topic of war, while at the same time bringing out questions as to how 
watching war takes place for each one of the visitors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.19 
 
 
 
    
            Visitor: The solo viewing room was my favourite spot.  
                    I wanted to hide here all the time while other visitors watched TV 
                    in the living-room. It was like being an adolescent and watching  
            my program while grown ups watched theirs in an adjacent space 
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Fig.20 
    
 
  Visitor: I organized the texts on the desk, compulsively, and 
     then I came across a poem about people having to clean up  
             after every war. Here I was cleaning up too. That was strange. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three installations led to different interactions with the visitors. As a situation its 
culmination resides in the agreement of the visitors to stay in order to reflect together 
and to evoke differences, and therefore in accepting to enact one’s mediation of the 
space through dialogue. Twice, visitors expressed the desire to leave, and to talk with 
me alone later, because they were left with sadness, and preferred to reflect alone. I 
was later told this was due to the combined effects of watching war in my footage 
through an everyday quotidian lens, and taking a few steps and watching it on a 
computer through a soldier’s perspective, namely through a military lens. The 
exchanges with the visitors revealed that inherent to their interactions were very 
distinct and different conceptions of distance to war. These distances determined how 
far back into memory they would dig. Those whose recent relationship to war was 
through the media, reflected on the daily impact it had on their grandparents’ lives, 
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(such as food rationing in Britain during the Second World War), detaching war from 
its spectacular notions bringing the reflections back onto war in the quotidian.  
 
 
 
 
 
  Fig. 21 
 
               Visitor in Philadelphia: Did you intend the space to feel like a bunker? 
              Visitor in London: I liked the fact that I could touch things. 
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 A select excerpt from a recorded exchange with visitors on 23-04-2012:  
Visitor 1 question:  Why did you remove and print the images and only leave the 
sound in the computer, here in the Gulf war corner. What was your intention?  
 
Answer:  The idea is that when you listen to the sound, you visualize something that 
is completely different from what is on the screen. What I realized when I was 
watching it was that the sound informs the frame, it inform a visual frame which you 
actually don’t see. In the sound, the reporter says: I am seeing colors, explosions, 
whereas what you see on the live TV screen is maps. So what they are saying is what 
is worth seeing, are colors. There is no mention of death, there are no humans, unless 
it is stories of the reporter. So the separation was meant to question what live war 
meant according to the first live war transmissions, as maybe the ancestor of what 
followed in live war which by now has been naturalized. 
 
Visitor 2: When I was listening to it I tried to remember where I was at the time, and 
what I was doing in Baghdad as an Iraqi citizen. The sound allowed me free reign and 
my memory was getting reconstructed. I stopped hearing the reporter’s voices and 
remembered myself sitting in a staircase. Hiding. I tried to recall what I was feeling, 
and seeing at the time. By listening, I saw something else. I was trying to put things 
from my own experience in sequence. I’ve seen this footage before and it never did to 
me what happened now. The black screen allows a reliving of a memory that is mine. 
I didn’t realize the framing had been restrictive in that way.  
 
 
Visitor 3.  Why do you ask visitors to arrange and be the narrators of these 
photographs in that corner? What is your narration since you picked the images?  
 
Answer: There is no particular story here, because the images belong to different 
languages as I see it. Some are military pictures taken directly from soldiers’ night 
vision footage and others are very personal portraits of refugees that I took. The 
difference between embodiment versus techno-strategic imagery is the main question 
here.  I wanted to engage in the game of trying to arrange –categorize- to see what 
thoughts it would evoke in visitors. 
 
Visitor 3: some aestheticize the war, and could go into galleries, and others are not 
considered art, so that mix is interesting.  
 
Answer:  yes, it is also a question of how can someone tell us that someone’s death is 
art. The whole space questions that.- what goes into a gallery? I question my own 
pictures as well, out of a feeling of responsibility. A bombed car from Iraq did get a 
Turner prize no?  
 
 
Visitor 4:  I thought of the TV show homeland. I turned the night vision images into a 
Hollywood movie, which basically mixes all… it says a lot about how we interpret 
images. As for the bombed car making it into a museum, if you think about it, it is 
like the memorializing of something that is a horrible memory. 
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Visitor 1:The space feels like a news room, you miss a lot of things and it gives you a 
feeling of lack.  
 
Answer: different spaces are different frames, that’s also the idea… Watching 
together is different from watching alone, and so there’s no way to experience 
everything, and one’s choices will inform their experience.  
 
Visitor 1:The fact that I have to change DVD’s, messing around with the technology 
is a step further as most galleries will tell you not to touch. 
 
Visitor 2: I actually wasn’t sure. The DVD started again and again and I watched it 
many times, and didn’t dare change it. (They all laugh) There are also different kinds 
of framing alongside one another which I thought was very powerful, the info war, 
and journalists boasting of how great they were, next to other types of framing.  
It was hard for me to watch the CNN stuff being watched from that perspective. I 
never thought about it from that perspective. 
 
Visitor: the feeling of missing out in interesting for me, because the way we follow 
news is that we don’t want to miss out, this is how I do it, at least. So it makes you 
conscious of that.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 22 
 
                      Visitor: I am not comfortable with sharing my views 
                       with others. I feel exposed and vulnerable. 
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   A Select Excerpt by Paul K. Saint-Amour, Dept. of English, Univ. of Pennsylvania 
 
“…In early December, I made my way in the bitter cold to the 40th Street Artist 
Residency where Sabine had installed “Fragments,” the open-platform multi-media 
piece that came out of her semester’s ruminations. The Residency is aptly named: 
one half of a red brick duplex in West Philadelphia, indistinguishable from the homes 
around it. Sabine opened the door and, lightly embracing the role of host, welcomed 
her viewers, took their coats, and showed them around the installation space. Yet 
here were strange objects for hospitality. Small tables on which sat miscellaneous-
looking stacks of photographs, diagrams, and articles. Laptops where earbud-wearing 
viewers sat watching Sabine’s wartime interviews with civilians as well as more 
dreamlike pieces less clearly connected to war. Printouts of digital photos loosely 
arrayed along the Residency’s dusty floor—uncaptioned images that seemed, on 
closer inspection, to have been taken on a walk through Beirut after a raid had 
freshly devastated a neighborhood whose residents were beginning to sort through 
the rubble for salvage. And in a narrow backroom, a flat-screen television on which 
other visitors were watching more clips chosen from a stack of ill-labeled DVDs. 
About the rooms there was a sense of the homemade, the makeshift—as if these 
things had been laid out quickly, with whatever was to hand, and might need to be 
packed quickly or even left behind. A sense, too, that the piece was grappling not 
with discrete wars—the kinds with start and end dates, names, numerals—but with 
war, singular. 
 
  
The various stations in the house were unnumbered so I wandered for a few 
minutes then sat down at a recently vacated laptop. I watched the civilians under the 
drone sketching portraits of one another and keeping, as they spoke to the person 
behind the camera, one eye always on the circling fleck. I heard Sabine’s voice asking 
them sympathetic questions then giving way, on another clip, to the music playing on 
the stereo of a car being driven through an inhospitable landscape. At another 
station, among stacks of other images and texts on a small table, I discovered 
Sabine’s copies of the readings for my seminar, complete with her underlinings and 
marginal notes. They seemed out of place, these essays written in French, British, 
and U.S. universities far from the places that had shaped and preoccupied the 
filmmaker. But now they, too, were documents in war, things that might have to be 
hurriedly packed or abandoned. And seeing these writings among photographs of 
rubble and copies of propaganda leaflets placed them in war’s production chain as 
well…”102 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
102Penn Arts & Science, Middle East Center: Artist in Residence Sabine El Chamaa, by Paul K. Saint-
Amour, Dept. of English, Univ. of Pennsylvania, accessed July 11, 2012, 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/mec/programs/air/el-chamaa/psareflection. 
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Chapter 3. What counts as (an image of) war? 
 
  
Look, the photographs say, this is what it’s like,  
This is what war does, and that, that is what it does too. 
War tears, rends, war rips open, eviscerates.  
 
Susan Sontag (2003) 
 
War is an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will. 
   
    Carl Von Clausewitz (1830) 
 
 
 
An inexhaustible archive of war images is accessible through internet search engines. 
Using Google with the search word war produced 655,000,000 results revealing ‘war’ 
in a mix of fictional and non-fictional images. A small digression onto algorithms is 
necessary to maintain that search engines (as filters of realit(ies)) are not neutral 
bearers of information. Using Google as a search engine takes a word like ‘war’ 
through algorithms that the company named PageRanks linking the search word to 
page results supposedly appearing in the order of the measurement of their 
importance. The algorithm remains private under the first Amendment US rights, 
which protects the right to free speech: “PageRanks are opinions, the company’s 
judgement of the value of webpages. These opinions are protected by the First 
Amendment.”103 Therefore the supposed value of the search results for a word like 
war is programmed by one group of people’s judgement of what counts as war, 
leaving out that which is considered to be without value. This digression is neither to 
                                                
103 Amy N. Langville, and Carl D. Meyer, Google's PageRank and Beyond: The Science of Search 
Engine Rankings, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 53. 
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support nor to question the integrity of one search engine over another, but to 
maintain that knowledge is not separate from the process that produces it. Being 
private, the algorithm’s exclusions cannot be known, but are to be taken as the 
personal judgement of the company owners. When viewed as an intra-active process, 
my internet search takes shape and becomes the material (of the topic) through 
entanglements, exclusions, inclusions.  Neither is the algorithm neutral, nor am I, and 
my search does not determine what war is, but reveals the processes I pursued to 
articulate war.  
 
In my initial search results for the term war, the fictional-factual merging of war 
movies, war games, and documentary footage of various wars pertained to 
Google’s104algorithm that mixes all genres under the term ‘war’, but the results 
displayed also reveal war’s imaging as transhistorical.  By showing one image from 
the First World War, next to one from the Crimean war, next to another from the 
Vietnam war, wars get mixed up while the figure of the soldier is maintained as the 
emblem of war. Defined as: “transcending historical boundaries; eternal,”105 it is the 
transhistoricity that is practiced by politicians (Georges Bush) and reporters (Peter 
Arnett reporting live from Baghdad) that led me to continuously research wars that 
were unrelated to the First Gulf war (which propelled the advent of live war) in order 
to understand the suggested imaginary links that they made by comparing and 
contrasting the first Gulf War (1990-1991) with the Second World War (1939-1945) 
and the Vietnam War (1956-1975). Through transhistoricity, epistemic exclusions are 
                                                
104 Incidentally, other internet search engines such as DuckDuckGo or Bing produce completely 
different organizing orders of wars. In the former, the reader has to select the war before being able to 
look at images and in the latter, war images appear with twelve additional categories including the 
Cold War and the Korean war. 
105 Oxford Dictionaries, definition of “transhistorical,” accessed July 21, 2012, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/transhistorical. 
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normalized and imaginary links are made from one war to the next regardless of the 
specificities of time and place. I will return to transhistoricity as a political tool that 
maintains a mythic ‘image’ of war as an on-going American story, but prior to that 
will follow the suggested epistemological research pathways that link every war to the 
one that preceded it. 
 
 
            Fig. 23, Screen grab no.1, Google/image search for the term: “War” (2013). 
 
 
               Fig. 24, Screen grab no.2, Google/Image search for the term: “War” (2013). 
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Watching different images of wars through the proposed organizing lens of the 
Google image search engine as if on a film editing software or a war photographer’s 
proof sheets reveals the flaunting of weapons in war photographs. The proposed 
categories that my search led to were of war games, Hollywood war films, as well as 
documentary and war photography images. My familiarity with these representations 
takes place through my exposure to Hollywood war movies, but they are far removed 
from my own experience of war as a disruption of daily life, be it through its 
interruption of schools, universities, and the frequent displacements from home to 
ensure safety. My aim is not to analyse the images of soldiers and weapons that 
predominate the five categories suggested by the Google image search page, but to 
reflect on the suggested angles with which war is represented and therefore 
recognized. What struck me first about the image results was that a category for 
Modern War (that I thought would lead me to the recent Gulf Wars) appeared next to 
the First and the Second World War and led to a computer game of war with the same 
naming.106 To deduce that Google’s suggestion is that Modern war is a game that 
comes third after the First and Second World Wars may be too hasty. Yet the critique 
of the first Gulf War (1990-1991) was precisely that it was presented as a game, and 
as infotainment (a mix between information and entertainment). The blurring between 
the boundaries of War as a game, and War as the result of the embodiment of an 
offensive on a civilian’s daily life suggests that it is the operational representation of 
war (as a real war, or as a game) that defines its modernity. 
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The measurement of an advanced civilization is judged by the novelty of the weapons 
it produces, the American humourist Will Rogers cynically joked: “You can’t say that 
civilization don’t advance, for in every war they kill you in a new way.”107 From 
bows, arrows, gunpowder, explosives, cannons, to submarines (shooting blindly from 
a distance to seeing from underwater) balloons, rockets, helicopters (allowing a bird’s 
eye vision), cruise missiles, atomic bombs (exposing a large field to destruction while 
remaining at a safe distance) spy satellites, to unmanned aerial vehicles (controlling 
and seeing without being seen/surveillance) etc.; the list of military technology 
displays a gradual capacitating of remote vision and surveillance where visibility 
becomes allied with power over a remote terrain which in turn impact the 
representation of war through images and through the language used to describe war.  
 
Susan Sontag’s quote that opens this chapter is about photographs as evidence of a 
war that has already taken place, and about its material manifestations on a cityscape. 
A photograph of war reveals how war ‘tears’, ‘rips open’, and ‘eviscerates’ writes 
Sontag. Carl Von Clausewitz’ quote underneath it is evocative of war as a necessary 
means to an end, without detailing what ‘the act of violence’ is, or what it does to 
bodies. The term ‘war’ can be used to designate tactical notions of war, the act of 
waging war, and the embodied effects of war on a human body. Is war the tactical 
view of the map of a terrain about to be bombed, is it the landscape of burning cities, 
or is it the body of a civilian escaping the violence of war? Carl Von Clausewitz’ 
unfinished treatise on strategy Vom Krieg (On War) continues to be referenced by war 
strategists. It was written after the Napoleonic wars, and published posthumously by 
his wife Marie Von Clausewitz in the 1830s. On War expands on the strategies 
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nations use to achieve what Clausewitz perceives to be war’s aim (curbing the 
enemy’s will), whether on the battlefield or through political means. The customary 
reading of Clausewitz’s treatise outside of the specific historical context in which it 
was written was objectionable to Foucault for whom such a reading fails to take into 
consideration the discontinuities that exist from one war to another. Discontinuities 
between wars reveal how power struggles in war are enacted, and the traces left by 
war (whether in images, texts, theories, or laws) that count as war’s outcomes are not 
external to the struggles inherent in the representations of war. In other words, one 
should probably question why Clausewitz whose theories of war are inspired by 
Napoleonic battles is still quoted by strategists to this day and what discontinuities 
such a referencing eludes and/or propels in one’s understanding of more recent 
warfare. The inseparability of war from its photographic representation has become 
unavoidable according to Sontag for whom “the ultra-familiar, ultra celebrated image 
of an agony, of ruin, is an unavoidable feature of our camera-mediated knowledge of 
war,”108 But harrowing photographs do not necessarily produce any understanding of 
war, she writes in Regarding the pain of others (2003): “They are not much help if the 
task is to understand. Narrative can make us understand. Photographs do something 
else, they haunt us.”109 For Sontag, photographs of war offer a space to reflect on the 
fact that some people’s sufferings are located on the same map as others’ privileges 
and on how the two may be interrelated “as the wealth of some may imply the 
destitution of others.”110 Critiquing her own notion that an excess of war imagery is 
affecting people’s capacity to respond to the suffering of others with empathy, a view 
that she held in her earlier book On Photography (1977), Sontag proposes that it is 
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not indifference but fear that makes people look away from contemporary 
representations of the horrors of war.111 “In each instance,” Sontag writes, “the 
gruesome invites us to be either spectators, or cowards, unable to look.”112 The ‘us’ 
for Sontag designates those who live at a distance from the daily material 
manifestations of violence and who end up not knowing how to turn the photographs 
they’re viewing into a meaningful action: “It is because a war, any war, doesn’t seem 
as if it can be stopped that people become less responsive to the horrors. It needs to be 
translated into action or it withers.”113Sontag ponders whether it may be better to 
withhold one’s undisputed right to look at photographs since the unstoppability of 
wars maintains one’s empathy without any outlets: “Perhaps the only people with the 
right to look at images of suffering of this extreme order,” Sontag writes, “are those 
who could do something to alleviate it- say, the surgeons at the military hospital 
where the photograph was taken- or those who could learn from it. The rest of us are 
voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be.”114  
 
As opposed to Sontag’s excavation of potential reactions from empathy, outrage, 
indifference, voyeurism, to the incapacitation of action while faced with the 
photographic representations of suffering, Ariella Azoulay refuses to use these 
emotions as the guidelines of a passive gaze and claims that it is “our historical 
responsibility not only to produce photos but to make them speak.”115 Azoulay calls 
for ethical spectators to interpret actively rather than passively the representations of 
the manifestations of violence that occur under the aegis of governing democracies. 
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“We look at the photograph of disaster as something that concerns us, not because we 
have to identify with the victim,” Azoulay states “but because we are governed by the 
regime that produced these disasters.”116 She proposes that all people are bound by a 
civil contract of photography composed of a borderless citizenry and constituted of 
“anyone and everyone who bears any relationship whatsoever to photographs- as a 
photographer, a viewer of photographs, or a photographed person.”117Every citizen 
within this citizenry has equal rights, according to Azoulay, although governments 
only protect some of citizens, while designating others as enemies, or non-citizens. 
“This inequality amongst equals”, she adds, “imposes a common though not equal, 
burden of responsibility on the shoulders of all citizens of photography.”118 The 
citizenship of photography ensures the visibility of offences that are perpetrated 
against some people and not others. Those who are unjustly treated and forced to 
remain silent can negotiate with others in the citizenry of photography and to rebel 
against their very silencing inside the photograph that the government willed.119 
Azoulay gives the example of a photograph of Israeli soldiers posing next to a dead 
Palestinian man as though he were a trophy of sorts. “Only several yards from the 
soldiers stood another photographer who watched what was happening,” she writes, 
“and thought it was proper to record it: not a photograph of soldiers next to a body, 
but of soldiers having their pictures taken with a body.”120 In this instance, a 
photograph of a photograph reveals the violated rights of the dead man’s body. 
According to Azoulay, the Palestinian citizen’s photograph thus turns into an active 
indictment against the acts violence he suffered (his death as well the disrespect to his 
                                                
116 “Institute for Public Knowledge: Ariella Azoulay/What is visual citizenship?” accessed June 5, 
2014, http://vimeo.com/25369128 
117 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 97 
118 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 144 
119 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography 
120 Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, 145 
 121 
dead body). The Israeli regime, according to Azoulay, does not acknowledge the 
citizenship of Palestinian citizens and continually tries to turn them into subjects 
through military force.121  
 
Yet indictment within a photograph cannot bring back the Palestinian man in question 
who remains nameless in both photographs nor can it change the course of his death, 
or remove the pain it engendered. Were the soldiers ever punished for their actions, or 
did this act fall into oblivion as one of many other similar violations? If the 
photograph reveals the workings of the ruling power and the normalization of an act 
of violence that remains unpunished by law, it also reveals how photography (as used 
by the soldiers) is sometimes inseparable from the exercise of power, and how the 
power is inherently self-protected from being held accountable. 
 
Whereas Sontag affirms that society merely chooses to highlight some photographs 
rather than others to instruct citizens on ‘important memories’ and asserts that there is 
no such thing as collective memory, or collective guilt,122 Azoulay perceives the 
collective citizenship of photography as enabling a new formulation of human rights 
that is based on the link between visuality and citizenship. 123  For Azoulay 
photography reveals the ways in which some people have been and are being 
dominated by a sovereign power suggesting that an active spectator can reconstruct 
the harm done to citizenship.124 Although the notion of an active and ethical spectator 
leads to the recognition of war within the mundane acts of violence that have been 
incorporated and normalized in society, how can an active spectatorship effectively 
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transform the laws of the sovereign powers? An active spectatorship does not take 
into account that those whose rights are continuously and actively violated may be 
tired of being the subject of a photographic debate while their daily life cannot 
provide respite from violence. Azoulay’s notion of a citizenry of photography does 
not eliminate Sontag’s proposition of the potential existence of an uninterested and 
apathetic spectator whose only concern is to be on the safe side of authority, or that of 
a passive spectator whose incapacitated action leads to a lack of interest. But her 
imperative of the active spectator highlights the urgency of questioning what one is 
looking at all the time, and reconstructing the social reality that led to the meeting 
between the photographer and the photographed. It also propels reflection on how the 
formulation of laws to halt any questioning of the authority’s actions may be 
implemented to limit an active spectatorship from turning into a tool for immediate 
action.  
 
“The law is not born of nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the first 
shepherds frequented” Foucault writes, “The law was born in burning towns and 
ravaged fields. It was born together with the famous innocents who died at break of 
day.”125 According to Foucault violence results in the drafting and the implementation 
of new laws, and it is within these laws that war as the manifestation of power can be 
best observed. Foucault questions whether the very function of laws in society is not 
simply an extension of war that ensures the domination of some over others: “Does 
what has now become the commonplace theme, though it is a relatively recent theme, 
that power is responsible for defending civil society imply, yes or no, that the political 
structure is so organized that some can defend themselves against others, or can 
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defend their domination against the rebellion of others, or quite simply defend their 
victory and perpetuate it by subjecting others?”126 The application of laws through the 
institutions that are assigned to protect civilians from harm, and by extension from 
seeing the ‘harmful’ effects of violence in images, occurs through censorship laws 
and camouflage ensuring the domination of one group over another thereby crushing 
any potential (foreign or local) rebellion.  
 
Searching for images that ‘count’ as war is just as much a delineation of the manner 
in which the cultural production of the knowledge of war is fraught with 
epistemological struggles among polyvalent interpretations of war. This is most 
evident in anti-war representations that decry the injustices and violence suffered by 
civilians as a result of war, and that sometimes remain banned for many years. 
Francisco de Goya y Lucientes’ The Disasters of War (1810-1820) for instance, 
consisting of eighty-two prints that were only released publicly in 1863 more than 
three decades following the artist’s death. Painted between 1810 and 1815 they depict 
Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and the subsequent guerrilla war that was unleashed 
following the defeat of the Spanish monarchy.127 There is no glory, valour or beauty 
only misery and violence to be found in war as Goya portrays it, just as there is no 
escape or breathing space for the body stuck in the nightmarish etched frames. One of 
the plates entitled De qué sirve una taza? asks what one cup can do to save a family 
from famine.  
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“Foucault invites us to pay attention to the past and ongoing epistemic battles among 
competing power/knowledge frameworks that try to control a given field,”128 Medina 
writes. The epistemic battles of what counts as war not only take place on the ground 
through battles, but also through the maintenance of the authority of some texts as 
seminal war texts and some images as famous war images, whereby ‘irrelevant’ 
information/images/representations are kept in the dark, no longer contributing to the 
recognizability of the political struggles that are inherent in war. 
 
Clausewitz’ famous dictum of war being the continuation of policy by other means 
was inverted by Foucault who defined “politics as war by other means”.129  
 
                          
 Fig. 25, Francisco de Goya Y Lucientes: De qué sirve una taza? (1863) 
 
It is within the application of laws that war can be perceived most clearly for Foucault 
and not in the act of war itself, nor in the analysis of the strategy that leads to war. 
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Foucault saw the theory of sovereignty that functions as an analysis of power from 
subject to subject (or the subject of the sovereign who makes subjects of his subjects) 
as insufficient to explain: “how operators of dominations inform relations of 
power.”130 He suggested a theory of domination instead in order to understand how 
power functions through bodies: “We should not, therefore, be asking subjects how, 
why, and by what right they can agree to being subjugated, but showing how actual 
relations of subjugation manufacture subjects.”131 The representation of war can be 
perceived as a practice of subjugation that manufactures the subject of war according 
to the drafting of laws that limit what can and cannot be seen, and what can and 
cannot be articulated through that visibility. Although it was in the Crimean War 
(1853-1856) that the first order of censorship was enacted and photographers who did 
not follow the rules were jailed,132 censorship laws forbidding the revealing of death 
in war were maintained alongside the development of the progressing technology of 
the camera from the daguerreotypes that necessitated the immobility of the subject 
being photographed for fifteen minutes (thereby leading to the staging of some war 
scenes by photographers such as Roger Fenton (1819-1869) who had to transport 
bulky camera equipment in his van to photograph the Crimean war) to handheld 
cameras capable of capturing an image in a click and that could well be placed in the 
centre of warfare as in Vietnam.  
 
Foucault suggests that operators of domination induce subjugation by manufacturing 
subjects who follow orders and who comply through the subtle functioning of 
dominations within the social fabric of institutionalized practices, rather than by a 
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forceful imposition of power. Photographers were not forcefully disallowed from the 
terrain during the First World War (1914-1918) or the Second World War (1939-
1945). Rather their presence ensured the spreading of the ‘image’ of an apparent 
liberty of press whereas the limits imposed by the drafted censorship laws pre-
regulated both wars’ visibilities to reveal some angles and dissimulate others as is 
now common knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 26, Roger Fenton, M.Sparling, seated on Roger Fenton's photographic van  (1855)133 
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Fig. 27, Roger Fenton, Quiet day in the "Mortar Battery" (1855)134 
 
 
 
Described by Rainer Fabian and Hans Christian Adam as being of a mechanized war, 
a mechanized death, and a mechanized destruction, First World War photographs of 
fighting served to reveal the action of war while camouflaging its effects on the 
bodies of the fallen: 135  “Never before had a war been so comprehensively 
photographed, and never before had the public seen so few pictures showing the 
realities of a war in which ten million men died, or so few depictions of death.”136 In 
“The Storyteller” Walter Benjamin describes the returning soldiers from the First 
World War as “grown silent—not richer, but poorer in communicable experience” for 
bodily experience had never been so strongly challenged by mechanized 
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warfare.137The soldier, for Benjamin, who once went to school on a horse-drawn 
streetcar, returned home to see that only the clouds remain unchanged. The fragility of 
his body in the face of the technology of war grows and he is muted by the sum of his 
experiences.138 According to Benjamin, the First World War marked the beginning of 
the decline in the communicability of all types of experiences. The tell-able and the 
see-able started to recede into secrecy and camouflage just as the technological means 
(print, photography, film) to transfer these experiences became more widespread.   
 
 
Fig. 28, (Author Unknown), WW1 Troops in trenches139  
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       Fig. 29, (Author unknown) Soldiers in World War II Germany140 
 
 
One can’t perceive images of previous wars today as they had been perceived then, 
since the very dissimulations that regulated the war’s coverage and that curbed wars’ 
visibilities have by now been uncovered, and since the perceptual changes that 
happened through different wars have been normalized. The passage of time gives 
images new meanings as the fictionalization of wars by governments becomes public 
knowledge and the visibility of the traces that have survived, spell new stories. Old 
photographs of war display the presence/absence of that which a viewer now knows, 
namely that an unframed brutality may be next to a most mundane photograph of 
soldiers in trenches. Surviving images of war are therefore a visible proof of a legal 
angle that hides that which was not allowed to become visible. Archival images of 
war can be seen as tricksters for when they were taken, there was no knowledge of 
how they would end up losing their initial intent and changing allegiances to decry the 
very government that allowed their existence. Images are like agents, W.J.T. Mitchell 
                                                
140 “Facts about World War 2,” accessed July 5, 2013, 
https://www.makewav.es/story/292441/title/factsaboutworldwar2 
 130 
writes, adding that: “If images are agents, then, perhaps they should be thought of as 
double agents, capable of switching sides, capable of being “flipped” by acts of clever 
détournement, appropriation, and seizure for purposes quite antithetical to the 
intentions of their creators.”141 When it comes to archival images of war, the act of 
détournement is most often done by the passage of time itself that supplies the image 
with the hidden information to reveal how photography was put to the service of 
camouflaging war, and how it is always part of the production of war.  
 
Haraway’s definition of the artifactualism of nature is a suitable analogy in 
understanding how fact and fiction combine in one’s understanding of war: “Nature 
for us is made, as both fiction and fact. If organisms are natural objects, it is crucial to 
remember that organisms are not born; they are made in world-changing 
technoscientific practices by particular collective actors in particular times and 
places.”142 Haraway’s quote is in reference to scientific practices that take place in 
laboratories where samples of what counts as nature (animals, trees, cells, etc.) are 
examined, visualized, tested, and reproduced through scientific experiments, leading 
to a seeming factual understanding of nature, whereas the very interventions of human 
and non-human actors (in reference to Bruno Latour’s actor-network-theory143) such 
as scientists and the tools they use actually determines the continuous ‘making’ and 
‘understanding’ of what nature is/is not. Similarly the representation of war, and one’s 
encounter with it, reveals war’s artifactualism not only through censorship laws as a 
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tool that governments impose to dissimulate war’s motives, workings, and outcomes 
but also because it is an all-encompassing violence produced by human and non- 
human actors such as soldiers, politicians, civilians, weapons, television sets, cameras, 
photographs etc. War, constituted of the combined effects of its elements, 
continuously alters the perception of the material space of life, as well as the 
understanding of those involved in it and their capacity to communicate their 
experiences. The specificity of ‘times and places’ that Haraway insists on in her 
definition of the artifactualism of nature, is just as important of a distinction in war as 
a reminder that war practices are always the result of the choices and experiments of a 
group of individuals (military personnel, scientists) that end up being used on the 
ground, in fields, on soldiers, and on civilians. War therefore always functions 
through and by individuals within a material space that redefines language, space, and 
communication in such a way that these changes become part of the course of life. 
 
 
  Fig.30, “Author Unknown”, Gas mask drill for primary school children, UK, 1941.144 
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In his often quoted sentence where he writes that “weapons are tools not just of 
destruction but also of perception,”145 French theorist Paul Virilio explores the First 
World War’s soldiers’ notions of mobility in the environment, their conception of 
space and distance, the limits of their eye-vision versus the weapon’s optical vision, 
and how these continuously shift with the changing military technology. These 
perceptual shifts alter the civilians’ lives just as much as they do the soldiers’, as they 
capacitate visibilities and angles (such as aerial views) that in turn circulate and 
become part of the recognition of war. The advanced military technology ushered in 
by the First World War led to a heightened visibility of distances, a growing inability 
to communicate bodily experiences and to the prevalence of deathless panoramic 
photography. 
 
Photography continued to serve the preferred framing of war as a victorious and 
honorable venture during the Second World War, as Rainer and Adam confirm 
writing that more than 15,000 war photographers were accepted in German society as 
civilian observers, and were reportedly filming, photographing and writing about 
German victories while the German fronts were disintegrating.146 For Chris Hables 
Gray, the Second World War was a scientific venture favoring discourses of science, 
logic and mathematical calculation: “It is with good reason that World War II is often 
called the physicists’ war, for physics made the total weapon, atomic bombs, possible,” 
Gray writes, adding “Yet, as valid as that label is, it disguises somewhat the pervasive 
role of formal logical systems and other aspects of technoscience. Consider scientific 
management and operations research. Both of these formal/logical systems are rule 
                                                
145 Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception,  trans. Patrick Camiller, (London: 
Verso, 1989), 6 
146Rainer and Adam, Images of War, 166. 
 133 
bound, explicitly defined, and involve a great deal of mathematical 
calculation.” 147 Technoscientific thought was enabled by the military’s use of 
computers allowing them to organize masses of people into punch-able categories and 
numbers to be managed, moved, killed, or allowed to live depending on the trajectory 
of the war. The Italian journalist Enzo Traverso, as cited by Mbembe, diagnoses 
mechanized thinking as the basis of Nazi Germany’s dehumanization and 
industrialization of death: “having become mechanized, serialized execution was 
transformed into a purely technical, impersonal, silent, and rapid procedure.”148 The 
serialized execution and categorization of civilians as ‘enemies’ or ‘allies’ was made 
possible through the management of masses of people on the ground, but also through 
military technology’s capacity to oversee cities through aerial control. A dualism of 
enemy versus ally ‘city space’ became more pronounced during the Second World 
War where the citizen (singular) was made invisible to the naked eye of the airman 
manning the military aircraft.  
 
The atomic bomb, being the culmination of military and scientific experiments of the 
Second World War, changed the conception of war to become the potential end of all 
known forms of life on earth, as Foucault writes: “The power to manufacture and use 
the atom bomb represents the deployment of a sovereign power that kills, but it is also 
the power to kill life itself. So the power that is being exercised in this atomic power 
is exercised in such a way that it is capable of suppressing life itself.”149 Atomic 
weapons have an impact on the perception (through language and through images) of 
‘life and death’ within societies; where some nations possess the power to maintain 
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life (on earth), their representatives (experts, scientists, politicians) therefore become 
the negotiators of whose life counts as life and whose death is irrelevant to the course 
of life.  
 
What counts as a recognizable image of war prior to the advent of the atomic bomb 
was continuously regulated through images and through language to maintain 
epistemic hegemonies despite the public’s knowledge of the age-old governmental 
tactics and secrecies to blur war’s violent realities. The advent and use of atomic 
warfare towards the end of the Second World War and the deployment of the 
technology of nuclear aerial bombing created the possibility to kill civilians in large 
numbers, and the camouflaging of that immense power possessed by some and not 
others was produced in linguistic representations. “Anyone who has seen pictures of 
Hiroshima burn victims,” writes Carol Cohn, “ or tried to imagine the pain of 
hundreds of glass shards blasted into flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to 
hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of-factly referred to as ‘clean bombs’.”150Cohn 
describes having attended a workshop on nuclear weapons in the summer of 1984 
where she spent some time learning the language that nuclear strategists used to 
describe nuclear weapons. Terms such as ‘clean bomb’, ‘collateral damage’, and 
‘surgically clean strikes’ take their reference from a combination of technology and 
strategy as Cohn observed leading her to coin the term ‘technostrategic’ discourse.151 
Cohn noted that she was only spoken to and taken seriously if she employed the 
technostrategic discourse, a practice that made her gradually lose her fear of nuclear 
weapons: “The more conversations I participated in using this language, the less 
frightened I was of nuclear war. How can learning to speak a language have such a 
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powerful effect? One answer, I believe, is that the process of learning the language is 
itself part of what removes you from the reality of nuclear war.”152 Cohn points out 
how language acts as a framing device screening out what is considered superfluous 
and revealing only the desired angle. In that sense, the technostrategic language of 
war censors by revealing, just as much as a photograph of war does, simply by 
locating words that reveal an aerial and distant vision. Situating the technostrategic 
discourse as a post-attack discourse, Cohn reveals its irreversibility for it is only 
concerned with what happens once weapons begin to fire: “The concerns of the 
dominant strategic discourse are limited to the destructive effects of the weapons 
when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the possible deterrent effects of 
possessing these weapons.” 153  The deployment of nuclear weapons and their 
accumulation therefore point to their conceptualizing and normalizing of a post-
detonation language where the notion of peace is rendered irrelevant. The weapons 
themselves, their proliferation, and the damage they cause, functioned as the only 
reference point in the lab, screening out another language that Cohn had started out 
with, namely the one that described the suffering caused by nuclear weapons. Cohn’s 
comparison of two paragraphs describing the aftermath of a nuclear attack on 
Hiroshima (1945) reveal the distancing effect of the technostrategic discourse used by 
an American general versus the embodied language of pain as described by a 
Japanese novelist: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
152 Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” 704. 
153 Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, Working Paper No. 104. (2003), accessed 
June 11, 2012: http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf. 
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They screamed with voices that were no longer human. The screams drowned 
out the groans rising everywhere from the rubble, groans that seemed to rise 
from the very earth itself. 
Hisako Matsubara, Cranes at Dusk 
 
 
You have ways to maintain communications in a nuclear environment, a 
situation bound to include EMP blackout, brute force damage to systems, a 
heavy jamming environment, and so on.  
General Robert Rosenberg154 
 
 
For Cohn, there is no way to use the language of the second paragraph to describe the 
sensations of the first even if they describe the same explosion. Language here is 
revealed as embodying the epistemic struggles of two knowledges one being aerial 
and the other on being on the ground. Nuclear scientists that employ physics to the 
service of military tactics silence the embodiment of their actions onto other human 
bodies in the very language they employ revealing the artifactualism of war as a 
fictionalized scientific linguistic lens. Who can accuse the technostrategic discourse 
of lying, or of hiding the real effects of war? Instead of writing “causing death to 
human bodies” nuclear scientists will write “causing a blackout to systems,” thus 
turning the enemy into an alien species whose bodies are ‘systems’, and whose 
accidental deaths are ‘damage’. Underlying such a discourse is racism that gets rid of 
the old-fashioned “savage/civilized” divide and computes people instead into numbers. 
The other is no longer described as a savage in the technsostrategic discourse but as 
some kind of a system to be dismantled, and blacked out.  
 
                                                
154 Cohn, “Sex and death in the world of Rational Defense Intellectuals,” 705. 
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Building on Carol Cohn’s observations, I believe that the term technostrategic 
framing describes the audio-visual framing of live war, as a post-detonation frame 
where the weapons are on the highest order of importance in the image, and where the 
‘reality’ of war is that of the soldier as the tool of strategy. Additionally terms such as 
‘collateral damage’155 have become widespread in media parlance. To search for co-
liveness in live war representations, as the embodied and mediatized experience of a 
civilian leads nowhere for the local quotidian space is outside of the alphabet that 
makes up the technnostrategic framing. Distance stops being the geographical 
distance between countries waging war and becomes the strategic distance between 
air raids and targets. Just as the technostrategic discourse restricts language, so does 
the technostrategic frame restrict vision, and abstract emotions. “Abstract discussion 
of warfare is both the tool and the privilege of those who imagine themselves as the 
(potential) users of weapons,” Cohn and Ruddick write, “The victims, if they can 
speak at all, speak differently.”156 Similarly, the representation of war through aerial 
angles is the privileging of the tactical over the embodied proposed by those who 
cannot imagine they will endure the effects of aerial bombing.  
 
What can one know of war through its camouflage in language and in images? 
Foucault’s advice to search for how the application of power functions in war, implies 
that one may be able to know more about war through the implementation of laws and 
prohibitions during and after war. Watching photographs and newsreels of war, 
listening to politicians talk about war, or nuclear strategists discuss their tactical views 
                                                
155 Military Dictionary: Collateral Damage: “Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or 
objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is 
not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the 
attack.”(JP 3-60), accessed, February 22, 2012: http://www.military-dictionary.org/collateral_damage 
156 Cohn and Ruddick, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,”11 
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on killing, are otherwise examples of governmentally regulated and approved 
evidence of wars which is camouflage in the making, a camouflage that changes 
allegiances and meanings with the passage of time.  
 
What is camouflaged through acts of censorship is the revealing of the fragility of 
those who serve in the military institution. As the political causes that propelled acts 
of war become irrelevant with time, photographs and newsreels reveal how soldiers 
go to war to kill others and to risk getting killed. The notion of sacrificing one’s body 
for the sake of the nation is maintained by the continuous camouflage of death during 
war that politicians have continuously controlled through the images of the Crimean 
War, the First and Second World War.  
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Fig. 31, Letter excerpt from the philosopher Bertrand Russell imprisoned 
for rallying against war, sent to his brother from jail (12 August 1918)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…Apart  from the question of physical  fitness,  I am seriously hampered by not having access to a library & by not being able to discuss philosophical questions except rarely & briefly”.157  
 
                                                
157 National Archives UK, Bertrand Russell, accessed July 05, 2013: 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/britain/p_bertrand.htm 
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                               Fig. 32, General Allenby’s Proclamation of Martial law in Jerusalem,  
                               Palestine. December 11, 1917 
          “The defeat  inflicted upon the Turks by the troops under my command has resulted in the occupation of your city by my forces….”158  
 
                                                
158  The Library of Congress, “A guide to World War I Materials”, accessed June 6, 2013, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/wwi/wwi.html. 
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It was the Vietnam War (1956-1975) that was, according to Susan Sontag, the first 
and last opportunity for the war photographer to act as the lone intrepid man operating 
out of sight most of the time.159 Despite the held belief that the war photographer was 
a lone hero whose aim was to reveal the horrific face of war, with the only aim to tell 
the truth through uncensored images, technostrategy dominated the Vietnam War with 
the continued use of aerial bombing. The popular belief that the Vietnam War was 
lost because of the media maintains fear from the ungraspable power of images and is 
presented by US officials as the reason why subsequent wars were tightly censored. 
This preferred framing of the Vietnam War suppresses both the military reasons why 
the United States lost the war, and ignores the fact that the passage of time changed 
the reading of many of the Vietnam War images. Two famous photographs from the 
Vietnam War namely Eddie Adams’ The Execution of a VC Suspect (1968), as well 
as Nick Ut’s Accidental Napalm Attack (1972), both Pulitzer Prize winners, are 
believed to have changed public opinion at the time, and resulted in a lack of support 
for the war. But various factors contributed to the de-popularization of the Vietnam 
War, and these were mainly rooted in anti-war movements that were mobilized in the 
1960s in the United States and in Europe. The language depicted in the choice of the 
photographs’ titles indicates their intended reading at the time. Whereas the former 
stresses the criminality of the suspect being killed and of ‘rough justice’ having taken 
its course, the latter stresses the accidental nature of napalm bombing, adding to it the 
‘human error factor’ that happens in war. Additionally, the three years between one 
photograph being taken and the other challenge the notion that Adams’ photograph 
halted the course of the war. The mythologizing effect of these two photographs on 
the course of the Vietnam War is questioned in the writings of scholars such as Robert 
                                                
159 Sontag, Regarding the pain of others, 21. 
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Hamilton, Guy Westwell and Michael Griffin. The notion that the visibility of war in 
one snapshot can and did alter the course of history is critiqued by Hamilton who says 
that Adams’ photograph did not change the course of history, and that it is more 
accurate to say that it is history that has changed the course of the photograph just as 
the dominant perception of the Vietnam War gradually shifted: “The Pulitzer prize, 
and the many awards subsequently won by Adams, guaranteed the image a place in 
the histories of news photography… In this way, while the image enters the domain of 
history, its effect is exaggerated and de-historicised.”160 The photograph, later used 
and disseminated by anti-war movements lost its initial intended hegemonic reading 
and became known as an anti-war image. The power of images may then reside in the 
their longevity and the capacity to revisit them to see if and how they have changed 
allegiances.  
 
The prevalence of aerial bombing reveals the continued implementation of 
technostrategy during the Vietnam War. In Peter Davis’ 1974 documentary Hearts 
and Minds, interviews of local Vietnamese citizens are juxtaposed with those of US 
Vietnam War veterans revealing the traumatizing effects of the technology of 
weapons used in the war: “You never could see the people”, United States Vietnam 
veteran Randy Floyd says in one of the interviews about flying a bomber plane. 
“Occasionally you could see the houses when you were bombing a village, you know, 
you never heard the explosions, you never saw blood, or screams. It was very 
clean.”161 Floyd reveals how the disembodiment of the military view takes place 
through aerial bombing, and presents an image of the Vietnam War that is not very 
                                                
160 Robert Hamilton, “Image and Context: The Production and Reproduction of “The Execution of a 
VC Suspect” by Eddie Adams”, in Vietnam Images: War and Representation, (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1989), 180. 
161 Hearts and Minds, Peter Davis, dir. (1974), a BBS production, Rainbow releasing, released 1975, 
Sweden, accessed April 20, 2012 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1d2ml82lc7s 
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popular. How could Floyd not have known about what was happening on the ground 
when the reporting of the Vietnam War was supposedly uncensored? Floyd’s 
reflection resulting from an interview conducted in the 1970s, reveals how the 
passage of time reframed the Vietnam War, and conveys how the materiality of his 
own position (inside the bomber plane and aiming at targets) produces and maintains 
the separation between his actions and the impact of his actions on others. “During the 
missions, the result of what I was doing,” Floyd says “the result of this…this game, 
this exercise of my technical expertise never really dawned on me. That reality of the 
screams or the people being blown away, or their homeland being destroyed. This was 
not part of what I thought about.”162 It is only when he imagines that someone may 
bomb his own children with napalm that Floyd sheds tears in the closing segment of 
Davis’ film. In a moving final address he says that he (and Americans in general) is 
trying very hard not to think of the lessons that the Vietnam War, and that the 
American military does not want to see that technology and military tactics will never 
be able to stop people from fighting for their freedom.163 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
 
162 Hearts and Minds, Peter Davis, dir. (1974) accessed April 20, 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1d2ml82lc7s  
163 Hearts and Minds, Peter Davis, dir. 
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3.1 Collateral Damage 
 
  
  Fig.33 
 
 
name:  collateral,  family  name:  damage,  body:  irrelevant  to  the  military  age: 
irrelevant to the military, crime: at the wrong place, at the wrong time, Aim of  re‐
search:  to  search  again,  to  un‐clone,  to  de‐clone  the  medialitary  technology’s 
unifying mono‐vision. 
 
The terms propaganda, and censorship may be unfitting to describe a photograph 
taken from an angle that allows the visibility of the combined effects of military 
technology (science, weapons, planes, and cameras) and media (framing, transmitting 
and distributing). From that angle, the other is not vilified but omitted altogether from 
the field of vision. The position of the camera communicates distance from the ground, 
as the source of visibility and as the relevant angle of knowledge. A technostrategic 
frame reveals instead of hiding, and by revealing disembodies and hides the actors 
who are part of the photograph. Who took the photograph, who enabled the 
explosion, who died, who survived, how many experiments were effected to capacitate 
the explosion, who is so fortunate as to look at this photograph and think it is merely a 
cloud formation? A photograph abstracts, simplifies, and brings the semblance of 
lightness to that which is heavy. 
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3.2 Transhistoricity and the advent of Live War. 
 
 
At the onset of the first Gulf War, the American president George HW Bush 
compared the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to Hitler. “The phrase, Saddam Hussein 
is Hitler seems to me very weak, even optimistic,” writes Paul Virilio, “as the risks 
associated with the Middle East in 1990 are ultimately incomparable with those of 
Europe in the 1940s.”164 For Virilio, the optimism of such a statement rests in its 
avoidance of the reality that an all-out nuclear war has reset the rules of war. A 
comparison of the sort eludes the military and scientific post cold-war nuclear 
weapons capabilities of the west who have the capacity to respond with nuclear 
weapons and unleash an irreversible war. “If the Russians and the Americans have 
just ended the ‘Cold War’ and have together initiated a promising disarmament,” 
Virilio states, “it is less by reciprocal goodwill than because they were no longer 
masters of an arms race that ruined their economies and threatened at any time to get 
out of control.”165 Virilio considers the real risk to be beyond the claim that Hussein 
was planning to use chemical weapons on his enemies in the west just as he did on his 
own people, but that the fragile alliances between the strong nations (France, U.K, 
Germany, U.S, Russia, China) may change at any given time and gradually lead to an 
all out and unexpected nuclear war between the nations who possess nuclear 
capabilities. In other words, the real threat lies for Virilio in the very possession of 
these weapons by any nation.  
 
                                                
164 Paul Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the speed of light. trans. Michael Degener 
(London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005),16 
 
165 Paul Virilio, “Desert Screen” 
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Having first compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler, Bush later declared that the 
American victory of the First Gulf War (1990-1991) had finally closed the chapter of 
defeat left by the Vietnam War. Freely mixing between three unrelated wars Bush 
used transhistoricity as an affective tool to propel a certain reading of the First Gulf 
War. Re-editing history with the disembodiment of its complexity, transhistoricty 
serves to represent the past through a tactical and military lens in order to serve the 
present. While live war was introduced as the technostrategic bombing of Baghdad, 
Bush’s rhetoric proposed that Hitler clone’s was being targeted, and that waging war 
led to the redemption of the American soldier from the woes he felt during the 
Vietnam War.  
 
What Bush’s speech proclaimed was that although a sixteen-year span separated two 
wars that are historically, geographically and culturally very remote to one another, 
wherever the war had stopped in Vietnam, (which is at the point of defeat) it was able 
to continue in the Gulf War and produce a happy and victorious ending. For Myra 
Mendible, the discourse of war in the United States had up until then been one of 
humiliation as seen in the news, in Hollywood films and in political speeches, 
whereas the victorious speech “pronounced an official end to the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, 
a malaise that had presumably stricken the American psyche for over 16 years.”166 
Mendible challenges the false notion that each and every American is defined as 
having suffered that humiliation and is now proud to “reclaim their sovereignty.”167 
 
                                                
166 Myra Mendible, “Post Vietnam Syndrome: National Identity, War, and the Politics of Humiliation,” 
Radical Psychology 7 (2008), accessed February 6, 2011, http://www.radicalpsychology.org/vol7-
1/mendible.html 
167 Myra Mendible, “Post Vietnam Syndrome”. 
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Hollywood War movies such as Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979), 
Stanley Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket, and Oliver Stone’s Born on the Fourth of July 
(1989) revealed the continued questioning of the soldiers’ experiences of the Vietnam 
War in the American psyche for years following its end. Yet these films often told the 
narrative of war as an American soldier’s narrative, supporting the myth of a one-
sided trauma as Griffin confirms: “Intentionally or not, the corpus of post-Vietnam 
Hollywood films creates an image of the war in which the American soldier was the 
primary victim betrayed by the government, by the media, and by the American 
people”168 adding that “the deepest strain running through American mythic views of 
the war is that it was primarily American soldiers who ‘got screwed’ (never mind the 
millions of Vietnamese deaths).” 169  Alternative epistemological readings of the 
Vietnam War are therefore suppressed within the agreed upon narrative of the war as 
one of loss and humiliation for the young American soldier. Local Vietnamese 
citizens are completely removed from that narrative unless they are seen as the 
escaping victims. For an affective link to be made between the Vietnam and the Gulf 
War is to instrumentalize the myth and to turn both nations’ civilian populations into 
passive vehicles for the drafting of an American soldier’s story of loss and redemption, 
trivializing the sufferings endured by the Vietnamese, and the Iraqis and making the 
first Gulf War appear like a Hollywood action sequel film to the Vietnam War. 
 
“The Gulf was a vindication not just of Vietnam,” Phil Melling writes, “but of an 
entire Cold War thesis, a confirmation that history could be rewritten, wars refought 
                                                
168 Michael Griffin, “Media Images of War,” Media, War & Conflict 3, no. 1 (2010): 16, accessed June 
24, 2013, http://mwc.sagepub.com/content/3/1/7.short. 
169 Griffin, "Media images of War,"17 
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and failures overturned through rapid demonstrations of military authority.”170 W.J.T 
Mitchell’s advice to pay close attention to the crossing of the borders between 
imaginary and real wars reveals transhistoricity as a constructed image of war that 
uses language and imagination to abolish the specificity of history by closing the 
distance gap between the past and the present. New wars are turned into cloned 
images of a familiar past war that can be fought again with ‘better’ results. Foucault 
suggests that it is by looking at the incoherence of statements and by following the 
thread of analogies that an affective rather than a rational thematic can emerge.171 The 
analogy made between the Vietnam War and the Gulf war locates the essence of the 
‘Vietnam syndrome’ onto the military losses that can be redeemed with the 
advancement of the technology of the weapons deployed in the Gulf. Moreover, by 
removing the existence of traumatic post-war syndrome from the realities of war, 
regardless of its outcomes, and by making sure the violent realities of war are out of 
sight (as bloody), while fully in sight (as technostrategy), Bush redefined a national 
trauma from an army tactical perspective. It remains to be seen if technostrategic 
military wars will not produce their own traumas in time despite their being perceived 
as having been a success, as recent reports reveal of “first Gulf war psychological and 
physical syndromes.”172  
 
By comparing the Vietnam War to the Gulf War, Bush dissimulates the restrictions 
imposed on the Gulf War coverage where journalists and photographers had to 
function under strict military control, and were forced to a pooling system which 
                                                
170 Phil Melling “Burial Party: The Gulf War as epilogue to the 1980s” in The Gulf War Did Not 
Happen: culture, politics, and warfare post-Vietnam, ed.Jeffrey Walsh,(Vermont: Arena 1995), 68 
171 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 
1989) 167 
172 Soldiers Show Gulf War syndromes, Mail Online (Nov. 29, 2013) Accessed Nov.29, 2013: 
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limited the coverage to militarily and governmentally approved angles. “The terms for 
allowing the use of cameras at the front for non-military purposes have become much 
stricter,” Sontag writes in reference to the First Gulf War, “as war has become an 
activity prosecuted with increasingly exact optical devices for tracking the enemy.”173 
When all knowledge about war can only be viewed and given from the optical device 
of a military angle, or from a technostrategic frame, the ‘reality’ of war becomes the 
‘reality’ of the military.  
 
 “The boundary between real and imaginary,” W.J.T Mitchell writes, “literal and 
figurative war, in fact, is just as important a consideration in the understanding of war 
as the borders between nation-states.  And the crossing of those borders, their blurring 
by the “fog of war” (and the fog of images and language as well) is one of the most 
important themes for critical reflection, especially in a time dominated by a “war on 
terror” that recognizes no borders or limits of any kind.”174 Mitchell’s use of the term 
‘the fog of war’ may be in reference to Clausewitz’ On War where it is described as 
the uncertainty principle of war, an uncertainty that exists because the fighting parties 
never truly know what will happen to them if the rain suddenly interrupts them, or the 
fog provided cover for the enemy.175 That fog surrounds the representation of war, as 
Mitchell confirms, as well as the language used to describe and define war where the 
borders between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ wars is blurred before the actual borders 
between nation states are also physically reordered.  
 
 
                                                
173 Sontag “Regarding the pain of others” 53 
174 W.J.T. Mitchell, Image War, Nomadikon, (The Bergen Centre of Visual Culture, #13, July 23, 
2012), accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.nomadikon.net/contentitem.aspx?ci=320. 
 
175 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J.J.Graham, (Digireads.Com, 2004), 61 
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The possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and its allies gives them the 
power to wage any war under the moral pretence of deterrence. This may be a real 
incentive in some cases, but it may be a lie in others. Camouflaged information from 
old wars often returns to reveal how settled facts were actually fictions that served to 
propel certain wars and (re) write history(ies). One recent example is the discovery 
that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction that was presented 
by the U.S. president as the rationale for the 2003 Iraq War in 2003.176 Watching the 
presidential speech that was made on the eve of the Iraq invasion with this in mind 
can reveal a lot about the artifactualism of war. It may not fully divulge the reasons 
for waging war but it discloses the manner in which words/images/acts of war were 
employed by the United States president in a live address to stage a fictional incentive 
and to propel an act of war in another part of the world. The passage of time reveals 
the president’s live address as an auto-indictment in the making. The rationale for war 
is a policing one where Bush proposes to protect one side of the earth from the other 
side of the earth, therefore policing a certain law through the application of war: “We 
will meet that threat now with our army, air force, navy, coast guard marines,” Bush 
said in his speech, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters, 
police, and doctors, on the streets of our cities.”177 Claiming to save local Americans 
from future harm, Bush rallied support for the Iraq war by evoking a very specific 
image of great distress. In that image local Americans would end up needing police 
and doctors to save them from the great fires that Saddam’s attacks may produce in 
American cities. The advent of liveness makes camouflage all the more pertinent to 
                                                
176 Julian Borger, “There Were no Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq,” The Guardian October 7, 
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war waging filtering it through satellite that addresses “world viewers” while 
separating them into different camps which the practice of transhistoricity supports. 
 
 
Live War was introduced by politicians within the conceptualization of two imagined 
distances as the recognized distances to and from war. The one is the distance of the 
technostrategic frame, being the distance between the weapon and the target, and the 
second is the transhistorical lens, as the affective distance between one war (the First 
Gulf War) and a previous war (the Vietnam War) as the American soldier experienced 
it and as Hollywood films framed it. Within this configuration of distances, the non- 
recognition of live war from a local citizen’s perspective may result from the 
reframing of her/his life within larger transhistorical and transcultural performativities 
of war, while dissimulating the quotidian space of war where s/he is a holder of 
presence and subjectivity.   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3.3 A fictional/ factual e‐mail  
  
 
Fig.34  Email title: Re: are you ok?  Sent: sometime in July 2006, to a friend in New York City  “Yes..Beirut is calm, there is some kings of a cease‐ fire. Spirits are low though. There is no more fuel. Cars lined up in gas stations for hours. Family and I woke up to images of the massacre, on TV, in the newspapers. It’s all too much. While driving my car, I felt people's eyes were haggard. There are no rules, and no NO’s. Everything here is a target. In the garden where I am filming, Malak, the young woman I told you about kept talking about death. Today, she asked me: what is death? and  can one live after death? She’s 16.  I wouldn’t want to be watching this on TV, or in the  news from the US. So no, I am not considering leaving.  I still haven’t read Sōseki’s I Am a cat. I thought  
I’d get to it this summer. I keep forgetting it’s summertime.  They stole July.” 
Reading about war while in London.  Images,  pictures and formulations and I can now see from a distant lens of  tactics,  history,  and words.  War  is  someone else’s  experience,  books tell  me,  someone  in  the distant  past.  War  as  the present,  the mundane,  that alters  streets  as  it  does individuals  is  silenced, appears  as  non‐existent.  It is  nice  to  think,  for  a change,  that  war  is someone else’s problem. 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Chapter 4. The Artifactualism of live war 
 
 
In Hearts and Minds (1974) directed by Peter Davis, the following scene evokes the 
complexity of filming war, where visibility from a weapon merges with the visibility 
provided by the camera lens and becomes a proof of vulnerability. Two Vietnamese 
men inspecting their home’s rubble following bombings by the American army see 
the filmmaker and his cameraman. “Look, they’re focusing on us now”, one of them 
says, adding: “First they bomb as much as they please. Then they film.” They, being 
the Americans, whose cameras are as invasive as their bomber planes for the man in 
question who has just lost his home and for whom the act of bombing and that of 
filming have merged into one single action. Davis, having included that segment in 
his film, reveals how his camera is viewed as an ally to destruction, and shares with 
his audience the complexity of being an other witnessing and filming a war being 
waged by his countrymen. It is a touching scene in its understatement and in its subtle 
engagement with the implications of Davis’ filming of the Vietnam War, revealing at 
once the director’s desire to engage with local perspectives while pointing to the 
filmmaker’s intrinsic separation from the lives he is filming. Although filmed during 
the Vietnam War, the scene shows that the difficulty of extricating the 
camera/gun/view from the camera/civilian/view has started to make itself visible. The 
filmmaker and the victim both know that a film cannot rebuild a house whose 
destruction was capacitated by an overhead camera inbuilt into a weapon, nor can a 
horrific image of war be so shocking so as to stop the course of war.  
 
When the cease-fire took effect in Lebanon I took a car trip to the South of Lebanon 
with two friends to see what had happened. I was also filming the destruction on the 
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way. There was an inherent aggression to the ease with which filming took place 
following the cease-fire and pressing the record button left me feeling like a voyeur of 
atrocities, a sensation I became acutely aware of as I saw others like me, holding their 
cameras to film the destruction. Admittedly this aggression in the image also 
aggresses the act of aggression itself by turning it into a recordable signal, an image 
which – maybe – enables a symbolic form of taking control (albeit of an image), and 
of maintaining the visibility of the traces of an act of violence. It took us about six 
hours in total to return to Beirut and the sense of space and place that the trip provided 
cannot be felt through a television screen. One’s own size relative to a destroyed 
bridge provides a spatial awareness, that of a body’s smallness within a city. A city’s 
reliance on the functionality of a bridge is taken for granted until the bridge falls. It 
seems simple enough, but the scope of such a loss is directly related to what it 
incapacitates. Circulation. Recording a destroyed bridge as a signal does not erase the 
continued impact of its destruction in one’s daily life. Recording destruction as an 
evidence may serve justice, but the loss becomes part of a series of actions that have 
to be followed in order to re-insure circulation. Even my grandmother who only saw 
the destruction on television may still feel its impact when the restricted circulation 
caused by the falling bridge affects her friends’ ability to visit her. In her observation 
of diffraction as a method of inquiry, Federica Timeto writes: “One way to observe 
the phenomenon of diffraction, which the naked eye can easily notice is when is a 
pebble is launched into water…”178 The circular waves that are formed on the surface 
of a pond from the impact of a stone are diffractions, and taking that analogy into war, 
recording the impact of explosions ignores the diffractions of that impact in the 
location itself. A situated epistemology posits the importance of the body in a space, 
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Poiesis & Praxis 8, no. 2-3 (2011): 163, accessed June 20, 2013, 
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and something as quotidian as no longer being able to circulate in a car because of a 
bombed bridge, is one diffractive path that shows the inseparability of the quotidian 
from the political. My filming of the destroyed bridge along the way revealed one 
angle only of a real impact on the lives of many citizens for many years to come 
through diversions, reconstruction, traffic jams, etc.  
 
Live war is a post-detonation impact driven frame that is registered only through the 
act of aggression itself while the diffractions it generates in the quotidian are ignored 
as irrelevant to the ‘latest live transmission’. As weapons’ trajectories through space 
can be aired through CNN satellite transmissions, recording and airing the impacts of 
air raids became the signature of live war since the first Gulf War. Watching live war 
and filming the quotidian is what initiated the questions that led to my research 
project whereby live satellite transmissions exacerbated the sense that everything 
about war was being recorded from all possible angles. The competing angles of what 
live war meant in 2006 (with Al Jazeera, Al Manar, BBC, CNN all covering war) are 
not comparable with the 1991 Gulf War broadcast when live war was introduced to 
TV audiences and critiqued as showing war as a spectacle. 
 
The second part of my research question namely ‘how to engage with a practice that 
counters the mediatized live view of war as a spectacle of destruction’ propelled me 
to look at the resurgence of the term spectacle (initially coined by Guy Debord as a 
critique of a society that is only concerned with consumption) as a critique of the first 
Gulf War and which remained in usage for subsequent coverage of live war (such as 
the 2003 Invasion of Iraq). Inscribed in a new history (through the passage of time) 
and materiality (on a computer screen) the first live war images can now be viewed 
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and re-viewed online outside of their initial intended context. By looking back at what 
is no longer ‘actuality’, Derrida’s advice to separate between presence and actuality 
can also be applied towards past artifactualities. As noted, the staging of the real 
through an international artifactuality is for Derrida the: “centralizing appropriation of 
artifactual powers for ‘creating the event’.”179 During the first Gulf War, the act of 
war was appropriated by the military gaze and was staged through CNN’s 
performativity of liveness. When the actuality effect has passed, as it has for the first 
Gulf War broadcast, the stylistic choices inherent in making war appear ‘live’ and 
appear as one ‘reality’ only, are more transparent as images begin to betray their 
initial intended meanings. 
In my installation “Fragments” I approached the first Gulf war live broadcast through 
Debord’s ‘détournement’ by separating the audio from the video. As noted in my 
exchanges with the visitors (see “select excerpt from a recorded exchange with 
visitors”), I reproduced the separation on a computer screen where people could listen 
to the audio while flipping through papers where I printed the live war frames as stills. 
When re-viewed outside of their intended context and seen in a new material space 
where the frames could be watched/touched as prints on paper, the first Gulf War was 
re-inscribed within multiple situated readings. It is through co-presence, and the 
sharing of different views, that the aim of my research which is ‘the articulation of co-
liveness by delineating a situated conception of distances in live war’, was achieved 
in my installation. The exchanges between different visitors capacitated the 
deconstruction of the term ‘spectacle’ that contains the notion of a spectator as being 
one type of spectator. Being spectators who came from different countries (some from 
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Lebanon, some from England, the United States, Iraq etc.) revealed the diversity 
inherent in watching war, and made the word ‘spectacle’ appear detached from the 
notion of the spectator. In other words, exchanges between differently situated 
spectators reveals the complexity of being a spectator but also reveals how every 
framed spectacle is always itself reframed in a new space of reception and through the 
subjectivity of perception. The spectacle of the archival footage of the first Gulf War 
has aged and it appears dated through the passage of time, revealing how the 
interpretation of live images is an on-going process of deciphering that occurs not 
only visually but through the historical inscription of the American War in Iraq within 
a series of more current developments such as the Invasion of Iraq (2003-2011) and 
the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein (2006).  Therefore whatever propelled 
war and the staging of the spectacle of war as live no longer exists. Inscribed within a 
new “now” and “here”, live war as it was introduced in 1991 defeats its initial 
promise of liveness but remains as a trace, a proof, an agent, as noted earlier in 
reference to W.J.T. Mitchell’s view of war images. 
 
Questioning what the spectacle means textually (in my written thesis as opposed to 
my installation) and articulating co-liveness through diffraction capacitated an 
exploration of the imaging of distances in language, in images, and in the critique of 
live war as a spectacle. Terms such as ‘simulation’, ‘virtuality’, ‘infotainment’, have 
become defining factors to the recognition of live war and are a critique of the 
epistemologies of war as a live televised signal as I will elaborate further. However 
these terms often remain within the television signal and do not imagine the resonance 
of war in the quotidian space of a viewer residing in the country under attack. Just like 
the technostrategic discourse made nuclear war appear tame for Cohn, so did my 
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engagement with some critical views on live war (such as Jean Baudrillard’s and Paul 
Virilio’s ) make me forget the embodied effects of war, and start to perceive all wars 
as spectacles, revealing the power of language in obscuring situated knowledges.  
 
I have no recollection of the process through which live war became part of war in 
Lebanon, only that war and live war have become inextricably linked. “Omissions, 
and silences are foundational,” Medina writes in his elaboration of a Foucaultian 
epistemology of resistance, “a constitutive part of the “origin”, or the “initiation” of a 
discursive practice. For that reason the fight against those exclusions requires a return 
to the origin.”180 As a discursive practice live war’s original formulation can be 
perceived in the coverage of the first Gulf War on CNN in 1990-1991, where the 
production of the meaning of live war was actualized within a set of stylistic 
approaches. “Discourse,” Hall writes, “is about the production of knowledge through 
language, but it is itself produced by a practice—the discursive practice of producing 
meaning. Since all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive 
aspect.”181 What live war entailed in immediate critiques (of war as a spectacle, and 
as infotainment) are also part of the discursive practices of live war for they engage 
with the deciphering of the meaning and significance of live war. My return both to 
the original First Gulf War CNN broadcast as well as to the critiques that it 
engendered follows Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and to see whether the 
absence of the recognition of co-liveness is a foundational omission embedded within 
the critique of live war. “The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences,” 
Medina writes “to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of 
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our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frameworks.”182 The necessity of 
play to identify the gaps and textual interstices existing in CNN’s broadcast of the 
First Live War is enacted in my text through the diffraction of an imaginary and 
fictional presence evoking co-liveness on the margins of the text. Eluded in both the 
live war broadcast and in its critiques, co-liveness reappears through a textual 
performativity which represents the ‘détournement’ of the original, and aims to 
question the established critical reception of live war as a spectacle, as infotainment, 
and as virtuality. 
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4.1 Frames 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 35 
 
 
Visitor: I didn’t realize people can also watch CNN in Lebanon.  
It made me feel uneasy. 
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Fig. 36 
 
 
 
 
Visitor: I placed my frame on the photograph. Then I returned later and saw 
someone had placed it somewhere else. That was interesting. I hadn’t seen what they 
saw. It annoyed me though, and I changed it back to return later and see if it would 
stay the same. 
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4.2 Live war as a Spectacle and as Infotainment. 
 
As noted previously, the term spectacle was coined by Guy Debord as a critique of 
capitalist society’s passive consumption of TV programming, and was revived (by 
Jean Baudrillard, and Douglas Kellner, for e.g.) as a critique of the sensationalist live 
media coverage of the first Gulf War. The separation between direct experience and 
the mediatization of that experience is addressed by Debord in one of his many 
definitions of the spectacle where “one part of the world represents itself to the world 
and thus becomes superior to it by this representation. The spectacle accordingly, 
becomes the common language of this separation.’183 Debord’s definition implies that 
the spectacle is attractive, appealing, and is a leisurely activity to the people watching 
it, one that they would like to be part of but are separated from in their daily lives. 
“Debord was writing in 1967, the Gulf War may reflect that the US military had 
finally caught up,” writes Keith Solomon, "employing the ‘spectacle’ of technological 
warfare to ensure the public’s consent and complicity …”184 Solomon sees the use of 
spectacle as a tactic to make the weapons and military technology appear attractive to 
ensure the public’s complicity in war.  
 
Although the term spectacle is a critique of the militarization of the media through 
live war, what does calling war a spectacle entail? Does it mean that war has 
effectively become a spectacle? And where such a spectacle elicits excitement, can it 
still be called a spectacle when seen from a local setting? As the spectacle of the 
army’s weapons in action, live war renders military technology attractive, and it 
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makes the active soldiers’ role appear exciting. Twenty years following the 
publication of his first book The Society of the Spectacle (1967), Debord commented 
in a new book entitled Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (1988) that his early 
work differentiated between two forms of spectacular power, the concentrated as seen 
in dictatorial societies and the diffuse as seen in capitalist societies. He added that a 
third form of spectacle has made itself visible, namely the integrated spectacle which 
integrates itself into daily life just as it describes and reconstructs it simultaneously. 
“The society whose modernization has reached the stage of the integrated spectacle,” 
Debord writes, “is characterized by the combined effect of five principal features: 
technological renewal; Integration of state and economy; generalized secrecy; an 
eternal present.”185 Debord locates the acceleration of the technology of the spectacle 
to the end of the Second World War with the rise of ‘specialists’ and ‘experts’ who 
based life on scientific calculations. In his analysis of the integrated spectacle and the 
appeal of Debord’s writings in anti-globalization movements, Julian Eagles analyses 
the notion of the integrated spectacle as the technological renewal of capitalist 
societies through “the existence of an Americanized system of mass production and 
consumption.” 186 Accordingly, an integrated spectacle functions by continuously 
presenting a so-called ‘reality’ as a consumable image of what capitalism allows one 
to achieve. Debord adds that secrecy is the other facet of the integrated spectacle that 
reveals in order to dissimulate. “Never before has censorship been so perfect… The 
spectator is simply supposed to know nothing, and deserve nothing. Those who are 
always watching to see what happens next will never act: Such must be the 
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spectator’s condition.”187 Although Debord does not use the term ‘liveness’ his 
description of the condition of the spectator who always waits for what is going to 
happen next, appears to designate television’s liveness that creates the semblance of 
an eternal present. The spectator is made passive and all her/his energies are expended 
in waiting to see what will happen next on TV. In this reading, the situatedness of the 
spectator is lacking and so is the manner in which her/his interaction with the media is 
not necessarily uniform but occurs through a variety of other societal practices and 
concerns. The notion that the spectacle has a grasp on people’s attention and psyches 
generalizes the notion of a spectator and the prefix ‘the’ is presumably meant to evoke 
a clear notion of who the spectator is. Debord’s description of the way in which the 
spectacle manifests itself as that which is desirable as a distant, unattainable and 
attractive signal is complex yet that same complexity is lacking in his discussion of 
the monolithic spectator. Debord’s evocation of a general notion of spectatorship 
neither reveals how the measurements of the success of the creation of a passive 
media spectator can be ascertained, nor does it take into account the multiplicity of 
spectators’ situated experiences of spectacles.  
 
“The orchestration of the Gulf War was a glaring expression of what the situationists 
call the spectacle – the development of modern society to the point where images 
dominate life,” writes Ken Knabb, adding that “the PR campaign was as important as 
the military one. How this or that tactic would play in the media became a major 
strategical consideration. It didn’t matter much whether the bombing was actually 
‘surgical’ as long as the coverage was; if the victims didn’t appear, it was as if they 
                                                
187 Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, 22 
 165 
didn’t exist.”188 Knabb’s description of the live coverage of the Gulf War, just as 
Solomon’s, explores the situationists’ notion of the spectacle in the framing of the 
first Gulf War. What is different about previous wars (such as the Second World War) 
where camouflage was also enabled by technostrategic angles and later revealed in 
militarily approved newsreels? The difference would be in the format of liveness 
itself and the fact that acts of war can be watched without delay, captivating a 
viewer’s gaze into the moment of impact as Paul Virilio asserts. “No expert, no news 
specialist, can estimate the effects induced by ‘war at home’,” Virilio writes, adding 
that “the example of Vietnam is not a good test case since its effects depended solely 
on televised news programmes in deferred time.”189 Watching war at home, according 
to Virilio, may lead to harmful effects for a viewer who, up until then had been 
accustomed to watching war in deferred time. It is the liveness of war as a televised 
signal that is problematic for Virilio and ‘home’ in this case, is his home. The 
possibility that a home is also a place that is distant from Virilio’s home, where 
people are living the actual effects of war is eluded. In critiquing watching war from a 
distance, Virilio creates the same abstracted notion of distance to the materiality of 
war through language, as live war accomplishes through images, turning a highly 
critical stance on the mediatisation of war into a one sided critique. Similarly Knabb’s 
critique of war as a spectacle and its construction as a clean war fails to conceive of a 
local viewer/spectator of the spectacle of war as living the impacts of war. The term 
spectacle, while efficient in critiquing the staging of war within an abstracted TV 
signal always engages a situated viewer who then alters the very meaning of the 
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spectator/spectacle combination. The spectacle functions through a conception of the 
western viewer as a consumer with no complexity and with no empathy.  
 
“How can we fail to recognize, after a month of standoff,” Virilio wrote about the first 
Gulf War, “that the true intervention force in the Gulf is television? And more 
precisely CNN, the Atlanta network. Saddam Hussein and George Bush certainly, but 
also Ted Turner, the owner of Cables News Network.”190 Virilio proposes that the 
epistemology of live war becomes imbricated with the competing angles that Saddam 
Hussein and George Bush exchange through Ted Turner’s CNN network that 
provides a platform for the broadcasting of live war. In her proposition to always ask 
readers to be critical of how one sees, and where one sees from, Haraway unpacks the 
multiplicity of views imbricated in vision and in positionality.191 Virilio’s analysis 
engages with the Gulf War as an image, and as an information war whose aim is at 
once to deter an enemy while also winning the distant audience. When the 
cartography of war becomes that of the two military angles and to CNN, the 
engagement with Virilio’s theory (which may be accurate, militarily speaking) leads 
to the effacement of the multiplicities inherent in both the local and non local viewers’ 
situated perspectives.  
 
In his notion of ‘the Total War’ Virilio writes: “Total War takes us from military 
secrecy (the second-hand, recorded truth of the battlefield) to the overexposure of live 
broadcast” later adding that the concept of foreign wars has been abolished with wars 
broadcast live into all the cities of the world.192 Virilio’s use of “us” is divisive for it 
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isn’t clear who stands outside this definition. Does there is no more separates and 
frames just as the live broadcast does in its claim to present reality to its viewers. By 
contrasting ‘our experience’ of live war with the ‘old fashioned second-hand recorded 
truth from the battlefield’ war becomes an experience that belongs to one way of 
perceiving, namely through images and not through direct contact with its material 
effects. Virilio eludes the notion that even live war may have an unrecorded, 
unfiltered facet whose materiality does not (and can not) make it through the selection 
processes inherent to live war. Although his critique of the ‘overexposure’ of 
information evokes the saturation of live war as a non-stop mediatisation of war, this 
overexposure is neither omnipresent nor equally distributed amongst different 
countries. “For With the advent of strategic bombing, everything is now brought 
home to the cities,” Virilio writes, “ and it is no longer just the few but a whole mass 
of spectator-survivors who are the surviving spectators of combat.”193 Although 
strategic bombing merged combatants with non-combatant civilians, watching the 
spectacle of air raids and being its victim is not one and the same. If the residents of 
Paris or New York City watching live war on the streets of Kabul in Afghanistan are 
survivors of war, then what are the citizens of Kabul to be called in that case? 
Survivors who are not spectators are non-existent in Virilio’s definition of war and the 
survivors who are forced to be spectators at once (as in co-liveness) are just as absent. 
The actual loss of property, the loss of life, the loss of family is not comparable to the 
sense of loss one watches via a recorded live 24/7 format framed for citizens who 
have been experiencing war from a distance since the end of the Second World War.  
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Limiting the epistemology of war to its representation only abolishes its multiple 
impacts. Indeed what concerns Virilio is how to mentally survive the live 
representation of distant wars whereas the body’s survival is a far bigger concern. An 
exploration of co-liveness in Virilio’s terms reveals that a new category of 
spectatorship did emerge through the advent of liveness, but remains silenced, or 
unseen.  When live war is at once virtual and real (to the senses) the body living both 
effects is at a loss. The violence on the senses, and the (mis)information on the news 
as information wars combine and interrelate to create spectators who are potential 
targets and who want to be survivors. If the live-transfer of war in the cities distances 
some local viewers from its reality, making them unaware of a pending death, the 
opposite proposition that Virilio makes is not realistic: when a surviving audience, as 
Virilio describes contemporary live-war audiences, residing in Paris for instance, 
watches a bombing of Beirut, they don’t turn off their TV sets to find their homes 
have been destroyed, nor do they think they will, whereas the ones living in Beirut 
may, and they always fear it will happen, as noted. The appeal of live information 
may be universal, but the plurality of the experiences denies live war its militaristic 
and unifying lens. For Virilio, all individuals appear to be falling under the prey of 
live-mediated time, discarding the individuality of experiences as well as the disparate 
spread of satellite technologies on earth. Although Virilio questions how one can deal 
with “optical hardwares that become omniscient and omnipresent and like any 
totalitarian regime, encourages us to forget we are individuated beings,”194 his critique 
mirrors omniscient visualizing angles in its failing to recognize the individuated 
beings who cannot escape war as a real destruction of space and place despite 
omniscient visualizing angles of war.  
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“It is absurd to identify the world with those zones in the well-off countries where 
people have the dubious privilege of being spectators,” writes Susan Sontag, “or of 
declining to be spectators, of other people’s pain, just as it is absurd to generalize 
about the ability to respond to the sufferings of others on the basis of the mind-set of 
those consumers of news who know nothing at first hand about war and massive 
injustice and terror.”195 For Sontag, the notion of war as a spectacle fails to take into 
consideration the complexity of what it means to be an audience to live war. The term 
spectacle conflates live war with watching war from a distance leaving aside the 
embodiment of war as a terrorizing violence, while being able to hear its 
mediatization (on live radio, or on live television). Although it is a critique of live war, 
as noted, the term spectacle limits spectatorship and fails to conceive that liveness in 
the first Gulf War was drafting a line separating Arab viewers from non-Arab viewers. 
The conception of an Arab spectator/potential victim is altogether inexistent. The 
critique of what it implies to watch live war locally while experiencing it as a civilian 
through a co-live space was a fundamental omission in the formulation of the 
critiques of live that emerged in 1991. In the Dictionary of Military History, John 
Childs also observes how the coverage of war has, since the first Gulf War, become a 
spectacle and a blood sport for worldwide TV audiences and cynically asks: “Will the 
future battles have to stop for the occasional commercial break?”196 Childs’ critique 
evokes the trivialization of war although the term worldwide TV audiences, once 
again, confines the definition of the world to some nations while excluding other. The 
critique of the staging of action-driven live war sequences presented with lively tunes, 
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logos, and expert commentators also gave rise to the term infotainment denoting a 
mixture of entertainment and news in the coverage of war.  
 
“Emerging during the late 1980s,” Daya Kishan Thussu writes, “the term 
‘infotainment’ has become a buzzword – a neologism that refers to an explicit genre-
mixture of ‘information’ and ‘entertainment’ in news and current affairs 
programming.” Thussu lists the key features of war as infotainment as: “an obsession 
with high-tech reporting using a video-game format to present combat operations, and 
providing a largely virtual and bloodless coverage of war.”197 The bloodless coverage 
of war appears under different guises, as noted in the last chapter. Censorship laws 
and technoscientific processes continuously alter where war is represented from, and 
how it is communicated. The term infotainment is a critique of live war’s camouflage 
of the seriousness of war framing the information in an entertaining manner but the 
term also omits the media’s omissions by mirroring its effects. In other words, 
‘infotainment’ as the information on war presented as entertainment does not reveal 
how the information is actually an entertaining military frame that may have no 
information value at all. Entertainment as such may can still provide information, and 
but when war is packaged as entertainment it is a form of military misinfotainment. So 
why is it called infotainment when in fact, it appears in Thussu’s critique to have no 
information value at all: “The TV’s obsession with high-tech war reporting has grown 
since the 1991 US attack against Iraq.” Thussu writes, and citing Edward Said adds: 
“CNN’s coverage of the Gulf War, for the first time in history brought military 
conflicts into living-rooms across the globe. In the high-tech presentation of war, 
cockpit videos of precision bombings of Iraqi targets were supplied to television 
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networks by the Pentagon thus presenting a major conflict responsible for huge 
destruction of life and property as a painless Nintendo game and the image of 
Americans as virtuous, clean warriors.”198 Although Said, as quoted by Thussu 
critiques the hypocrisy of the military angles provided by the Pentagon to CNN to 
turn war into a computer game, the question of who the viewers are across the globe 
remains obscure. I am not opposed to the critique of infotainment but to the language 
that leaves no space to conceive of co-liveness as a potential space in the making, 
where citizens are shown how they are being killed on their own television screens. 
The purpose of infotainment in war appears to be the camouflage of war’s ugliness 
but when the singularity of every viewer is abstracted from the term itself, all 
viewers appear uniform. Since infotainment relies on a viewer, the abstraction of the 
process of viewing favours a critique of the production aspect of the news while 
making the reception of infotainment to appear of a lesser importance.  
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  Fig.37. “Shwarzkopf,” author unknown, (1991)199 
                                                
199 “The luckiest man in Iraq,” (1991), accessed March 6, 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vteVel7h9b8 
General Shwarzkopf’s often 
referred to debriefing during the 
First Gulf War entitled The 
luckiest man in Iraq is an 
example of infotainment and of 
live war as spectacle.  
 
The General instructs his 
audience to keep their eyes on 
the crosshairs on the television. 
A moving dot appears and he 
jokingly mentions that this is 
the luckiest man in Iraq on that 
day. He then adds, theatrically: 
‘and in his rear view mirror…’ 
The silence that ensues is a 
moment when the audience 
knows what to expect. His own 
audience of journalists and 
reporters burst out laughing. 
The explosion then appears like 
a blotch of ink in the middle of 
the screen, and they continue to 
laugh. 
 
Although Shwarzkopf is making 
entertainment out of war, and 
revealing a tragic moment as a 
spectacle that trivializes the loss 
of property and the dangers of 
war, and normalizes 
technnostrategy, it is in the 
reaction of the spectators that 
the success of Shwarzkopf’s 
performance lies. Had his 
audience yelled, or screamed in 
horror, or even stood up in 
protest, the scene would have 
played differently.  
 
The spectators make the 
spectacle which then appears 
pre-inscribed like a TV show 
with a laughter track to tell 
more spectators how to feel, 
react, and not react. 
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4.3 The virtual, the real, and the live war. 
 
 
Nick Couldry’s exploration of liveness as a ritual category, as discussed earlier in the 
thesis, is of relevance to reiterate how the naturalization of the boundaries between 
real time and live time is instrumental to the media/army’s combined angle of war as 
a technostrategic framework. When the first Gulf War was relayed live on television, 
television liveness was not a novelty but its function was put at the service of 
transmitting war within a 24/7 structure. “It has always mattered that television is 
‘live’ in some sense,” Couldry writes, adding “I want to argue that ‘liveness’ however 
obvious its meaning might appear at different historical moments, is a socially 
constructed term tied not just to television’s but to the media’s claim to present social 
‘reality’”200 The construct of liveness is maintained in television according to Couldry 
despite the fact that its meaning changes, through the media’s claim to present social 
reality. “Live transmission (of anything, whether a real event or a fictional narrative),” 
Couldry writes “guarantees that someone in the transmitting media institution could 
interrupt it at any time and make an immediate connection to real events.”201 By way 
of example the announcement of the 1963 JFK assassination interrupted a fashion TV 
program to broadcast the news.202 
 
In live war, liveness becomes the combination between the live signal, the media’s 
promise of real war as social ‘reality’ and the military gaze. When the military/media 
gaze combine as a source of the real, the real is assigned within a policing lens that, 
                                                
200 Nick Couldry, Media Rituals, A Critical Approach (London: Routledge, 2003), 96. 
201 Couldry, Media Rituals. 
202 JFK Assasination on Live Dallas TV, Accessed October 1, 2013: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpicOfFajNE 
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akin to a surveillance camera tracks criminals and punishes them in live time and for 
all to see. In the first Gulf War, live war on CNN appeared as the technostrategic 
angle of the ‘operational reality’ of military technologies that were used to wage war 
in the early 1990s. “Claims to represent reality are multiplying in contemporary 
societies,” 203  writes Nick Couldry highlighting the connectedness between “the 
countless new forms of reality TV which have received attention in media studies, 
and the claims to present ‘reality’ associated with real-time information processing by 
government and other systems.” 204  Couldry suggests observing liveness in its 
connection to governmentally regulated forms of power such as the police force using 
CCTV. The merging between reality TV and CCTV in police shows such as 
Crimewatch UK, reveals how the normalization of surveillance methods happens 
through mediated forms of entertainment.205 The merging between liveness and the 
technostrategic frame through an entertainment lens normalizes the practice of war 
through its operational military angle, just as reality TV shows normalize surveillance 
methods. Couldry’s reminder that liveness is a construct asserts that the invisibility of 
the televisual processes that make liveness appear seamless, are essential to its 
functionality as a source of ‘reality’. When applied to live war the authority of the 
aerial military angle from which war is being filmed relies on media’s designation of 
‘liveness’ as the source of ‘now’, and ‘here’ thereby obscuring the ideology of the 
military angle, and normalizing the practice of live war.  
 
Even in the naming of “live war”, as introduced by CNN at the onset of the first Gulf 
War (1990), language framed war so as to deny the obvious and to dissimulate within 
                                                
203 Couldry, Media Rituals, 95. 
204 Couldry, Media Rituals. 
205 Couldry, Media Rituals. 
 175 
the oxymoron of live + war, the violence inherent in war. What is live in war? The 
reference is ambiguous. Although live war is an angle on the live representation of 
death in war (without fully displaying death, but displaying the military means of the 
violence) what seems to be “exciting” in the promise of live war, is that the image is 
live first rather than who or what will remain a/live inside its represented frame. The 
format and ideology of liveness as a construct overtakes the content (of war). Three 
initial frames constitute a large part of the first night of the live CNN coverage of the 
first Gulf War (1990-1991). It unfolds as a conversation between the CNN anchor 
based in Atlanta and the two reporters who are stationed at a hotel in Baghdad 
watching the events unfold from their window. The usage of the window as the frame 
from which watching/narrating the events occurs normalizes the distancing of the 
reporters from the streets of Baghdad. Distance is therefore inscribed in the space 
separating the local civilians from the American reporters and the proposed ‘real’ and 
‘now’ of liveness is conceived as a reporter’s experience of war from a window of 
hotel Al Rashid. With the absence of video footage that the reporters say is due to the 
blackout in Baghdad, maps are used instead to illustrate Baghdad. The purpose of the 
live war is not to reveal but to cover, to keep something on view as though from a 
gunsight (to reiterate Stanley Cavell's definition of the live frame)206 and to expose a 
frame until it explodes in an anticipated future. Inside the frames, Baghdad is 
represented through an aerial map, and the only human presences in the frame are the 
two reporters who are each shown as a headshot in a frame within the frame. They 
stand out as audible and visible – and thus recognizable – elements in a city whose 
distance and danger is highlighted by its representation as a rudimentary map. As 
Judith Butler writes, framing “the lives we can apprehend from those we cannot 
                                                
206 Cavell, The World Viewed, 24. 
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preordains the lives that matter as separate from those that don’t.”207 Individuals 
residing in Baghdad don’t matter. What matters is the “now” and “here” as 
determined by the reporters and anchors and the military action all merged into one 
time. “The live image is a filter,” Paul Virilio writes, “not through the space and the 
frame of the screen, but first through its time: a mono-chronical filter that does not 
allow the present to pass away.”208 Similar to Debord’s description of the integrated 
spectacle consisting of an eternal present, the present that is not allowed to pass away 
in live war, is the ‘actuality’. If it is always now in the mono-chronogical filter of a 
live image implicates the ‘live’ and the ‘now’ where the illusion that the separation 
between presence and the actuality (as noted earlier in reference to Derrida) is blurred. 
Audiences are therefore engaged all the time in a televised ‘present’. Since the 
mediated presence is not the same as one’s material presence of the space however, I 
suggest that to be the difference that determines the meaning and substance of 
‘presence’ as a heterogeneous materiality. Karen Barad describes existence as an 
entanglement where individuals are inseparable from their interactions. When 
meaning and materiality are inseparable they occur through entangled intra-relating 
where space, matter, and meaning are continuously reconfigured.209 A mediatized 
‘now’ and ‘here’ ceases for some people if they just turn off the Television. Virilio’s 
own possibility to interpret war is not separate from the materiality of his space, what 
it enables, and/or incapacitates. “Everything is true in the offensive of direct 
broadcasting,” Virilio writes, adding: “true in the instrumental sense of the term, 
operationally and immediately efficacious. The audiovisual landscape becomes a 
                                                
207 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable, (London: Verso, 2009), 3. 
208 Paul Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light, trans. Michael Degener (London: Continuum 
International, 2005), 17. 
209 Karen Barad, Preface to Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
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“landscape of war” and the screen is a squared horizon, overexposed with video 
salvos, like the field of battle under the fire of missiles.”210 Virilio asserts that it is 
‘operationally’ true when a viewer sees a smart bomb is hitting its target and is being 
broadcast yet the truth of the visibility of war is not sufficient to reflect on what other 
truths it generates through its construction and production as an image for all viewers 
to see. “Crucial to understanding the workings of power is an understanding of the 
nature of power in the fullness of its materiality,” writes Barad adding, “to restrict 
power’s productivity to the limited domain of the ‘social,’ for example, or to figure 
matter as merely an end product rather than an active factor in further materializations, 
is to cheat matter out of the fullness of its capacity.”211 In other words, the production 
of a landscape of war as a video battle is an active production power with multiple 
materializations to can only be excavated from different situated perspectives.  
 
“Images do not go into battle and kill each other; human beings do.” WJT Mitchell 
writes, adding: “Images do not plan invasions, massacre populations, and shatter 
bodies… Images are ‘agents’ of war in the sense that a ‘secret agent’ works for a 
foreign power, or an ‘agency’ is an instrument of a state.”212 Whether they are secret 
or covert agents therefore, images are neither true nor not true but their 
instrumentalization and translatability gives them meaning. As an angle on war, the 
illusion of the eternal present of mediation, and the truth of the military televisual 
frame is irrelevant to some viewers, and is always interrupted for citizens whose city 
is under attack. When someone, as the Polish poet Wislawa Szymborska writes, has to 
clean the rubble: “someone has to get mired/in scum and ashes,/sofa 
                                                
210 Virilio, Desert Screen, 17. 
211 Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity,”810 
212 W.J.T. Mitchell, Image War, Nomadikon, (The Bergen Centre of Visual Culture, #13, July 23, 
2012), accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.nomadikon.net/contentitem.aspx?ci=320. 
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springs,/splintered glass,/and bloody rags/…;”213the meaning or truth of any live 
image of war is interrupted. In his description of the televised signal as the sole source 
of analytical inquiry, Virilio ignores the procedures that enable a mono-chronological 
illusion to appear mono-chronological whereas it engages various situated 
chronologies. Imagining for one moment the variety of the processes involved in 
making the truth of the military image translatable in different cities of the world 
(including those who ignore it as irrelevant and quickly switch channels) opens up to 
the multiplicity of translations, and enactments of the military image. Just as the 
conceptualization of the flow of televisual time cannot exist outside of the time of the 
consenting presence (and therefore time) of the viewer, so is the truth-value of a 
military frame directly linked to its translatability by experts who want to say that 
“this” or “theirs” is “the” truth of war that matters. The information presented in the 
opening three frames of the CNN live War broadcast is simultaneously true and false 
in highlighting some truths (maps, aerial views, probing about the reporters’ health) 
and blurring others. 
 
Lisa Parks’ analysis of the 1967 BBC programme Our World reveals how the notion 
of a “scheduled liveness” was enabled through time zoning in the late 1960s and 
remains in effect as a stylistic televisual technique. Park describes the technique as “a 
singular simultaneity, or a global now based on the interweaving of various time-
based imaginaries, which the west tries to control, reorder and rearticulate as the time 
of the now.”214 Parks observes how this televisual technique separates the west from 
                                                
213 Wislawa Szymborska, “The End and the Beginning,” trans. Joanna Trzeciak, accessed June 1, 2011, 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/237694. 
214 Lisa Parks, “Our World, Satellite Televisuality, and the Fantasy of Global Presence” In Planet TV,a 
Global Television Reader, eds., Lisa Parks and Shanti Kumar (New York: New York University Press, 
2003), 87 
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other parts of the world creating a semblance of unity by intercutting from one 
location to another. Parks reveals how the show drew divisions between the 
industrialized nations of the west, and those of the “hungry” developing world, while 
excluding the countries of the communist bloc, challenging the assumption that early 
satellite technology was used to connect nations and generated a harmonious global 
village.215 The use of Time Zoning remains in effect and her analysis sheds light on 
the manner in which the invisibility of the local viewer/target is effected during in the 
first Gulf War broadcast. By conflating the live signal with the now, through a 
montage between different TV studios, war’s materiality and significance is removed 
from Baghdad while it is taking place in Baghdad. 
 
 
                                                
215 Parks, “Our World,”75. 
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     Fig.38. “CNN’s live war during the First Gulf War” 216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
216 “As it Happened, The Gulf war on CNN (part 1),” accessed May 4, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlC60Kef9Mg 
 
 
 
 
The editor has the flu. 
 
Arnett remembers what it felt like in 
Vietnam. 
 
He is excited about the war starting 
 
 
The war has started 
 
 
Now listen to the bombs in the 
background 
 
The colors of the explosions are red 
 
Smart bombs are really precise, and 
always hitting something 
 
 
In Vietnam, bridges held for a long 
time. Here something is getting hit 
every time. 
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The start of war is a source of anticipation rather than one of fear for John Holliman 
for instance, one of the reporters in Baghdad, who says: “We are a little excited as I 
am sure is obvious,” later adding “our editor got a cold, you can probably hear her 
cough in the background.”217 A prolonged imaginary countdown creates suspense, 
one that all the reporters refer to and are waiting for. one that all the reporters refer to 
and are waiting for. The war becomes an inevitability thus preordaining a future 
within the present time of war liveness. The performativity of the global now of war is 
dependent on the construct of a global us of viewers, which is an imaginary and 
dystopic possibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
217 “As it Happened, the Gulf war on CNN (part 1),”accessed March, 11 2009, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlC60Kef9Mg 
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    Fig. 39. “Maps of Baghdad on CNN,”(1991)218 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
218 “As it Happened, The Gulf War on CNN (part 1) accessed May 4, 2011 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlC60Kef9Mg”. 
The global viewer’s eyes 
are told where to look 
from: The high angle, 
the technostrategic, the 
seeing from nowhere. A 
distant viewer is 
immortal when s/he 
watches war. There 
seems to be an 
underlying negotiation 
of mortality and 
immortality through live 
war. Some die while 
others watch from a high 
angle. Only debates on 
whose mortality is being 
negotiated by whom, 
who is at risk and who is 
not can relocate the 
subject of live war 
images back to the 
materiality of war. 
When the military shows 
global viewers how 
others die, it is also 
showing viewers how 
they will get killed if the 
term globe really means 
the whole globe, and if 
the term citizens, really 
includes all the citizens 
on that globe. 
 
 
 
Watchi
ng the 
news 
the 
central 
railway 
station 
is 
visible. 
Next to 
the 
yellow 
circle is 
where 
our 
house 
it. Does 
its 
clarity 
on the 
map 
mean  
that our 
house is 
a 
target? 
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The pre-selection of the satellite view serves to reveal sites of attack from a military 
technostrategic view that needs interpretation by war experts. The translatability of 
satellite views is linked to some experts and not others, limiting the intelligibility of 
the views to the supposed transparency of the military. For Parks, satellite views are 
devoid of meaning but they acquire meaning from interpretation. Writing from an 
embodied epistemology Parks proposes satellite witnessing as a practice to be 
employed by citizens to demilitarize the satellite view: “Satellite witnessing is a 
critical practice that refuses to accept the satellite image as an omniscient view, a 
strategic map, a final perspective and instead appropriates its abstractions to generate 
further interrogation, discussion, and inquiry.”219 For instance by going to the places 
that satellites purport to display, a critical enquiry can ensue and reveal the omissions 
inherent in the military gaze. According to Lisa Parks, live war allowed for the media 
and the military gaze to join: “The Persian Gulf War has actualized a set of synoptic 
relations between the military machine and the television camera, making their gaze 
one and the same.”220 The fusion of the media and the military into one gaze makes 
any live war image a camouflage in the making, and watching television turns into 
watching a governmentally regulated view. 
 
“With whose blood were my eyes crafted?”221 Donna Haraway asks. The verb ‘to 
craft’ has two different meanings, namely to have a skill, and to deceive. Haraway’s 
violent but necessary question could then be rephrased: Do I remember how, when, 
and with what means (or with which technologies of vision, be it satellites or video 
cameras) my own eyes were crafted by war images? In light of this question, 
                                                
219 Lisa Parks, Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 
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220 Parks, Cultures in Orbit, 96. 
221 Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 585. 
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watching the first Gulf War broadcast crafted (perfected and deceived) people’s eyes 
with other people’s bloodshed. The first Gulf War aimed at teaching viewers how to 
wait for and to watch war with the help of reporters, anchors, and military personnel 
who served as interpreters of the images which by abstracting war removed the 
possibility of empathy and therefore revolt from distant viewers. All viewers are 
framed by live war images in Judith Butler’s observation of how ‘being framed’ also 
means to “to be subject to a con, to a tactic by which evidence is orchestrated to make 
a false accusation appear true.”222 The tactic of live war relies on the presumed guilt 
of the ‘accused’ who in this case appears to be Saddam Hussein but who in the 
broadcast is the whole city of Baghdad. Whoever believes the con is being framed. 
The attempt at highlighting the precariousness of Baghdadis only occurs, 
exceptionally, through the reports of Bernard Shaw, who relocates the reporting to the 
local experience of war. He mentions having been hiding with the personnel of the 
hotel, adding that the attack is unprecedented and will probably shake the psyches of 
Baghdadis. 223 In a later instance Shaw says that Baghdadis are: “praying for fog, it 
was very thick they couldn’t come in this morning, and so I know they must be 
praying for fog.” Peter Arnett responds that fog has no power over the technology of 
the Americans and the Allied forces, effectively turning the United States military 
technology into an invincible power: “We mentioned earlier its strategic bombing, 
these American planes know exactly where they are going and what they are going to 
hit, and fog isn’t going to help anyone if they are on gun sites or bombsites.” Arnett 
supports the notion of strategic bombing as though he is part of the army personnel, 
failing to contemplate the notion that civilians do not wish to be bombed at all, neither 
                                                
222 Butler, Frames of War, 11. 
223“As it Happened, the Gulf war on CNN (Part 5)”accessed June 1, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRoEiqDz_LM  
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strategically nor in any other way, and may very well die accidentally. Such a 
statement relies on the technological faith that ‘smart bombs’ only hit desired targets, 
and small mistakes or collateral damage, is part of the risk. That risk is not taken by 
the ones bombing the city, nor by the reporters whose location is known to the army 
and who keep reiterating the hotel they are in has bullet-proof windows. Reporters 
who are on the ground are forced to see/report/produce material proof of war from the 
angle that is an extension of the technostrategic frame. Their access to the locale and 
their presence in Baghdad becomes stifling to their journalistic aims and serves a 
military frame that purports that bombs are smart and only hit their targets. If the 
opposite turns out to be true, if civilians are killed, or if it later emerges that some of 
the ‘live’ scenes were not live but staged, the controversies that are raised become 
centred around the blatant lies that media broadcasts to its own citizens. As necessary 
as the right of citizens is to know the truth, the right to not be bombed should precede 
that right, and debating media constructs while remaining removed from the 
materiality of war’s effects cannot repair the injustices resulting from waging war.   
 
The first Gulf War was simulated to appear like a real conflict between two enemy 
forces but when in fact it was not, according to Baudrillard in his polemic book The 
Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1995). As a critique of the virtualization of war on live 
television Baudrillard’s proposition is that simulation has reached a point, whereby 
the virtual war has eradicated the real war. Divided into three segments (The Gulf 
War will not take place, The Gulf War: is it really taking place? The Gulf War did not 
take place) and written during the standoff and as the Gulf War proceeded, the essays 
in the book were published in Libération in 1991. Baudrillard follows the CNN live 
war format of the “real war” where it is always “now” and “here” in his text using his 
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own words to play on the formulation of the live, and the real in war and to deny that 
a war was taking place at all. At once critiqued as a nihilist, whose writing is 
fragmented and hard to critique, and hailed as a misunderstood philosopher, 
Baudrillard achieved great notoriety after this book. “Simulation is the great theme in 
Baudrillard’s writing,” Chris Rojek wrote, “His definition of culture as ‘the collective 
sharing of simulacra’ reduces truth and reality to a language game. Image makers 
have opened up Pandora’s box of illusions, treatments and enhancements which have 
obliterated the division between reality and unreality.”224 What is real and what is not 
real is not a subject of debate according to Baudrillard, for whom everything is being 
constructed as a semblance of the real for the viewers. The Gulf War Did Not Take 
Place may have shaken the complacency of those who watched the First Gulf War as 
a spectacle, but the passage of time makes it appear as a mimic of the very spectacle it 
critiques. Baudrillard’s book is best read while watching CNN’s live broadcast 
images of the First Gulf War revealing the image/language clash it enacts. Having 
written it at the exact time when war was being waged, the book reflects on the lies of 
the live images engaging with the now, and acts as a verbal duel to the audio-visual 
war liveness, or simulation as Baudrillard sees the war. However despite the fact that 
a military image of an exposed field of vision, appears like mere lines on a television 
screen or an abstracted simulated view that is everywhere and nowhere at once, this 
visibility is part of the military’s conception of sights as sites of attack that activate 
material realities and imagined spaces that block the visualizations of other material 
effects of war.  
 
                                                
224 Chris Rojek, and Bryan Stanley Turner, eds. Forget Baudrillard? (London: Routledge, 1993), xi 
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225 “2/227 Apaches-Desert Storm,” accessed October 10, 2013, http://vimeo.com/4593872. 
The abstraction of some 
computerized live Gulf war images 
lulls one’s vision. Their violence 
resides in a semblance of 
peacefulness. Lunar, and devoid of 
sound they activate the fantasy of 
walking on the moon, and recreate the 
combined graininess and quietness of 
early silent cinema.  
 
When they are exposed with the 
sound the hors-champs becomes 
audible as the operator’s calculations 
of targets, and they change. Their 
violence becomes evident. People’s 
eyes are still young and blinded by 
the decoding process of virtual 
images. Crying with empathy at these 
images can occur when the decoding 
no longer requires a military officer. 
The decoding authority hints at to the 
intention of the image.  
 
Who is the interpreter? Who is the 
framer? What capacitates vision, or 
lack of? And who distributed the 
frames? Who and what is being 
abstracted and by whom? Could this 
be me I am looking at through the 
camera/eye of the military in my own 
living-room? 
 
 
 188 
“Virtual space”, Haraway writes “seems to be the negation of real space; the domains 
of SF (as science fiction, and the speculative/factual) seem the negation of earthly 
regions. But perhaps this negation is the real illusion.”226 It is in toying with the 
possibility that the virtual is not the negation of the real that Haraway sees 
multiplicities of knowledges emerging. For Paul Virilio just as the virtual substitutes 
the real, the real is in danger of disappearing: “We are entering a world where there 
won't be one but two realities, just like we have two eyes or hear bass and treble tones, 
just like we now have stereoscopy and stereophony: there will be two realities: the 
actual, and the virtual.”227 Virilio’s suggestion only functions if reality is truly one 
reality, and if so then whose reality is the reality that determines what is real?  If 
every reality is the result of singular situated perspectives engaged in communication 
with one another, then reality appears to be too large a term to encompass the realities 
that every reality entails. Only a perception of reality as being one consensual reality 
can indeed be threatened by virtuality, eradicated and taken over by its copy. But if 
reality is the result of multiple realities then virtuality can be a tool to help enact these 
multiplicities. Virtuality for Haraway is the way to forge connections outside of a 
worldview as having one solid reality, a view in which simulation and virtuality 
enable the formulation of unheard and unseen‘realities’. 
 
Baudrillard’s critique of the first Gulf live War broadcast had references to the 
inexistence of the ‘real war’ such as: “how is it that a real war did not generate real 
images?” 228 and “We have neither the need of nor the taste for real drama or real 
                                                
226 Haraway, “The Promise of Monsters,” 106 
227 Louise Wilson, “Cyberwar, God And Television: Interview with Paul Virilio,” eds., Arthur and 
Marilouise Kroker, accessed August 11, 2012, www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=62. 
228 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 82. 
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war”229 and “War is no longer what it used be,”230 “our virtual has overtaken the 
actual.”231 For Baudrillard the un-reality of war resides in the knowledge that the 
advent of nuclear weapons implies that only two unequal powers can confront each 
other, and therefore whatever is called war is won in advance by the stronger party, 
and therefore what took place on the live television screen was not war. As a show of 
power, a spectacle of force, a staging of the real and a staging of what a post-modern 
war should look like, the first Gulf War was an example of simulation. Yet presence 
in Baghdad was not only linked to actuality or to the virtualization of the city. By 
limiting the analysis of the event to its militarized virtuality, Baudrillard then 
proposes the disappearance of the real. Ian Almond, who is critical of Baudrillard’s 
book, wonders whether “Baudrillard could ever have written a book called 9/11 did 
not take place, or the second world war never happened,” adding that “even if the 
book were written in mockery of the western media’s complete imagization of the war, 
one inevitable side-effect of such a gesture is that familiar orientalist refrain – that of 
the east as a dream, a mirage, an illusion.”232 Admittedly, another reading is that 
Baudrillard purposefully arrests the debate on the representation of war, and on the 
surface of the frame, using language to engender shock and to reveal how live war 
itself recreates orientalist notions by imagining distant others as caricatures. In a text 
that is clearly meant to shock, I wondered if it could be perceived as a détournement 
of existing racist notions (such as his calling Arabs ‘rug dealers’, and his mentioning 
of the impotent Arab masses). However this was only achieved in the form of the text, 
and not in its implications for the real lives in Baghdad. In other words, by taking the 
televised liveness of the Gulf War and transferring it into a linguistic representation, 
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231 Baudrillard, The Gulf War did not take place, 27. 
232  Almond Ian, The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to 
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Baudrillard managed to deconstruct CNN’s claim that ‘this was war’, but failed to 
turn its visuals upside down maintaining a cynical reiteration of the images: 
“Strangely, a war without victims does not seem like a real war but rather the 
prefiguration of an experimental, blank war, or a war even more inhuman because it is 
without human losses.”233 Clearly writing in jest of the image and in mimicry of its lie, 
Baudrillard’s language game appears to be taken over by the visual which tricks it to 
reflect the same image all over again through words. Whereas live war as an image 
moves on to give its place to a new live war, the words in Baudrillard’s book remain 
confirming that which the military officials wanted to say, namely that there was no 
death in that war. Baudrillard’s soundness of statement as a critique of simulation, is 
one-sided for on the receiving end of simulated smart bombs and air raids death was 
still death as Derrida writes: “This [the manipulation of information/that in the end 
this was lived only through the simulacrum] should not make us forget and the event 
is unforgettable – that there were deaths, hundreds of thousands of deaths, on one side 
of the front and not the other, and that this war took place,” adding “we should not 
forget that these deaths are each time, by the hundreds of thousands, singular deaths. 
Each time, there is a singularity to murder. It happens, and no process, no logic of the 
simulacrum can make us forget this. For along this process, we must also think 
singularity.”234 For Derrida, the deconstruction of the format of transmission and its 
artifactuality took over the event in Baudrillard’s analysis. By ascertaining that the 
war took place, Derrida refuses to engage in Baudrillard’s language game while 
insisting on keeping the format of liveness and the event/reality of war separate, and 
therefore separable from presence. In his call to remember the singularity of every 
death Derrida cautions his readers to remain aware of that which is irreversible 
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through the act of waging war, namely death, which only happens once every time it 
happens, and is lived only once by every single human being. 
 
Although both Virilio and Baudrillard are highly critical of live war and they reveal 
how the ‘information war’ and the ‘military war’ are bound to one another, they both 
engage with live war from a place of distance while proposing no alternatives in a 
vision of the world that is bound to implode both through information excess and 
through technological acceleration. “Virilio’s lasting contributions and I would 
suggest that the power of his work resides in his sustained interrogation of the 
virulence and power of military technology,” Douglas Kellner writes, “but his works’ 
limitation in turn results from using the model of military technology to interrogate 
technology as such and particularly the new information technologies.” 235  The 
plurality of the uses of technology is eluded when Virilio’s model is confined to its 
military uses. The formulation of an elsewhere, in Haraway’s sense of the term, as a 
place where binaries and categories can be traversed through fictional and science-
fictional universes that pave the way for a different siting/sighting, could not be 
effected in a critique that sees the military cyborg as overpowering both the visual 
field as well as the information systems. 
 
Haraway’s conception of the cyborg can be contrasted to Virilio’s and Baudrillard’s 
notions of technology. Although the military has produced cyborgs, Haraway 
proposes that they can be “unfaithful to their military origins.”236 Cyborgs that end up 
producing unlikely configurations and connectedness with others can be liberated 
                                                
235 Douglas Kellner, “Virilio, War and Technology: Some Critical Reflections,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 16, no. 5-6 (1999): 122, accessed July 11, 2013, http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/16/5-6/103. 
236 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 149. 
 192 
from the narratives of war as a dualism (one god/one devil, one reality/one virtuality, 
one us/ one them) and from doomsday views where humans are imagined as headed 
towards apocalyptic disasters. These configurations began to appear online through 
personal blogs where the space of co-liveness is continuously reflected as part of the 
quotidian of war. By way of example, during the invasion of Iraq (2003) Iraqi blogger 
Salam Pax wrote: “We are counting the hours from the moment one of the news 
channels report that the B52s have left their airfield. It takes them around 6 hours to 
get to Iraq. On the first day of the bombing it worked precisely.”237 Raed’s blog 
entries reveal how as a local Baghdadi civilian, his engagement with live war in 2003 
is inseparable from his quotidian. As a means of survival and of a limited response-
ability interpreting the live war news by counting the hours it takes B52 bomber 
planes to arrive to Baghdad, while he is also on the receiving end of air raids, shows 
war as neither a spectacle, nor infotainment, nor simulation nor virtuality. Live war 
images become like international police agents of war (in W.J.T. Mitchell’s use of the 
term) who turn the local citizens into anticipators of violence that will be perpetrated 
on their own bodies and cities. The performativity of actuality reveals that 
international artifactualism normalizes power structures. In other words, and in this 
example, the United States can and does tell Arab citizens how and when it will send 
B52s to bomb their cities. The reception of this live report (which is quite similar to 
the shipment of weapons I elaborated upon in my introduction) in the presence of 
every individual space is that which gives it meaning. Raed reflects on the 
multiplicities of accessible and available angles of live war, revealing the manner in 
which a situated local Baghdadi civilian always juggles with multiple sources of 
information, while constantly examining them in light of his daily life and fears, and 
                                                
237 “Where is Raed?” Accessed February 11, 2013:  
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sorrows:  “The images we saw on TV last night (not Iraqi, jazeera-BBC-Arabiya) 
were terrible,” Raed writes in another one of his entries, “The whole city looked as if 
it were on fire. The only thing I could think of was ‘why does this have to happen to 
Baghdad?’ As one of the buildings I really love went up in a huge explosion I was 
close to tears.”238 Raed’s blog neither claims a universal truth, nor to be representative 
of Iraqis, but rather to write of the individuality and complexity of his daily life in war. 
Exiting from the confines of a military perspective, his blog is not about the truth or 
falsity of competing live war frames (on Al-Jazeera, and CNN, etc.) but a reflection 
on its routine inscriptions in his daily life. Co-liveness appears in Raed’s blog as a 
potential space of excavation for the drafting of a counter-memory against the 
epistemic exclusions of militarized frames and towards the possibility of accessing a 
situated questioning of the imposed insertion of live war into the quotidian space of 
those who are under attack, and of those who watch from afar. The necessity to 
formulate, imagine, produce, and enact different conceptions of audiences is linked to 
the situatedness of the screens. If the preponderance of blogs, personal websites, and 
twitter feeds, etc., obscure the factual from the fictional, the real from the unreal, and 
the true from the untrue what they also reveal is that the process of image making is 
inseparable from space-time-material enactments. 
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4.4 Tele-vision 
 
.  
   Fig.41. “Sanayeh Garden TV”  
 
 
No it’s not mine. I didn’t run away from my house holding my T.V.  
in my two arms. I borrowed it from a friend, to see what’s happening.  
It’s hooked to the generator, over there… 
And you? Which T.V. station are you filming this for? 
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Conclusion 
 
In this practice-based thesis presented as an installation and a text, I have articulated a 
situated conception of distances in my reflections around live war in order to support 
my thesis argument. My argument is that co-liveness is inherent to experiencing and 
watching live war in the Arab world, but has been absent from critical scholarship 
where the conception of the viewer of live-war is that of a distant viewer. I have 
defined co-liveness as the combined space generated between the live mediatization 
of war on various satellite channels, and the embodied experience of war.  
 
In the first Chapter, I contextualized my research in light of my experience of filming 
during the Lebanon July war (2006), as well as continuously watching live war where 
access to various satellites versions of live war exacerbated a sense of impotence, and 
made me question the function of images during war. Through my research question I 
aimed to find practice methods that would capacitate reflections on the connectedness 
between live time and real time in war, to counter the mediatized live view of war as a 
spectacle of destruction and to question – in form and in content – the limits inherent 
in representing war. Donna Haraway’s epistemology of situated knowledges inspired 
a continuous excavation of a situated and limited view where the materiality of the 
body takes precedence rather than an all-seeing objective and abstract account. By 
way of reflection (as the same, displaced) and diffraction (as a record of interference 
patterns) both the text and the installation capacitated an articulation of co-liveness as 
an experiential and material space. 
 
In Chapter 2, the process of editing my first sequences necessitated the excavation of  
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my dailies where live war and real war had turned into digital images where meanings, 
emotions, and narratives could be recreated on a computer screen in London.  
Abandoning any attempt to ‘historicize’ the July 2006 War on Lebanon, I attempted 
instead to capture the essence of my quotidian life in my grandmother’s house. My 
colleagues’ non-recognition of war in my sequences made me question whether only 
violent and/or spectacular images of explosions are recognizable as ‘war from a 
distance’. Through Derrida’s definition of international artifactuality defined as the 
centralization of the performativity of the real, and contemplating his proposition to 
always separate ‘presence’ from ‘actuality’, I perceived the hors-champs of the 
materiality of the TV set as a constitutive meaning-making space of live war. Whether 
co-liveness is recognized (as the memory of turning off the TV where live war is 
broadcast but war still raging on through the night) or not recognized (as the memory 
of turning off the TV, and live war ceasing and continuing with one’s plans) depended 
on presence, rather than on actuality. My exchange with my colleagues left me with 
wondering what counts as a recognizable image of war and whether a geographical 
distance from war is perceived as imbricated in the conception of live war. Noting 
that it was through co-presence that the different conceptions of distance to war 
diffracted into different opinions, I decided to maintain co-presence as part of my 
practice.  
 
In my audio-visual, textual installation entitled “fragments” presented three times in 
the course of my research, [The first time in Philadelphia at U-Penn university (2010) 
and the next two times in London at Goldsmiths University College (in 2012 and in  
2013)], co-presence meant remaining in the space with the visitors and gathering 
together to articulate our different conceptions of watching war. Inspired by Guy 
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Debord’s détournement as the reuse of existing material in a new order, Jacques 
Derrida’s questioning of the limits between the parergon (as the frame) and the ergon 
(as the work) and Donna Haraway’s articulation as a means to join unlikely elements 
through diffraction, the space of the installation space was divided into fluid 
enclosures that question the act of framing as a presence/absence, and as a meaning-
making trajectory enacted by visitors’ choices.  
 
In Chapter 3, I searched for what counts as an image of war. I researched older wars 
in order to understand the imaginary connections proposed between one war and the 
previous by politicians who view war as transhistorical. Searching for images that 
count as war through the Crimean War, the First World War and the Second World 
War revealed that cultural production of the knowledge of war is not external to the 
epistemological struggles among polyvalent interpretations of war. Anti-war 
representations for example often remained hidden from the public for years. 
Following Foucault’s advice to look for how operators of domination inform 
power/knowledge, the implementation of censorship laws in war appeared to have 
constantly regulated the production of knowledge about war, ensuring death is never 
revealed. All images of war appeared like camouflaged double agents (as W.J.T. 
Mitchell writes) that meant one thing in the past but could change allegiances as years 
went by to mean another and to either reveal the multiples meanings of an image of 
war. Simultaneously, the capacity to communicate the embodied experience of war 
diminishes as it is directly related to the technology of the weapons that distanced 
soldiers from their targets. Through air space control, the end of the Second World 
War brings a technostrategic discourse as Carol Cohn termed it. Cohn’s exploration of 
technostrategy as a language that is only concerned with a disembodied aerial view 
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and that combines strategy and technology leads me to recognize it as a frame of 
reference in live war. Expressions such as collateral damage, and smart bombs, etc., 
initially coined in nuclear strategists’ labs have become common usage in live war. 
The use of transhistoricity is then explored as the affective facet of technostrategy. 
Only concerned with strategy, politicians such as George Bush (father and son) have 
employed transhistoricity to sift through past wars to frame contemporary wars as 
simplified myths of an on-going American soldier’s story of loss and redemption. The 
recognition of live war appears to stem from technostrategy, as the aerial distance 
between the weapon’s operator and his target, and transhistoricity as the affective (yet 
imaginary) distance two wars that are historically and geographically unrelated (the 
First Gulf War and the Vietnam War for e.g.). 
 
In the last Chapter, Following Foucault’s advice to “return to the origin” and look for 
foundational omissions, I analyse the first Gulf War on CNN in 1990-1991, where the 
production of the meaning of live war was actualized within a set of stylistic 
approaches that led to critiques (war as a spectacle, as infotainment, as Virtuality) that 
became part of the discursive practice of live war. Although highly critical of the 
technostrategic frame, critics of the first Gulf War CNN broadcast such as Paul 
Virilio, and Jean Baudrillard do not theorize the local conception of war as an 
embodied danger, and as a co-live space. Inserting performative/diffractive readings 
of fictional propositions that respond to the critique’s omissions by evoking co-
liveness I attempt to write the missing component in the analysis of live war in the 
margins of the text. 
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Postface and a situation 
 
When I began my thesis, I was searching for a regenerative practice that would enable 
me to communicate with the video images that I filmed, and the photographs I took 
during 2006 July war, articulations of war beyond its spectacular view. The 
paralyzing impact of war images and their sheer excess coupled with the materiality 
of war left me with no space to imagine new configurations, new stories. Through 
diffractive enactments of multiple presence(s), the aim of image-making became the 
site to question how sightings (of different representations of war) enable completely 
different materialities. Instead of seeking out the ‘real’ in images of war, this research 
has taught me how to question how the creation of the real manifests itself in images 
and in words and how performativity is continuously enacted in the domain of critical 
analysis. “Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything 
(including Material bodies) into words,” Barad writes, “on the contrary, 
performativity is precisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language 
to determine what is real.” 239  Performativity within this thesis allows for the 
contestation of the equally excessive power given to images to determine what is real. 
Within the combined playful linguistic and visual performativities, the real as 
elusiveness, movement, communication, and exchange produced regenerative 
possibilities within my practice.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
239 Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity,”802 
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 How I see, when I see, from where I see, why my seeing  is capacitated, who gets to have more than one point of view    
 Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders?  Who interprets the visual field?240   
 
fig.42                                                                                         241 
                                                
240 Haraway, “Situated knowledges,” 587. 
241 Pete Souza, Situation Room, Time Photos, 2011 
 
This  is  an  image 
of  war.  In  the 
hors‐champs  of 
the  photograph 
is a screen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  success  of 
the  photograph 
resides  in  what 
one imagines the 
ones  who  are 
allowed  to  see, 
see.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Its title  ‘situation 
room’  has  no 
bearing  to  Guy 
Debord  although 
it  may  be  a 
situation, and  a  
détournement  of 
the  spectacle  of 
war.  Here  the 
point  is  to  no 
longer reveal the 
spectacle  of  war 
but  its  official 
spectators. 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